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ABSTRACT 
The digital environment is increasingly organised to transform aspects of people’s 
lives into data in order to make use of those data in the production of economic value. 
Data activism has emerged as one response to the resulting asymmetries in data 
usage and distribution. Adopting the concept of collective imagination, this thesis 
investigates imaginaries about an alternative data economy developed in data 
activism. Based on the data studies literature, a view of the dominant data economy 
imaginary is first constructed. It consists of collectively shared notions about how 
the data economy currently functions and ought to function. Based on four original 
publications, alternative imaginaries are compared with the dominant imaginary. 
The aim is to examine the alternative imaginaries and their underpinnings and to 
scrutinize the desirability of the data futures they promote. 
Empirical research in this thesis has focused on MyData, a data governance 
initiative striving for a more central role for people in the data economy. The thesis 
identifies two alternative imaginaries developed in the context of the initiative: the 
market imaginary and the citizen imaginary. Both build on the notion of data agency, 
that is, providing people with new capabilities to act in relation to personal data. The 
market imaginary is based on viewing data agency as market choice, and relies on 
the market for data governance. Individuals are imagined to act in data markets to 
improve their lives, making data serve their personal ends. The citizen imaginary 
foregrounds collective data governance and the common good. Here, data agency is 
imagined as citizens’ collective capability to participate in the processes that 
determine how and for what purposes their data are used. 
This thesis discusses how the market imaginary is the better positioned of the 
two to expand beyond data activism; it resonates with notions about technology as 
the enabler of individual choice, leverages existing regulatory instruments, and is 
aligned with commercial views of the value of data. Based on this research, however, 
the reliance on market agency appears as a precarious starting point for a desirable 
data future. The practical implication is to encourage data activists to experiment on 
collective data governance and on new ways to make data valuable alongside the 
market-oriented ones. The implication for data activism research is that identifying 
imaginaries underpinning activist initiatives can aid with shaping pathways toward 
a desirable digital environment. 
KEYWORDS: collective imagination, data activism, data agency, data citizenship, 
data economy, data governance, MyData, social imaginaries  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Digitaalisessa ympäristössä ihmisten elämästä tuotetaan dataa tavoitteena talou-
dellisen arvon luominen. Data-aktivismi on yksi reaktio datan käytön ja jakautu-
misen epäsymmetrioihin. Tässä työssä tarkastellaan kollektiivisen mielikuvituksen 
käsitteen avulla data-aktivismissa tuotettuja vaihtoehtoisia datatalouden mielikuvas-
toja, imaginaareja. Sosiaalitieteellisen datatutkimuksen avulla rakennetaan näkymä 
dominoivaan datatalouden imaginaariin. Tätä verrataan neljään tutkimusjulkaisuun 
pohjautuen data-aktivismissa tuotettuihin vaihtoehtoisiin datatalouden imaginaa-
reihin. Tavoitteena on paitsi eritellä vaihtoehtoisia imaginaareja, myös tarkastella 
niiden edistämien tulevaisuuden datatalouden muotojen tavoiteltavuutta. 
Väitöskirjan empiirisenä tutkimuskohteena on MyData, datan hallintaa koskeva 
aloite, joka pyrkii muovaamaan ihmisille keskeisemmän rooliin tulevaisuuden 
datataloudessa. Tutkimuksen perusteella aloitteessa vaikuttaa kaksi datatalouden 
imaginaaria, jotka ovat sekä toisilleen että dominoivalle imaginaarille vaihtoehtoisia. 
Molemmat nojaavat ajatukseen ihmisten lisääntyvästä toimijuudesta suhteessa heitä 
koskevaan dataan. Markkinaimaginaari nojaa markkinoihin datan hallintameka-
nismina. Tällöin toimijuus kiteytyy valintoihin markkinoilla: ihmisten ajatellaan 
tekevän valintoja, joissa data palvelee heidän henkilökohtaista etuaan. Kansalais-
imaginaari nojaa ajatukseen kollektiivisesta datan hallinnasta ja datasta saatavista 
yhteisistä hyödyistä. Toimijuus datan suhteen kytkeytyy tällöin kollektiivisiin 
prosesseihin, jotka ohjaavat datan käyttöä ja käytön päämääriä. 
Tutkimuksen perusteella markkinaimaginaarilla on näistä kahdesta paremmat 
edellytykset laajentua data-aktivismin ulkopuolelle: se hyödyntää olemassa olevaa 
sääntelyä, pohjautuu vakiintuneisiin käsityksiin datan taloudellisesta arvosta ja 
korostaa yksilön valinnanvapautta tukevaa teknologiaa. Tutkimuksen valossa 
luottaminen markkinatoimijuuteen yksinään vaikuttaa epävarmalta pohjalta tule-
vaisuuden datataloudelle. Työn käytännön implikaatio on rohkaista data-aktivismia 
kehittämään kollektiivisia datan hallinnan tapoja ja arvonmuodostuksen muotoja 
markkinavalinnan ohella. Työn implikaatio data-aktivismin tutkimukselle on 
osoittaa, että data-aktivismin taustalla vaikuttavien imaginaarien tunnistaminen 
auttaa kartoittamaan toivottavaa tulevaisuuden digitaalista ympäristöä. 
ASIASANAT: data-aktivismi, datakansalaisuus, datan hallinta, datatalous, data-
toimijuus, kollektiivinen mielikuvitus, MyData, sosiaaliset imaginaarit   
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Preface 
It can be quite difficult to pinpoint when an idea, such as an idea for a thesis, 
emerged. Luckily datafication, which I will properly define later, can help. 
Researchers not only meticulously document their own work by means of notes, 
annotations, memos and research plans. Nowadays, mundane parts of the research 
process also automatically produce metadata. Reference management software 
shows when an article was discovered, and time stamps of annotations reveal when 
it was read. The forensics made possible by these data traces made it surprisingly 
easy to track down when the questions addressed in this thesis started taking form. 
I began working on this thesis in the summer and early autumn of 2014 at the 
Helsinki Institute for Information Technology when I joined a multi-disciplinary 
research consortium doing research on data and knowledge work. I had already been 
exposed to celebratory accounts on online platforms and big data (e.g., Anderson, 
2008; Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). While reading for the project, I 
encountered more critical literature on the topic. Based on Mendeley time stamps, 
these included work by Mark Andrejevic (2014), danah boyd and Kate Crawford 
(2012), Tarleton Gillespie (2010) and José van Dijck (2014). 
I was also affected by the Finnish discussion on individuals’ rights to their 
“digital footprint” (e.g., Kuittinen & Ruckenstein, 2014; Pitkänen, 2014). Around 
that time, a working group of Finnish open data proponents, some of whom were my 
new colleagues, prepared a report for a Finnish Ministry (Poikola et al., 2014). It 
described MyData, a data governance concept aiming at what was (and is) imagined 
as a more sustainable, human-centric digital environment built on the understanding 
that people, firms, and society at large would benefit if individuals were equipped 
with means to control their personal data and would thus become more active 
consumers and participants. 
As reflected in the first iterations of the research plan for this thesis, I was 
interested in what I considered the personal data economy – that is, in 
conceptualising the collection and use of personal data in terms of economic activity, 
including value creation, production, exchange, consumption, prosumption and 
distribution. Inspired by the data studies literature, discussions on individuals’ rights 
in the digital environment, and new models for organising the production and use of 
 ix 
personal data, initial research questions started taking form. Are people becoming 
economic actors toward their data in some new sense? What does that imply for the 
data economy? What could participation in the data economy mean? In addition to 
the Finnish MyData initiative, do others have similar aims? Later, after a more 
thorough plunge into the data studies literature, more critical questions began 
emerging: Is this something that we should strive for? Paraphrasing the title of boyd 
and Crawford’s influential 2012 article, what are the critical questions for my data? 
This thesis gathers together five years of work that started with these questions. 
The original research is reported in peer-reviewed and published articles, and this 
book serves as an introduction and contextualisation of that research, a summary of 
its findings, and a means to draw the findings together to answer a set of broader 
research questions. In addition to datafication and data economy, key concepts of 
this thesis include data activism and collective imagination. The emerging stream of 
research on data activism helped to conceptualise MyData and similar initiatives as 
data activism in the context of the data economy. The literature on collective 
imagination offered an overall analytical framework to connect the original 
publications. The title of the thesis is based on a small trope in the literature on 
collective imagination and owes to Robin Mansell’s 2012 book Imagining the 
Internet, which also has an overall framework somewhat similar to mine. 
A research aim motivating this work was to better understand the empirical field 
of data activism. I was from the beginning both sympathetic and critical toward the 
data activists’ aims and approaches. I strived to engage with the field in a manner 
that would be committed to a critical scholarly position but that could simultaneously 
be constructive and offer something for data activism. This resulted in a research 
approach of taking different engagement positions in relation to the field. This turned 
out to be a fruitful research strategy, even if at times it necessarily became a 
balancing act. 
A final note on the nature of this work – the starting point of data activism 
examined in this thesis is to make better, not to start from scratch. They are not the 
activists who take to the figurative streets of the digital environment to smash data 
capitalism; rather, they intervene in the prevailing data arrangements, aiming to 
make them serve their own ends. This thesis is about critically examining both the 
data economy and data activism, aiming to produce scholarly knowledge as well as 
to improve data activism (which, in turn, tries to improve the data economy). This 
means that the thesis, like the data activists it examines, does not smash but rather 
tries to assemble; it operates “within,” hopefully helping to intervene and improve. 
x 
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1 Introduction 
The digital environment is increasingly organised to transform aspects of people’s 
lives into data, and the purpose of producing data is often to make use of those data 
in the production of economic value. This has created an inherently asymmetric 
situation in terms of data usage and distribution. Some actors, such as digital 
platform companies, are well-positioned and well-equipped to produce and use data. 
Other actors, such as small firms or the public sector, might be less capable of 
making use of data. People whom the data concern fundamentally lack the means to 
make data serve their own ends. 
This thesis investigates data activism that has emerged as a response to the 
asymmetries of data usage and distribution in the context of the data economy. The 
focus is on imaginaries about the data economy, that is, collectively held notions 
about how the data economy works and ought to work. The thesis compares 
alternative data economy imaginaries developed in data activism with the dominant 
imaginary about the data economy and with each other. 
Our data future remains uncertain and unknowable. How the future is imagined 
to unfold and how current actions are imagined to affect the future nevertheless make 
a difference, as they have consequences in the present. The dominant imaginary 
about the data economy affects the development of data technologies and the data 
arrangements in which they are embedded. Compared to this, data activism, its 
imaginaries about an alternative data economy, and its alternative data 
infrastructures and data arrangements represent a possibility for change. This is to 
say that imaginaries about the societal and economic outcomes of new data 
technologies affect the technologies that are developed, delimit how they are used, 
and shape the data arrangements in which these technologies and their use are 
embedded. Imaginaries have implications, making data economy imaginaries – both 
dominant and alternative – a relevant research topic. 
This thesis consists of a synopsis part and four original research publications. 
This introductory chapter starts with describing the broader context of the data 
economy and datafication and then proceeds to introduce other central concepts of 
the thesis: data activism and collective imagination. It also lays out the research 
approach, research questions, and the empirical context of the thesis. 
Tuukka Lehtiniemi 
2 
1.1 The data economy 
Celebratory and more critical accounts of the contemporary digital economy agree 
on at least one issue; the creation of economic value relies heavily on the 
unprecedented visibility, knowability and calculability of actors and their behaviours 
and preferences. The digital economy’s new means of value creation are made 
possible by the transformation of aspects of people’s lives into quantified data and 
then turning those data into information and knowledge. Data on our everyday lives 
including consumption, work, health, mobility, communication, social interaction, 
and leisure, are increasingly captured, stored in databases, processed, analysed or 
mined, shared, assessed, and acted on in various ways by the state as well as 
commercial actors (Kitchin, 2014). Technological advancements such as digital 
platforms, sensors, internet connectivity of devices in personal, domestic, and 
industrial contexts, and tracking techniques online and in the physical world make 
possible the production of more and more data. In 2012, an industry estimate claimed 
that 90% of all existing data was produced within the two previous years, and around 
the same time it was estimated that the production of data will continue to increase 
around 40% annually (see Kennedy, 2018). It is difficult to fathom the volume of all 
data that humanity and its devices currently produce. A recent estimate puts the 
amount of data produced each day at 2.5 quintillion bytes (Marr, 2018), and it is 
estimated that in 2020 there will be 40 times as many bytes of data as there are stars 
in observable universe (Domo, 2019). 
This thesis concerns the economic system consisting of the production, 
distribution, exchange and utilisation of data by and about people. By way of a 
definition of what I am discussing, I will use the term personal data economy or, 
interchangeably, data economy to refer to the activities providing goods and services 
that serve human needs based on personal data. The data economy is here understood 
in terms of its function – activities intended to meet human needs (Elder-Vass, 2016: 
28–29; 2018). Understood in this way, the data economy does not refer only to 
production that meets market demand. While it includes such production, it also 
covers things that are provided without charge as well as things that fulfil the need 
for public goods. The focus is particularly on economic activities that concern 
personal data or, as they are sometimes called, user data or human subject data. I 
consider personal data as any data related to or resulting from actions by a person. 
More colloquially, personal data refers to data by and about people. 
For the discussion in this thesis, this definition of the data economy serves the 
purpose of simply delineating as the object of interest actions that produce goods and 
services that serve human needs and that are based on personal data. For more 
practical purposes such as producing measures and statistics about the data economy, 
the definition could lead to difficulties that would call for more specificity. These 
difficulties could concern both the data and the economy. For example, it might not 
Introduction 
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always be obvious whether data are related to an individual and should therefore be 
considered personal data. As another example of potential difficulties, specifying 
economic activity in terms of provisioning departs from definitions underlying 
macroeconomic statistical aggregates, which are typically defined in terms of market 
exchange. 
Nevertheless, numerical estimates of the economic value produced in the context 
of the data economy give some sense of the scale of the phenomenon. A 2013 
consultancy estimate puts the potential annual economic value of all digitally 
available information about individuals in Europe only at around 1,000 billion euros 
in 2020 (Boston Consulting Group, 2013). This figure attempts to include the 
economic value of these data to all parties involved, including organisations and 
consumers; in other words, it does not include just market activities, and it does not 
measure the value of data in the context of any currently measurable aggregate figure 
such as the gross domestic product. According to another estimate that specifically 
involves macroeconomic aggregates, the value of the European data economy in 
2017 was 335.5 billion euros, or 2.4% of the EU GDP (Cattaneo et al., 2018: 15). 
This figure attempts to include “the direct, indirect, and induced effects of the data 
market on the economy as a whole” (Cattaneo et al., 2018: 45) – that is, the 
contribution of both personal and non-personal data to the EU GDP. These figures 
and the reports describing the processes that go into producing them are, among other 
things, testimonials on the conceptual and practical difficulties of measuring the 
economic value of data. 
Another way to provide concrete context for the production of economic value 
involving personal data is to look at the data-producing and data-using companies 
and their revenue streams. At the end of 2018, the fourth-largest public corporation 
in the world, as measured by market capitalisation, was Google’s parent company 
Alphabet, and the sixth-largest was Facebook (Statista, 2019c). The annual revenues 
of Google and Facebook in 2018 were 136 billion and 56 billion USD, respectively. 
Advertising brought in around 86% of Google’s revenue and more than 98% of 
Facebook’s revenue (Statista, 2019a; 2019b). These firms have reached their 
positions in the advertising market by means of collecting personal data via 
commercial surveillance on their platforms and elsewhere, turning those data into 
predictions of users’ behaviour and interests and targeting advertisements according 
to these predictions (Rieder & Sire, 2014; West, 2019). Advertising revenues are 
therefore intimately connected to, and made possible by, personal data. To be clear, 
these figures contain the value of those personal data-based commodities that are 
exchanged on the market. They do not measure the economic value of data only; a 
number of other things in addition to data go into the production of value including 
inputs such as computational and storage resources, programme code, intellectual 
capital, and human labour as well as the creation of necessary market arrangements. 
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As a summary, the data economy and other key terms employed throughout this 
thesis are listed in Table 1.  
Table 1.  Summary of key terms employed in the thesis. 
Term Definition 
Collective 
imagination  
Imagination as social phenomenon. Produces imaginaries, or collective 
and normative beliefs of how the society functions and ought to function. 
Holds together communities and institutions but also produces visions of 
counterfactual futures and alternative social realities (Beckert, 2016; 
Taylor, 2004; Jasanoff, 2015a). 
Data activism 
Civic engagement and political action responding to the uneven 
distribution of data and data-related capabilities in datafied times 
(Baack, 2015; Kennedy, 2018; Milan & Gutiérrez, 2015; Milan & van der 
Velden, 2016). 
Data agency Capability to act intentionally in relation to the production and use of personal data. 
Data arrangements The practices of producing data, making use of data, and exploiting data for economic value as well as the policies governing these practices. 
Datafication The transformation of aspects of life into quantified data by means of information technology (van Dijck, 2014). 
Personal data Any data related to an individual, or resulting from actions of an individual. Data by and about people.  
(Personal) data 
economy 
The economic system that provides goods and services for human 
needs based on personal data. 
MyData 
A data governance initiative aiming at a more central role for people in 
the digital environment based on the understanding that people, 
companies, the public sector and society at large benefit if individuals 
control personal data (MyData Global, 2019; Poikola et al., 2015).  
1.2 Datafication 
The emergence of the data economy can be viewed through two related but 
conceptually distinct phenomena: digitalisation and datafication (Flyverbom et al., 
2019). In the conventional sense of the term, digital refers to anything involving 
information technology (Peters, 2016), and digitalisation refers to the employment 
of information technology to translate processes, inventories and records into digital 
format. Digitalisation allows for storing more information as well as processing 
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information more efficiently and can bring obvious performance enhancements to 
various organisational, commercial and societal processes. Digitalisation has also 
contributed to many aspects of changes often associated with globalisation; with it, 
“phenomena such as outsourcing, the deterritorialisation of production, and the 
emergence of virtual, amorphous value chains became possible and advantageous” 
(Flyverbom et al., 2019: 6). 
Rather than simply digitalisation of previously analogue things, the data 
economy is to a large extent the outcome of the other digital transformation, 
datafication. It is an outcome of a distinct capacity of information technology; in 
addition to simply automating things, it can create data on whatever it automates. 
One early exploration of this capacity was Shoshana Zuboff’s (1985, 1988) research 
on computer-mediated work in the 1980s. Zuboff conceptualised the data production 
capacity as the ability to “informate” and the outcome of informating as a 
comprehensive “textualisation” of the workplace, leading to the production of “the 
electronic text.” Datafication as a term is usually credited to Viktor Mayer-
Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier (2013: 78), who lamented the lack of a term for 
the contemporary development allowing the quantification of various things that had 
so far been largely qualitative. The authors proposed the term, stating that “to datafy 
a phenomenon is to put it in a quantified format so it can be tabulated and analysed.” 
José van Dijck (2014) introduced the term in the social scientific context of data 
studies by framing datafication as something that has been gradually normalised into 
a new paradigm for understanding sociality and social behaviour. For van Dijck, 
datafication refers to “the transformation of social action into online quantified data, 
thus allowing for real-time tracking and predictive analysis” (2014: 198). 
In practical terms, datafication now concerns a wide array of aspects of our lives. 
In the data economy, datafied aspects of people’s lives are raw materials to be 
extracted, mined for valuable insights, and turned into products. In social media and 
elsewhere, datafication turns friendship, emotional responses and interests into 
processable “algorithmic relations” (Bucher, 2012; van Dijck, 2014). It affects 
practices of clinical healthcare and self-care (Ruckenstein & Schüll, 2017), 
permeates the fields of online and physical retail (Turow et al., 2015b), makes 
possible personal profiling by means of location and mobility (Bellovin et al., 2013), 
and – through the internet of things and smart device development – makes possible 
the analysis of banal and mundane activities such as toasting the bread or opening 
the fridge. 
From a technical perspective, datafication is driven by developments resulting in 
the capacity to produce and store data automatically. This can happen without the 
exertion of much effort once the automated process is set up and without action or 
even awareness from those being datafied. It is claimed to be easier to keep data that 
has once been produced and stored than it is to discard them (Mayer-Schönberger & 
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Cukier, 2013: 101). The technical ease of producing and storing data leads to 
concerns over the quality, efficiency, reliability, validity and usability of the means 
of data production, storage, sharing, processing and inference (Kitchin, 2014: 12–
13). Attempts to ensure that human or technical deficiencies do not result in 
unreliable data or analysis results include systematic data collection and analysis 
procedures, equipment specification, technical compensation of biases and errors in 
analysis, or the adherence to technical schemas or standards (Kitchin, 2014). A focus 
on technical aspects of datafication is closely related to the idea that this development 
is unavoidable but needs quality control. 
1.3 Datafication as a societal transformation 
To paraphrase Kranzberg’s (1986) first law of technology, while not necessarily a 
force for good or ill, datafication is not neutral either. A key insight of surveillance 
studies (e.g., Lyon, 2007) can be borrowed here: surveillance does not simply relate 
to the mechanisms of surveillance but should rather be considered in the context of 
institutions and practices that enable these mechanisms and the ideological 
justification and normalisation of surveillance. Analogically, the same concerns 
datafication. It does not simply relate to technical capabilities of datafying. While 
datafication is made possible by technical capacity, it has gradually become “a trend 
advanced by the amalgamation of different cultural, political and economic forces 
that both shift and entrench power relations in contemporary society” (Hintz et al., 
2019: 49). 
Rather than a technical phenomenon related to the practical means of turning 
qualitative aspects of life into data, datafication is most usefully considered as a 
societal phenomenon. Following Rob Kitchin (2014: 12), considering datafication’s 
societal significance requires framing it, in addition to technical terms, also in 
ethical, philosophical, political and economic terms. Such a broader perspective on 
datafication starts from the observation that the “data revolution” does not unfold in 
a passive, neutral and non-ideological manner but is rather driven forward by a 
powerful combination of normative arguments, the involved actors’ beliefs, and 
economic and political interests (Kitchin, 2014). Datafication converts aspects of life 
to data, and the societally significant questions about datafication concern who 
makes use of those data, for what purpose, and what shapes the answers to these 
questions. 
Following Kitchin, an ethical perspective on datafication concerns the right and 
wrong conduct in data production, sharing, analysis and use – in short, the extent to 
which data practices can be morally justified and under which circumstances (e.g., 
Herschel & Miori, 2017; Richards & King, 2014; Zwitter, 2014). Three branches of 
data ethics can be distinguished (Floridi & Taddeo, 2016). The ethics of data is 
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related to data generation, recording, curation, sharing and use. The ethics of 
algorithms is related to the increasing automation and complexity of processes 
employed in data collection, analysis, interpretation and decision-making. The ethics 
of practices is related to the questions of responsibilities and liabilities of people and 
organisations involved in the above processes and the devising of practices and 
professional code attempting to guide us toward ethical conduct. 
A philosophical perspective to datafication focuses on the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions related to data and their use. Here, Kitchin (2014) identifies 
two endpoints of a spectrum. One is to consider data as something collected from the 
world in neutral and objective ways within technical constraints and subject to 
quality concerns. In this view, data are pre-analytical, pre-factual, and non-
ideological; only the use of data can be political. The other is to view data as never 
“raw” but always “cooked” (Gitelman & Jackson, 2013) so that data are always a 
product of the thought systems and instruments that produce them (Bowker & Star, 
1999). Contextual and material factors shape what is data and what data are. The 
transformation of human experiences into numerical values in databases for the 
purpose of learning via computational means produces particular forms of 
information and knowledge (Berry, 2011: 2; Hintz et al., 2019: 47). Emphasising the 
quantitative and computational means of understanding the social world “constitutes 
a novel, powerful system of knowledge with its own epistemology” (Milan & van 
der Velden, 2016: 63), delineating the limits of what can be known and affecting the 
way people relate to information and knowledge. 
A political-economic perspective on datafication was apparent already in the 
1980s explorations of informating the workplace, which pointed out how the 
introduction of information technology could produce radically divergent outcomes 
(Zuboff, 1985; 1988) depending on choices made regarding who can use new 
information to learn, how, and for what purposes. The outcome could be the 
amplification of the worst features of automation including the centralisation of 
authority and the depriving of workers of their autonomy; alternatively, workers 
could be empowered by the new information-creating capacity, engage in new kinds 
of learning processes and become an organisation’s most precious resources. More 
broadly, Arne Hintz and colleagues (Hintz et al., 2019: 4) point out that while the 
collection of data about people has long been at the heart of governance and control, 
questions about data are becoming ever more central in the contemporary society 
through the advancement and expansion of technological means for data production. 
The important issue here is not that databases contain more data or that these data 
are more valuable than before – rather, the important part is the new uses to which 
the data are put (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014: 186). Data, their production, and their 
interpretation are shaped by (and shape) the context in which they happen (Dalton & 
Thatcher, 2014) and thereby need to be examined as questions of power (Tufekci, 
Tuukka Lehtiniemi 
8 
2014). Framing data, or access to data, as a form of power makes data an increasingly 
important issue in contemporary politics (e.g., Iliadis & Russo, 2016; Milan & 
Gutiérrez, 2015). The political-economic logic underpinning datafication matters 
because it affects the ways that society makes and can make use of data. The logic 
therefore shapes the societal transformations brought along with datafication; it 
“produces its own social relations and with that its conceptions and uses of authority 
and power” (Zuboff, 2015: 77). 
1.4 Data and capitalism 
Understanding datafication as a societal phenomenon motivates looking at it more 
broadly than a matter related only to technical capabilities and their development. 
This notion is in line with the view of the data economy that I am pursuing in this 
thesis. Sociological views of the economy have, since at least Max Weber, been 
based on the notion that economies consist not only of exchanges between economic 
actors but also of the social, cultural or institutional context in which those exchanges 
take place (Hass, 2007). Acknowledging this context means that production and 
exchange taking place in the data economy are viewed as culturally, institutionally 
and politically embedded. The cultural context affects what is understood as 
legitimate and normal economic practice; institutions such as property, contracts, 
markets and data protection shape and constitute economic action through rules and 
the associated roles of interaction, and political relations of power affect the 
distribution of material and economic resources (Hass, 2007: 16). 
In the context of the data economy, scholars working on the political-economic 
aspect of datafication have outlined this broader context by examining key features 
running through the ways that data are used for economic profit (Andrejevic, 2014; 
2016; Couldry & Mejias, 2019; Fourcade & Healy, 2017; Pasquale, 2017; Sadowski, 
2019; Srnicek, 2017; Thatcher et al., 2016; van Dijck, 2014; West, 2019; Zuboff, 
2015; 2019). The issues of concern include the normative construing of data as a 
legitimate object of economic interest such as a resource or an asset to own or trade; 
the understanding and analysis of the instituted economic logics and imperatives at 
work in our digital environment; the normative assumptions about normal, proper 
and expected data arrangements; the nature of data itself as a form of economic 
capital; and the assessment of data’s power relations. Related research also 
investigates the potential counteracting of these power differentials by means of 
governance and regulation of data and their use (e.g., Engels, 2016; Evans, 2017; 
Prainsack, 2019; Schneider, 2018). 
One of the concepts employed to make sense of these developments is 
surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2015, 2019; on the previous use of the concept, see 
Foster & McChesney, 2004). Shoshana Zuboff describes surveillance capitalism as 
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an emergent economic form gaining power and hegemony in the data economy. In 
surveillance capitalism, firms aim to produce data about individuals for the purposes 
of knowing, controlling, and modifying behaviour, which are in turn employed to 
produce new varieties of commodification, monetisation, and control (Zuboff, 2015: 
85). Its features include treating data as a resource for the taking, users as targets of 
data extraction through data-based surveillance, and extracted data as a form of 
capital. Data capital are then employed for automatic behavioural prediction and 
modification. To maximise the efficacy of their operations, many firms operate what 
economists call multi-sided markets (Rochet & Tirole, 2003), offering often free 
services to users and basing revenue streams on selling prediction-based products 
and services to paying customers who typically do not include the users. In Zuboff’s 
analysis, the normative assumptions underlying the surveillance capitalism model – 
or the features of its economic logic – are viewed as being embedded in the ways in 
which data about people are collected, stored, and used. 
How did this economic model come to be? A simple answer is that it emerged in 
the normal course of the evolution of capitalism. Citing Fernand Braudel (1984), 
Thomas Piketty (2014) and Roberto Unger (2007), Zuboff (2015) argues that there 
is no single variety of capitalism in terms of how production is organised; capitalism 
is “institutionally indeterminate” (Unger, 2007: 8), and the market economy can take 
variable forms of organisation of production, property and ownership, only small 
parts of which are realised at any given time (Piketty, 2014: 483). In fact, 
“capitalism’s success over the longue durée has depended upon the emergence of 
new market forms expressing new logics of accumulation that are more successful 
at meeting the ever-evolving needs of populations and their expression in the 
changing nature of demand” (Zuboff, 2015: 77; also see Braudel, 1984: 620). 
Whereas this indicates continuous innovation on economic models over time, the 
market economy also seems to gravitate toward dominant models for value creation, 
which might become the institutionalised, taken-for-granted context in which 
companies operate. The production and consumption system known as Fordism is 
an example; its logic based on mass production of identical products and their mass 
consumption by the production workers took hold of industries and whole societies 
for decades, becoming the institutionalised, taken-for-granted context in which not 
only firms but also the society at large operated. 
The company pioneering the economic model reliant on the production and use 
of personal data is, by many accounts, Google (e.g., West, 2019; Zuboff, 2015; 
2019). Its economic model co-evolved with the search engines, as Google 
successfully created not only search algorithms but also a new business model with 
the aid of a specific combination of innovation culture and relatively lax data 
protection regulations (e.g., Elmer, 2004; Mager, 2012; 2017; van Couvering, 2008). 
The innovation that made Google immensely successful was to tap into the cache of 
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data that the firm had accumulated about its website users (West, 2019; Zuboff, 
2019). Some of these data had been used to improve the search service provided to 
end-users, and the rest had been considered a surplus. Now this surplus was 
employed to predict the users’ future behaviour by determining the probability that 
a specific individual would find a particular ad or offer interesting. Google then 
created auction-based markets for targeting services based on these predictions. As 
we now know, this contemporary form of “fortune telling and selling” (Zuboff, 2019: 
88) turned out to be an immensely profitable endeavour. Google’s position toward 
its users and customers, resulting from the combination of search and targeting, led 
to incentives to modify user behaviour in ways that serve the firm’s own commercial 
ends (Rieder & Sire, 2014). Sarah Myers West (2019) argues that this model of 
operation was further strengthened by successfully masking the collection and use 
of personal data with a rhetoric of user empowerment and enhanced means of 
societal participation that came with the services offered. Previously, for example, 
José van Dijck and David Nieborg (2009) identified a similar business rhetoric on 
the benefits of democratized, transparent and collectivist digital space. Google’s 
method of data collection about users was made possible by the institutional context 
of privacy protection, which acts as a countermeasure against some forms of 
surveillance but also as an enabler of extensive commercial data production (Coll, 
2014; Draper & Turow, 2019). I will return to these aspects of the data economy and 
the institutional context in more detail in Chapter 3. 
The significance of this economic model is not just that some large firms exhibit 
similar data arrangements. While the economic logic embodied in the data 
economy’s successful exemplars is a relatively recent innovation, the argument made 
by Zuboff and others is that it has become an institution in itself, a model to which 
various kinds of firms looking to leverage data default. For example, competitive 
pressures push physical retail firms to mimic the surveillance practices of successful 
online firms (Turow et al., 2015b). More generally, the economic model seems to be 
mimicked by established firms in other sectors as well as up-and-coming start-ups 
in the form of institutional isomorphism – that is, “a constraining process that forces 
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 149). In this isomorphism of 
economic models, institutionalised pressures induce conformity to a specific 
economic logic that becomes the default model for data arrangements. Mechanisms 
of isomorphic change include coercive isomorphism through pressures exerted on 
organisations by other organisations on which they are dependent and by cultural 
expectations in the society as well as mimetic isomorphism resulting from voluntary 
imitation of models that are deemed acceptable or working, and they can be resorted 
to when facing uncertainties and poorly understood conditions (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). In the context of isomorphic forms of economic utilisation of personal data, 
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coercive pressures might include funders demanding firms to gather data and employ 
them for value creation in a specific way, platform operators’ coercive power over 
firms attached to them (Caplan & boyd, 2018), necessities introduced by the sheer 
scale of data-collecting operations (Andrejevic, 2016), and discursive strategies 
making it difficult to contest established economic expectations (e.g., Kitchin, 2014: 
113; van Dijck, 2014; Sadowski, 2019). Mimetic pressures, on the other hand, could 
include the lure of lucrative profit opportunities exemplified by surveillance 
capitalism’s pioneers. 
1.5 Data activism 
While capitalism’s adaptability and institutional indeterminacy have led to one 
particular economic logic emerging and taking hold, they also mean that further 
innovation on novel data arrangements will continue to occur. Innovation on new 
data arrangements and practices no doubt currently happens in the context of 
commercial business development. At the same time, the cat-and-mouse play of 
commercial innovation and formal regulation continues as expected. State actors and 
policymakers have recognised the need to adapt old approaches and to develop new 
ones to engage with challenges and societally undesirable aspects of the data 
economy, slowly but nevertheless gradually aiming the regulatory apparatus at the 
economic models developed in the digital domain (Schneider, 2018). 
Rather than commercial innovation or formal regulation, the focus of this thesis 
is on the civil society’s inventiveness in responding to the commercial data 
arrangements. In particular, I will consider data activism as the context in which the 
underpinnings for alternative forms of the data economy’s logic are being developed. 
Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, both commercial and regulatory 
developments have an important role to play; the form of data activism investigated 
here leverages both in order to reach its aims. 
Data activism broadly refers to civic engagement and political action responding 
to the uneven distribution of data access and data-related capabilities in datafied 
times (Baack, 2015; Milan & van der Velden, 2016). Data activism, therefore, 
recognises the power differentials underlying the data economy and, in some sense, 
aims to affect or revert data power relations. Different initiatives have been 
conceptualised as data activism in the literature including employing data or data 
collection and analysis methods to improve the activists’ or their interest group’s 
condition, lobbying and implementing new ideas of data governance, or preventing 
data collection by means of technical tools and alternative platforms. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I follow Milan and van der Velden (2016) and consider data 
activism as a heuristic to examine engagement, action and participation that take a 
critical stand in relation to, but not necessarily in opposition to, datafication. 
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Data activists may or may not be explicitly interested in the data economy’s 
economic logic; they might rather seek to employ the capacities of data technology 
to promote new forms of agency and participation, to mobilise data in order to 
enhance social justice, or to work against existing practices such as tracking or 
surveillance (e.g., Article III, Article IV; Baack, 2015; Gutiérrez, 2018a; Hintz et al., 
2019; Kennedy, 2018; Milan & van der Velden, 2016). Nevertheless, when data 
activists experiment with and develop ways to act in relation to data, they engage in 
the political economy of data and channel discontent with the dominant industry 
practices. 
The alternatives promoted and developed in data activism are obviously not 
mainstream; however, the novel data arrangements developed by data activists can 
nevertheless be significant. Building on previous scholarship on data activism 
(Baack, 2018a; Gutiérrez & Milan, 2019), data activists can be viewed not only as 
representing active engagement and political action with respect to datafication but 
also as a “front line” of developing alternative forms for the data economy through 
new data practices. Data activists “pioneer the exploitation of data infrastructure as 
a catalyst for social action” (Gutiérrez & Milan, 2019: n.p.), and such pioneer work 
expands the horizon of possibility to which others can orient themselves (Hepp, 
2016). Therefore, data activism can represent the potential for meaningful change in 
the broader data arrangements (Schrock, 2016). The existing literature on data 
activism is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
1.6 Collective imagination 
The line of inquiry I pursue in this thesis is based on the notion of collective 
imagination. The focus is on new, collectively imagined economic forms that 
introduce new pathways for the data economy. I will examine data activism as a 
context in which such new and potentially alternative pathways are explored and 
developed. Here, I build on the notion that data activists aim to develop alternative 
forms of collective imagination around datafication “to create a new sense for the 
legitimacy of collective knowledge creation” (Baack, 2015: 8). 
The established concepts for discussing collective imagination in this sense are 
the social and sociotechnical imaginaries. Whereas the semantics of the imaginary 
in its contemporary everyday use involves the fancy, the non-reality, or the non-
actuality, the concept is employed in a much different sense in philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, and – significantly for the purposes of this thesis – social theory and 
science and technology studies (see McNeil et al., 2017). In Charles Taylor’s (2002, 
2004) socio-political theory, social imaginary is the common understanding, shared 
by groups of people, of how the world works and what is normal. This ethos makes 
it possible for people to make sense of the society around them; it is constituted of 
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widely shared understandings that are taken for granted and that have achieved 
general legitimacy. In the context of examining scientific and technological progress, 
the notion of collective imagination is invoked in a more future-oriented manner, 
with a specifically articulated role for the material aspect of social order (i.e., 
technology). Sheila Jasanoff (2015a; also see Jasanoff & Kim, 2009) discusses the 
sociotechnical imaginary as a collectively held set of ideas, beliefs, and normative 
visions of desirable futures that are attainable through advances in science and 
technology. In both socio-political theory and studies of technoscience, imaginaries 
are considered as understandings that are taken for granted and, as a result, work 
implicitly in the background. 
The approach in this thesis is inspired by the notion of multiple imaginaries. 
Even if imaginaries are collectively held, multiple imaginaries can nevertheless 
coexist in a society, be it in tension with one another or in a more productive, 
dialectical relationship (Jasanoff, 2015a: 4). Among the imaginaries, some prevail 
and emerge as dominant, becoming embedded in how actors in the society generally 
operate (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009: 123). Others could be considered “counter-
imaginaries” (Hess, 2014), potential alternatives to the dominant ones. Heeding to 
these notions, I employ the concept of collective imagination in two senses. The first 
sense of employing collective imagination is to outline that-which-is, to depict the 
dominant imaginary of the data economy. This is the collective imagination that 
currently underpins the data economy – how the data economy is imagined to 
function, how personal data are understood to be normally exploited for the purpose 
of creating economic value and profit, and what role is consequently assigned to and 
assumed by people as participants in this economy. However, this dominant 
imaginary is not the only one; concurrent imaginaries can exist in the society, 
sometimes in a dialectical relationship, sometimes at odds with each other (Jasanoff, 
2015a). This points to the second sense in which I will employ collective 
imagination: to outline that-which-should-be, to depict alternative data economy 
imaginaries. The alternative imaginaries developed in data activism contain the 
activists’ visions about a more desirable data future and different ways of functioning 
for the data economy. However, there is no reason to assume that data activism 
would be based on a uniform imaginary about the data economy. Taking the notion 
of multiple imaginaries to a logical end, one can begin by assuming that multiple 
concurrent imaginaries can also exist in data activism. Research on these alternatives 
makes it possible to do research on alternative possible futures (Jasanoff, 2015b: 
339) contained within data activism. My interest in the dominant data economy 
imaginary is to use it in a comparative manner to analyse different alternative 
imaginaries. The literature on collective imagination and how collective imagination 
can be employed as an analytical tool is discussed in Chapter 2 
Tuukka Lehtiniemi 
14 
1.7 Research aims and research questions 
The original research done for this thesis is reported in the attached peer-reviewed 
and published articles I–IV.  Each original publication has its own research questions 
and approach, collectively contributing to two broad research aims of this thesis. The 
first aim is to understand what the alternative data economy imaginaries developed 
in data activism are about and to pick apart their political and ideological 
underpinnings. This research aim informs the following two central research 
questions: 
1. How do alternative data economy imaginaries and the dominant 
imaginary compare with each other? 
2. How do different alternative imaginaries developed in data activism 
compare with each other? 
The second research aim stems from the first one. If data activism produces not one 
but multiple alternative imaginaries, one logical follow-up question is whether some 
of these alternatives are more desirable than others. The second aim is to produce, 
through the understanding gained about the empirical phenomena, a position on what 
alternative imaginaries about the data economy could be considered to promote 
desirable data futures. This aim informs the third central research question: 
3. How can we identify and promote societally desirable data economy 
imaginaries? 
The research questions are developed into more specific sub-questions in Chapter 5. 
1.8 The empirical context 
As an empirical case of data activism, I examine MyData, a data governance 
initiative based on the idea that people should be able to exercise more control over 
personal data about them. Research for this thesis was to a large extent carried out 
in the context of participating in MyData-related research projects since 2014. 
MyData is originally a Finnish initiative aiming at a more sustainable digital 
environment based on the understanding that people, companies, the public sector 
and society at large benefit if individuals control the gathering, sharing and use of 
personal data (MyData Global, 2019; Poikola et al., 2015). The initiative is focused 
on redistributing data, particularly the benefits of data use, from data-gathering 
organisations to people. According to a white paper, the initiative’s goal is to turn 
people into “empowered actors, not passive targets, in the management of their 
personal lives both online and offline” (Poikola et al., 2015: 2). The present section 
provides a brief overview of MyData. Two of the original publications, Articles III 
and IV, consider MyData as a data activism initiative, focus on it as an empirical 
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case, and discuss the initiative and its origins more closely. Articles I and II focus on 
examining end-user data management services. There are better-known firms that 
promise to put organisations in charge of their data for their own advantage (Beer, 
2018; Degli Esposti, 2014); the developers of the kinds of services examined in 
Articles I and II aim to do the same for people. They are closely related to MyData 
in that they have shared political aims with it, but they do not necessarily explicitly 
commit to a specific brand of data activism. 
MyData originated with an Open Knowledge Finland working group, where it 
was initially developed in an open and collaborative manner by a group of open data 
activists and researchers along with businesspeople and civil servants, some of 
whom had more than one of these roles. This background invites one to consider 
MyData as a translation of open data ideas into the context of personal data. Whereas 
open data activists usually argue that data produced by public authorities should be 
technically and legally free for anyone to use, distribute and reuse (Kitchin, 2014), 
MyData translates the scope of both the data and the beneficiaries from the collective 
to the individual level. According to the MyData initiative, the right to decide on the 
uses of personal data collected by organisations should reside with the data subjects 
instead of being monopolised by the organisations. This does not mean that the 
initiative would frown upon commercial use of data as such; in contrast, a white 
paper portrays the initiative as aiming to provide the society with “parallel 
development of digital rights, innovation and business growth” (Poikola et al., 2015: 
4). This can be interpreted so that MyData attempts to foster processes and policies 
for advancing individuals’ rights while concurrently accommodating the industry’s 
demands to process personal data in the production of economic and commercial 
value and in the development of new services. MyData seeks to simultaneously 
achieve these potentially divergent outcomes by rearranging the infrastructure 
underlying individual-level data practices; the newly imagined and gradually 
developed infrastructure comprises of personal data storages, data schemas and 
standards, exchange protocols, digital identity frameworks, and permission 
management tools. The private sector’s role is significant. MyData is built upon the 
understanding that to have an effect on the digital environment at large, the principles 
of individual data control developed in MyData need to be implemented by services 
developed by private firms. 
Since the start of the research for this thesis in 2014, MyData has expanded from 
a working group of a Finnish open data NGO into an international non-profit 
organisation in its own right, MyData Global (2019), with local hubs listed in all 
continents. Nevertheless, as the initiative originated in Finland, it is in many ways 
grounded in the local institutional context and its embedded values. The above-
mentioned white paper even explicitly frames the initiative as “a Nordic model for 
human-centric personal data management” (Poikola et al., 2015). One example of 
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this specific context is the early involvement of state actors. The white paper and its 
earlier Finnish-language version were commissioned by a Finnish government 
ministry. In addition to the socio-cultural context, the initiative is rooted in the formal 
regulatory environment. To achieve its aims, MyData leverages jurisdiction-specific 
regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation in the EU, particularly 
its data portability rulings. Setting up an international NGO with local hubs speaks 
of attempts to transfer MyData’s principles from the Nordic to other international 
contexts. In a different sense of transferability of the initiative’s principles, 
individual data control is intended to be general, sector-independent, and ready to be 
embedded in any field-specific initiatives. 
The idea of putting people in better control of their data is, of course, not new; it 
has been proposed under many labels in different times and contexts since at least 
the 1990s. One possibility to make sense of the discussions involved is to identify 
two strands based on whether the focus is on controlling data to limit adverse 
consequences of data production and use or on controlling data to make new data 
uses possible for the benefit of individuals (Iemma, 2016). Examples of the former 
include discussions in the context of ubiquitous computing environments (Bellotti & 
Sellen, 1993), a proposal for a market-based mechanism through which consumers 
could restrict the distribution of data by paying companies that have collected them 
(Noam, 1995), and more recent debates under the concept of privacy by design (e.g., 
Belli et al., 2017). Examples of the latter include the idea of gaining fair 
compensation for personal data use through regulated data markets (Laudon, 1996) 
and “infomediaries” envisioned as bargaining agents acting between consumers and 
businesses and making it possible for consumers to gain useful services in exchange 
for data and for companies to access a broad array of consumer data (Hagel & 
Rayport, 1997). In this pre-internet technological context, data ownership, paired 
with an intermediary facilitating data exchanges, was expected to shift the power 
balance toward consumers. 
More recent developments in the same field include the “re-decentralisation” 
initiative by the web pioneer Tim Berners-Lee aiming to make personal data a 
resource for people (Andrejevic, 2014; Brooker, 2018), the development of software 
(Article II) or devices (e.g., Crabtree et al., 2016) to provide users with means to 
exercise control over data collection and use, and government-initiated “smart 
disclosure” programs releasing machine-readable personal data from firms to 
consumer-citizens (Iemma, 2016). Alex Pentland’s (2009) “new deal on data,” 
including among other things the notion that individuals should have the right to 
control their data, was introduced in a report by the World Economic Forum, which 
later declared personal data as a “new asset class” that individuals should control and 
benefit from (World Economic Forum, 2011). In a somewhat different take of the 
matter, Jaron Lanier proposes working toward commercial symmetry between firms 
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and users to be achieved by remunerating people whenever personal data are used 
(Lanier, 2013). A later iteration of the idea proposes treating data as labour and 
consequently introducing “data labour unions” (Arrieta Ibarra et al., 2018) or 
“mediators of individual data” (Lanier & Weyl, 2018) to take care of negotiations on 
the remunerations and terms of data use. By the end of 2019, data control and 
ownership had become mainstream enough to be minor talking points for would-be 
US presidential candidates (Levy, 2019; Molla & Stewart, 2019). 
While these ideas have emerged elsewhere, many of them have affected 
MyData-related discussions, and some have resonated well with MyData 
proponents. The point here is not to investigate these similarities and differences 
further but to highlight that ideas about individuals’ capabilities to act in the digital 
environment and in relation to their personal data have been and still are under 
discussion, experimentation, debate and contestation in many locations and contexts. 
This connects the empirical investigations of this thesis to the broader theme of 
citizen agency and participation in datafied times. 
1.9 The structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the synopsis part of this thesis is organised as follows. The next 
three chapters examine the strands of research literature needed to reach the research 
aims. Chapter 2 establishes the use of collective imagination as an analytical tool, 
particularly as a tool of comparison between alternative imaginaries. Building on the 
data studies literature, Chapter 3 depicts a view of the dominant imaginary of the 
data economy that will provide a comparison point for the alternative imaginaries 
developed in data activism. Chapter 4 describes data activism as a field in which 
alternative imaginaries are being developed, discusses the variable forms of 
engagement with data and data technologies that data activism can include, and 
situates MyData in the data activism context. The remaining chapters lay out the 
original contribution of this thesis. Chapter 5 develops the research questions, 
presents the research approach, and discusses methods and data. Chapter 6 
summarises the findings of the original research publications in light of the research 
aims of the thesis. Chapter 7 discusses the findings, and Chapter 8 concludes the 
thesis by summarising the results, pointing out their implications and outlining 
opportunities for further research in the area. 
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2 Collective Imagination 
As Sally Wyatt points out, “the future has to be discussed in terms of the imaginary 
[…] but sometimes today’s imaginary becomes tomorrow’s lived reality” (Wyatt, 
2004: 244). As it is discussed in this thesis, developing alternative imaginaries about 
the data economy means reimagining how the data economy functions, and what 
people’s role is in it – as citizens, consumers, or users. I do not refer to imagination 
as just a faculty of one person, whether a creative individual or a genius inventor. 
While an alternative data economy imaginary could be identified to originate in 
dreams of some key individuals who see beyond the constraints of what currently is, 
if an alternative data economy is to be realised, it will be “substantiated into people, 
objects, and practices” (Jasanoff, 2015b: 324) in a sense that surpasses individual 
creative faculties. The capacity to imagine is not only a capacity of individual human 
beings; rather, imagination is also a social phenomenon, and operates in an 
intersubjective, shared and collective manner (e.g., Beckert, 2016; Jasanoff, 2015a; 
Taylor, 2004). Imagination in the collective sense produces visions of counterfactual 
futures, alternative social realities, or new practices and arrangements; “it is through 
acts of imagination by collectives that start from somewhere different, not with 
solutions to problems already defined, but through practices of invention and 
experimentation that different futures can be performed” (Ruppert, 2018: 33). 
The notion of collective imagination has inspired approaches from several 
disciplinary standpoints. It has its origins in a number of intellectual traditions in 
social theory, where collective imagination is considered as that which holds 
together large things: society’s institutions, market economies, national identities 
and modernity. Here, imagination concerns what is, as well as how it ought to be. 
While this notion of collective imagination is mainly oriented at the present, the 
concept has also been employed in an explicitly future-oriented manner in, for 
example, studies of technoscience and in examinations of capitalism’s success as a 
system of economic organisation. In this chapter, I discuss the literature dealing with 
collective imagination in the fields of political philosophy, science and technology 
studies and economic sociology. The aim is to establish the use of collective 
imagination as an analytical tool to address the research questions of this thesis. The 
resulting analytical approach will be to investigate the politics of collective 
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imagination by means of a comparative approach, distinguishing between a 
dominant data economy imaginary and its alternatives developed in data activism. 
2.1 Collective imagination in social theory 
In social theory, collective imagination refers to collective and normative beliefs, 
often implicit or tacit, of how the society functions and ought to function. It is the 
common understanding, shared by groups of people, of how the world functions and 
what is normal, enabling common practices and a shared sense of legitimacy. A key 
concept is the social imaginary, often employed in reference to the philosopher 
Charles Taylor and his work on modern social imaginaries (Taylor, 2002; 2004). 
However, before Taylor, other authors have written on collective imagination as 
well, employing varied terminology (see Adams et al. 2015; Flichy, 2007; Ruppert, 
2018; Jasanoff, 2015a). Examples include the political philosophy on ideology and 
utopia by the philosopher Paul Ricœur (1986), the work on society’s institutions by 
the philosopher, economist and psychoanalyst Cornelius Castoriadis (1987), as well 
as the work on nations as imagined communities by the political scientist Benedict 
Anderson (1991). 
In terms of Ricœur’s (1986) work, collective imagination (or “social and cultural 
imagination”, in Ricœur’s vocabulary) is a product of two contrasting components: 
ideological and utopian thought (Adams et al, 2015; Flichy, 2007: 8). Ideological 
thought is what maintains social order, legitimising and reproducing society’s image 
of itself. Utopian thought is subversive and questions and problematises this order 
and produces alternative images for the society. Where ideology legitimises power, 
utopia provides an imagination for an alternative to power. Because of the interplay 
of ideology and utopia, there is a constant tension between the stability of the 
instituted social order, and its change. For Castoriadis (1987), collective imagination 
(or “social imaginary significations”) is a way of understanding society’s 
institutions; imaginaries are what underpin the institutions and the interwoven social 
practices of, for example, democracy, bureaucracy, or capitalism. To put it 
differently, for Castoriadis, these institutions are manifestations of a broader 
imaginary that is central to the existence of the society, so that society itself may be 
considered an imaginary institution (Adams et al., 2015). While imaginaries in this 
sense are necessary for society’s institutions, there’s no guarantee about their 
functioning and effect; in Castoriadis’ view, then, while imaginaries are required for 
the functioning of institutions, they do not determine institutions (Ruppert, 2018). 
Anderson (1991) engaged with collective imagination in his work on nationalism 
and “imagined communities”. For Anderson, the role of imagination is to hold 
together a nation; a heterogeneous and dispersed community that is made up of 
Tuukka Lehtiniemi 
20 
people who may never encounter in face-to-face reality but nevertheless share, 
through collective imagination, practices which tie them together. 
Taylor’s work on social imaginaries (2002, 2004) is concerned with the question 
of how modernity came about. For Taylor, the notion of modernity includes new 
practices and institutional forms including technology, industrial production and 
urbanisation; the new ways of living such as individualism and secularisation; and 
new afflictions such as alienation and the experience of life’s meaninglessness. In 
Taylor’s account, central to the emergence of modernity is a new moral order of 
society, which came to influence the social imaginary that acts as the underpinning 
of modernity. Modernity, in short, came about as the social imaginaries underlying 
the society and its institutions and practices changed. For Taylor, social imaginary is 
the understanding, shared by groups of people, of how the world works and what is 
normal. It is that which “enables, though making sense of, the practices of a society” 
(Taylor, 2004: 2) and the “common understanding that makes possible common 
practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy” (Taylor, 2004: 23). When 
understood in Taylor’s sense, social imaginaries “define the contours of the social 
world and influence its governance” (Mansell, 2012: 33). Institutions such as the 
market and the civil society exist in the imaginations of actors who at the same time 
recognise that these notions are shared among other actors, which enables common 
practices around them (Kelty, 2008: 41–42). When common understandings are 
widely shared and taken for granted, they achieve general legitimacy. 
The social imaginary, then, is something broader than a set of ideas or an 
intellectual scheme about social reality; it rather refers to “the ways people imagine 
their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between 
them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor, 2004: 23). 
The normative dimension of social imaginaries refers not only to the norms that 
structure our actions, but also the normative notions and expectations, as well as 
assumptions about expectations, of how the world usually works. According to 
Taylor, the shared understandings are “both factual and normative; that is, we have 
a sense of how things usually go, but this is interwoven with an idea of how they 
ought to go, of what missteps would invalidate the practice” (Taylor, 2002: 106). 
The foundations of social order, then, are made up of not only collective 
understanding of how the society functions, but also beliefs about how it is supposed 
to function. 
2.2 Collective imagination and technology 
In light of the research interests in this thesis, it is of particular interest that in the 
digital age, collective imagination influences both the development and the use of 
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digital technologies, and how they permeate and affect people’s lives (Mansell, 
2012: 33). In the context of technoscientific advancement, collective imagination has 
been invoked to account for implicit normative ideas underlying technology, such as 
collective notions of the correct role of technology in achieving societal and 
economic transformations. Collective imagination is a way to account for the 
normative aspect of technological advancement, that is, how technoscientific 
development is affected by a shared understanding of how things usually work and 
what is expected, and the normative notions that underlie these expectations. One 
example of such use of the concept is Kelty’s (2008) ethnographic work on Free 
Software. Kelty builds on Taylor’s discussion on social imaginaries and particularly 
their relationship to practices. In Kelty’s account, Free Software practices are altered 
and transformed, or modulated, as they spread; as a result of these modulations, 
practitioners do not necessarily share the same goals, but what they do share is a 
social imaginary that “defines a particular relationship between technology, organs 
or governance […] and the internet” (Kelty, 2008: 12). The point here is that 
decisions made about technology are embedded in imaginations of moral and 
technical order; social change enabled or facilitated by technology can encompass 
both ideas about the proper collective ordering of the economy and society, as well 
as the correct role of technologies in achieving that ordering. 
In science and technology studies literature, collective imagination is employed 
in an explicitly future-oriented manner, so that collective imagination does not 
concern only to the role and use of available and existing technologies; rather, 
imaginaries project the future as it ought to be and contain a positive vision of 
technologically mediated progress. The key concept in this literature is the 
sociotechnical imaginary, developed particularly by the science and technology 
studies scholar Sheila Jasanoff (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009; Jasanoff, 2015a). Jasanoff 
takes the above-discussed social-theoretical accounts of the social imaginary as a 
starting point, but notes that while they consider imaginaries as things that shape and 
hold together large-scale social processes – such as Anderson’s nationhood or 
Taylor’s modernity – they take imaginaries mainly as ideational constructs. If the 
role of material constructs such as technology are discussed, it is only in passing. In 
Jasanoff’s view, “Taylor’s imaginaries do not have space for the material aspect of 
order” (Jasanoff, 2015a: 7). Considering this as a deficiency, Jasanoff aims to resolve 
it by providing a way to account for the interplay between the design of technologies 
and the social arrangements that inspire and sustain their production – in other words, 
how technology both embeds, and is embedded in, the social (Jasanoff, 2015a: 2–3). 
Jasanoff highlights the ”instrumental and transformative” role that technological 
developments play in generating imaginaries of social order, that is, how society’s 
self-reproduction relies on science and technology practices (Jasanoff, 2015a) and 
even more to the point, how imagination, material objects and technologies, as well 
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as social norms are joined together in practice (Jasanoff, 2015b) so that visions of 
technological progress contain also implicit understandings of what is desirable in 
our collective futures. By addressing the normative underpinnings of techno-
scientific developments, sociotechnical imaginaries give an explicit role for both the 
ideational aspects of societal transformations, as well as the material means of 
achieving those transformations. 
Jasanoff defines sociotechnical imaginaries as “collectively held, institutionally 
stabilised, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared 
understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and 
supportive of, advances in science and technology” (Jasanoff 2015a: 4). In Jasanoff’s 
view, these visions of how the world is and ought to be originate in dreams and 
ambitions of people, but are substantiated into objects and practices (Jasanoff, 
2015b: 324). They can be articulated by nation-states (e.g., Felt, 2015), which was 
the focus in Jasanoff and Kim’s earlier iteration of the concept of socio-technical 
imaginaries (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009). Expanding from this notion, the context of the 
sociotechnical imaginary can also be a supranational organisation such as the EU 
(e.g., Mager, 2017). Smaller-scale organised groups may also orient their actions via 
collective imagination. These include, for example, corporations (e.g., Sadowski & 
Bendor, 2019; Smith, 2015) or social movements (e.g., Kim, 2015).  
Yet another way to employ collective imagination in the context of technology 
is provided by the sociologist Patrice Flichy, who is interested in how subversive 
collective visions shape the realisation of large-scale technical objects (Flichy, 2007) 
– the case being the information network that became the internet. Flichy’ argument 
is that in the long term, such objects are articulated around a collective vision that is 
common to not only designers of technologies, but also the technology users. Flichy 
calls the collective imagination envisioning technological visions the technical 
imaginaire. Flichy builds on Ricœur’s (1986) above-mentioned schema of the 
interplay between utopia and ideology to describe the interplay between subversive 
elements of technology utopias, and legitimising and justifying elements of existing 
technological implementations. The utopian element of the initial technology vision 
means it aspires to alter the established order. It can still be broad enough to 
accommodate alternative technological implementations that can have contrasting 
features. The initial vision, then, does not represent an actual, realisable alternative 
to existing technical devices. Rather, there may be parallel realisable versions – in 
Flichy’s language, “project utopias” – that fit under the umbrella of the initial vision 
and can be experimented on. Once some of the experiments resonate widely enough 
among developers and users, they can catch hold and become to represent successful 
exemplars of the initial vision. The experiments are here successfully developed into 
boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) that represent a “compromise that can be 
used to associate multiple partners sufficiently loosely for everyone to benefit, yet 
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sufficiently rigidly for the device to function (Flichy, 2007: 10–11). This is where 
the ideological element of the exemplar now becomes visible. Its case-specific 
aspects are hidden, its success as a typical realisation of the initial vision is 
underlined, and the alternative realisations of the initial vision are cast aside. The 
exemplar may now be employed to encourage collective action of both technology 
developers and users. An initial utopian technology vision, then, gets worked 
through stages of experimentation on technical devices into material realisations that 
become to act similarly to an ideology; they justify the selection of specific solutions 
over others, and are able to mobilise developers and users.  
2.3 Future imaginaries and economic dynamics 
In addition to socio-technical imaginaries discussed above, another way to consider 
collective imagination in a specifically future-oriented way has been proposed by the 
economic sociologist Jens Beckert (2016). Here, the context is capitalism’s success 
as an economic system, which Beckert attributes to economic actors temporally 
orienting their actions towards an open and uncertain future. This orientation is 
subject to the actors’ capability to imagine the future and fill it with counterfactual 
economic imaginaries, which Beckert calls fictional expectations. Beckert discusses 
fictional expectations in an intersubjective sense, as a social phenomenon shaped by 
people’s collective beliefs. Fictional expectations, then, refer to the images that 
actors collectively form of the states of the world in the future, and to the ways that 
actors expect their own actions, and the actions of others, to have an effect on those 
states of the world. These expectations are shaped by collective beliefs on how the 
economy functions, as well as by the cultural and institutional interpretive frames 
actors use to interpret economic events. In concrete terms, these collective beliefs 
and interpretive frames refer to, for example, economic theories and economic 
institutions, as well convictions such as reliance on technological progress as a 
solution to problems (Beckert, 2016: 13).  
The effect that actions are expected to have in the imagined future are what 
motivate current action; in this way, actors behave “as if the future were going to 
develop in the way they assume it will, and as if an object had the qualities 
symbolically ascribed to it” (Beckert, 2016: 10; original emphasis). The future 
matters in the present, since actors’ expectations of the future, and their expectations 
of how their current decisions will affect the future, will have consequences on their 
actions in the present. This leads to economic imaginaries having real-world 
consequences in the present, and through that, to the future state of the world, 
whether or not that effect is what was expected. Future imaginaries may be 
performative in nature, as has been discussed in the context of how economic theory 
shapes markets and their future outcomes (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006). Even if 
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the outcomes of current actions do not play out as imagined, the important thing is 
that fictional expectations motivate current real actions and therefore have a role in 
shaping the future. 
For Beckert (2016: 11–12), fictional expectations have implications on the 
dynamics of capitalist economies due to their coordinating role and contingent 
nature. The coordinating role emerges in situations where actors have similar 
convictions regarding how the future will develop and the effects that their own, as 
well as others’, actions and decisions have on it. One example of coordination are 
pressures institutionalised by the capitalist economic system, such as competition. 
Collective imagination motivates future orientation in two distinct senses. Actors 
seek self-advantage though new opportunities, but also experience the competitive 
threat posed by similarly advantage-seeking other actors. These pressures push 
actors to seek novelty through innovation and the increase of efficiency. 
The contingent nature of fictional expectations, in turn, gives rise to a politics of 
collective imagination. Expectations can represent a departure from the current 
empirically observed reality; imagined futures make it possible to deviate from, for 
example, the present institutionalised economic practices or today’s technologies. 
As expectations of the future affect present actions andm through those actions, the 
future state of the world, it is possible to shape the future by shaping current 
expectations about it. Given that some future states of the world are more 
advantageous to a given actor, and given that future imaginaries of others have real-
world consequences to the actor, actors have incentives to influence the collective 
imagination concerning the future to their own benefit. This gives rise to what 
Beckert calls the politics of expectations; future imaginaries are an entry point to 
economic power, and that is why they can become the object of present interest 
struggles (Beckert, 2016: 79–81). 
2.4 Collective imagination as an analytical tool 
The research aims of this thesis attend to the politics of collective imagination in the 
context of the data economy. The future of technology is created in the present 
through contested claims over technology’s potential; therefore, examination of 
different imaginaries does not only reveal what different actors think about the 
future, but also tell us about what they want it to become (Wyatt, 2004). Imagined 
future states of the data economy motivate real, current decisions and become subject 
of current interest struggles (Beckert, 2016). If imaginaries are in this way able to 
affect current decisions and the future outcomes of the decisions, actors have 
incentives to attempt to affect the collective imagination in a way that suits their own 
interest. Collective imagination about the data economy, then, is a field of struggle 
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involving actors or groups whose economic and political interests, whether private 
or collective, are served by particular kinds of imaginaries.  
My analytical approach is inspired by studies that use comparisons of 
imaginaries as an analytical tool. Comparisons are “perhaps the most indispensable 
method for studying sociotechnical imaginaries” as Jasanoff notes (2015a: 24). In 
this thesis, the comparisons take place between different data economy imaginaries 
serving different interests. Social imaginaries, as discussed by Taylor (2002; 2004), 
are focused on what holds things together rather than change, and therefore 
particularly attend to the ascendant imaginary instead of alternatives or conflicts 
(Mansell, 2012: 33). The social imaginary in Taylor’s sense may, however, be 
employed as a comparison point with which other imaginaries can be compared. 
Motivated by Jasanoff and Kim’s (Jasanoff, 2015a; Jasanoff & Kim, 2009) notion of 
multiple imaginaries and the emergent dominant ones,  Robin Mansell’s (2012) 
analysis of dominant and alternative imaginaries of the information society, as well 
as the notion of counter-imaginaries by David Hess (2014), I will first establish the 
dominant imaginary of the data economy, consisting of taken-for-granted notions, 
images, and visions of those who are engaged in its development. Understood in this 
way, the dominant data economy imaginary consists of ideas about how the data 
economy functions as well as how it should function. Alternatives to this dominant 
imaginary act as conduits for “crystallising the dissatisfactions of the present into 
possibilities for other futures that people would sooner inhabit” (Jasanoff, 2015b: 
329). An alternative imaginary emerging from discontent with the present is formed 
in response to the dominant imaginary, and works to alter the established order. I 
will therefore employ the dominant data economy imaginary for the purpose of 
assessing alternative imaginaries for the data economy through comparison. 
There are two interrelated senses in which the politics of imagination is relevant 
for my analysis of different imaginaries through comparison, the first sense being 
the struggle between dominant and alternative imaginaries. Alternative imaginaries, 
here, being the ones developed in data activism. Taylor (2004: 30) notes that the 
constitution of a social imaginary takes place through the development of new 
practices, or modifications of old ones. The insight here is that the relationship 
between practices and social imaginaries works both ways. While practices are 
associated with social imaginaries, the transformation of practices can lead to the 
development of new imaginaries. Existing work on data activism by Stefan Baack 
(2015; 2018b) and Miren Gutiérrez and Stefania Milan (2019) has pointed out how 
the use and appropriation of data technologies in new ways by such “pioneering 
communities” (Hepp, 2016) can be the source of new data practices. The point of 
interest is that pioneering communities do not only develop new practices for 
themselves, but simultaneously work to expand the horizon of possibilities more 
generally. Broader transformations in practices, and hence social imaginaries, may 
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start from improvisation of new practices in smaller strata of the population (Taylor, 
2004: 30); here, a pioneering community of data activists imagine how the use of 
technology can provoke change, exemplify new technology practices that others can 
adopt, and therefore “provide orientation for broader social discourses” (Hepp, 2016: 
918). New practices emerging from data activism can shape new data economy 
imaginaries and instigate changes in the broader collective imagination. 
The struggle between dominant and alternative imaginaries is not the only sense 
in which the politics of collective imagination is relevant in this analysis, the second 
sense being that different subversive visions for the data economy may embrace 
contested values and can work towards divergent, potentially mutually exclusive, 
alternative futures. This suggests that there can be alternative alternative imaginaries 
that may be in tension with one another, competing for power over a broader 
collective imagination not only against the dominant imaginary, but also between 
one another. While different alternatives can in the abstract sense work towards 
similar subversive visions, they may be underpinned by contested values and can be 
in tension with one another. In terms of technological development, these alternative 
imaginaries can end up producing contrasting or conflicting material realisations of 
the same or similar visions (Flichy, 2007). The success of these alternatives in the 
struggle over collective imagination, that is to say how well they succeed in 
expanding to broader social imaginaries, depends on how they fit together with 
existing norms and moral values, how they attach to things that generate economic 
or social value, how they resonate with collective identities, and how they tie in with 
existing social structures and material infrastructure (Jasanoff, 2015a; 2015b; 
Sadowski & Bendor, 2019). 
In this thesis, the politics of collective imagination, then, concerns dominant and 
alternative imaginaries. Collective imagination will be employed as an analytical 
tool by making comparisons between imaginaries; particularly, comparisons 
between the dominant data economy imaginary and alternative data economy 
imaginaries developed in data activism. The dominant imaginary will be employed 
as the primary point of comparison, and comparisons against it will be made in order 
to reveal differences between the alternatives. 
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3 The Dominant Data Economy 
Imaginary 
The aim of this chapter is to construct a view of the dominant imaginary about the 
data economy, which I employ as a comparison point for alternative data economy 
imaginaries. As discussed in Chapter 1, the data economy is in this thesis viewed as 
culturally, institutionally and politically embedded; the economy does not concern 
only market exchanges or even relations of production and exchange more generally, 
but also their broader cultural context, institutions, regulation and power relations. 
The data economy imaginary concerns collective beliefs and shared, possibly often 
implicit, understanding of how the data economy functions and what is normal and 
expected. Reflecting a broad view of the economy, these beliefs and understandings 
concern legitimate objects of economic interest and modes of operation, institutions 
governing production and exchanges relations, and the associated roles for economic 
actors. 
The view of the dominant data economy is based on literature that I refer to as 
data studies, a stream of scholarship that “seeks to understand the new roles played 
by data in times of datafication” (Kennedy, 2018: 18). Data studies is not necessary 
a label that scholars would self-identify with, and strands of the literature I discuss 
might alternatively be referred to as critical data studies, surveillance studies, the 
political economy of data, or privacy research. Even if some of this literature 
concerns the politics of imagination in datafied times, the data studies literature does 
not usually discuss the data economy imaginary as such. Scholarship on data studies 
has, however, examined in detail the prevailing practices of producing and handling 
data, exploiting data as a resource for economic value creation, as well as the policies 
that govern these practises. 
Data studies literature offers a view of the data economy’s dominant data 
arrangements which in turn reflect the dominant data economy imaginary: the taken-
for-granted ways of producing or acquiring data, the means of making use of data to 
produce services and economic value, notions about monetising data and the 
associated market arrangements, the regulatory context that makes these practices 
possible, as well as the roles assigned for people as users, consumers and citizens in 
the contemporary digital environment. The examination of the dominant 
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arrangements can shed light to the dominant imaginary that underpins the data 
economy. For the purpose of my discussion, it offers a framing that allows the study 
of alternative data economy imaginaries. 
3.1 The economic arguments for datafication 
Contemporary organisations are culturally impelled to collect as much data as 
possible from all possible sources (Fourcade & Healy, 2017). The factors that drive 
this include beliefs and promises about possibilities to economically exploit data and 
the “radically new way of understanding and managing all aspects of human life” 
(Kitchin, 2014: 114) that they offer. In the industry parlance, data are presented as 
lucrative data capital that, if exploited correctly, can provide operational efficiency 
and economic advantages (e.g., Yousif, 2015) and firms can extract “big value from 
big data” (Gantz & Reinsel, 2011). Once “almost everywhere and nearly everything” 
have been datafied, “the potential uses of the information are basically limited only 
by one’s ingenuity” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013: 96). Because of this 
potential, data are “becoming a significant corporate asset, a vital economic input, 
and the foundation of new business models” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013: 
16). All data are expected to have some insights hidden in them, it just takes the right 
application and the right analytical means to uncover them. It does not matter if all 
gathered data are not useful or valuable immediately; it makes sense to take hold of 
them, as by assumption they will ultimately turn out to be valuable (Fourcade & 
Healy, 2017).  
These expectations of data’s value, combined with the statistical nature of firms’ 
analytic capabilities, lead to structural imperatives for increased scale and scope of 
data production, as well as to actors in the data economy valuing the quantity of data 
over their accuracy (Zuboff, 2015). More data, simply put, improves firms’ 
offerings; the more and more diverse data there are, the more and more diverse 
knowledge can be derived (Sadowski, 2019), leading to better service and more 
precise targeting (e.g., Mai, 2016). If more data leads to more valuable service, data 
are a competitive advantage, and a company benefits from data that others do not 
have (Srnicek, 2017). Accordingly, firms have an incentive to broaden the scope of 
their data collection to new people and new aspects of people’s lives, as well as an 
incentive to prevent others from gaining access to similar data. For example, the 
extraction of data takes place beyond the immediate boundaries of online services, 
an expansion of data extraction capabilities made possible by means of like buttons, 
tracking pixels and similar arrangements (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013; Helmond, 
2015). The need for new data extraction capabilities also at least partially explain the 
acquisition of up-and-coming competitors by data giants, as well as their forays into 
new fields such as payment systems or health applications.  
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When data are considered as a form of capital, they may be turned into value in 
various ways. Sadowski (2019) identifies six such ways, presented here as one 
taxonomy of deriving value from data. First, and perhaps foremost when it comes to 
personal data, data are used to profile and target people. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
a considerable share of revenue of some of the most successful internet firms come 
from personalised advertisements. Their business models are driven by the notion 
that knowing more about people translates into more value through more nuanced 
profiling and better targeting. Businesses also translate knowing more about people 
into value and profit by scoring people in industries such as credit and insurance 
(Fourcade & Healy, 2017) and by means of targeting and price discrimination in the 
retail industry (Turow et al., 2015b). The data broker industry specialises on creating 
dossiers of data about people and offering them to different kinds of businesses for 
the purposes of knowing more and better (Crain, 2018).  
The second mean of deriving value is using data to optimise systems (Sadowski, 
2019) for more efficient processes and employment of capacities, for eliminating 
waste or downtime, and for the improvement of productivity. For personal data, 
examples include making workers more efficient in warehouses, and optimising 
customer service processes or the running of public services. Third, value is derived 
from data by using them to manage and control things. Here, the ability to exercise 
power over something is enhanced by amassing data on it. To manage health, the 
data in question might concern exercise, diet or bodily functions; to manage traffic 
in a city, the data may concern the environment or the movement of people and 
things; to manage and control clicks on websites, the data may concern browsing 
patterns collected via tracking cookies. Fourth, data are used to model probabilities 
of future events, such as risks of illness for the purpose of preventive healthcare, or 
the likelihood of criminal activity by individuals or groups for the purpose of 
predictive policing (Andrejevic, 2017). Fifth, data are used to build things, such as 
services or digital systems (Sadowski, 2019). A service like Uber would not work 
without real-time data about users and drivers. Similarly, smart homes or smart cities 
depend on personal data, among other kinds of data. Finally, data about the use of 
assets such as buildings or machines is used to prevent or slow down the depreciation 
of their value over time. These means of deriving value from data are interlinked. 
For example, the modelling of probabilities of future events may be related to 
knowing more about people, the management of things, or the optimising of systems. 
What they have in common is that they all represent what Cinnamon (2017) refers 
to as “competitive value”; the value lies in the possibility to leverage data for 
competitive advantage over others.  
When data are employed by organisations as a form of capital, they are 
naturalised as a universal substance or a generic raw material that is there for the 
taking, and that can be used or turned into value (Couldry & Yu, 2018; Pendergrast, 
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2019; Puschmann & Burgess, 2014; Sadowski, 2019). The beliefs and assumptions 
that underpin this use of data to understand human life are summarised by van Dijck 
(2014) as constituting dataism, or the ideological component of datafication. A 
central belief related to dataism is that datafication is a legitimate means to access, 
understand and monitor behaviour. To be viewed as a raw material that can be turned 
into meaningful predictions about people’s actions and behaviour, data are 
considered an objective representation of the world, and platforms and services on 
which data are collected are channels through which such data can be acquired. 
Consequently, data are believed to represent human behaviour in a manner that can 
be meaningfully mapped to people, and represent social life in a manner that social 
identities, relationships and practices can be reduced to data and, through data, 
processed as abstractions (Hintz et al., 2019: 46–47). Data collecting and processing 
technologies are therefore viewed as neutral conduits that can be used to uncover 
truths that exist regardless of data about them. Supported by these beliefs of 
objectivity and neutrality, the promises of value and competitive advantage have 
turned datafication into business-as-usual mode of operation in the data economy. 
From political-economic and philosophical perspectives, however, these 
assumptions about datafication and its benefits are set up on highly problematic 
grounds. Data are not simply “raw” or “objective,” but rather always a result of 
various different decisions and assumptions that go into their production. These 
decisions – and, by extension, who makes them – can be consequential to the 
outcomes of data use. Data does not simply exist out there waiting to be harvested, 
rather it is produced by technology and people using and creating that technology 
(Gitelman & Jackson, 2013). When people’s behaviour and social life are 
represented by data, complex things are mapped to simpler ones, dimensions of the 
situation are truncated and projected, and choices are necessarily made about how to 
carry this out. When data about people are employed and analysed to generate 
representations of social identities, data technologies are “embedded and integrated 
within a social system whose logic, rules, and explicit functioning work to determine 
the new conditions of possibilities of users’ lives” (Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 167). 
Rather than uncovering existing truths or knowledge, technologies used to produce 
and process data contribute to the creation of certain kinds of regimes of knowledge 
(Monahan, 2008).  
Irrespective of these problematic aspects, the arguments about the benefits that 
data-based new means of knowing offer firms constitute a powerful discursive 
regime (Kitchin, 2014) that provides the rationale for adopting data technologies and 
legitimises their development, making its message commonsensical and persuading 
actors to its logic. As Kitchin (2014) points out, countering the narrative about 
datafication’s economic benefits is difficult. If datafication promises lucrative 
business models and competitive advantage through optimisation, efficiency, 
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control, foresight, new innovative services and durable assets, who would want to be 
left out? Rejecting data’s value means having less of these things, in other words, 
missing out on innovative services, being less efficient and giving competitive 
advantage to others. 
3.2 Datafication and informational capitalism 
The collection of data about people has always been important to the practices of 
governance and control, but the questions around data and power are becoming more 
central due to the advancement of datafication (Hintz et al., 2019). While the 
accumulation of data was previously by and large the domain of the state, we are 
now witnessing an expansion of the role of private sector in this domain (Andrejevic 
& Gates, 2014; Flyverbom et al., 2017). Accordingly, a growing literature examines 
data-based business practices from the point of view of political economy of 
datafication, focusing on the power relations shaping the production and distribution 
of data, and on the economic logic of data-based knowledge production. So far, this 
literature has not converged into agreed-on concepts and terminology, and authors 
discuss contemporary capitalism in the digital environment with a focus on, for 
example, data as a form of capital, surveillance as a mode of producing data, and 
platforms as the apparatus of data production. The use of different concepts and 
approaches reflects parallel, potentially complementary and partially overlapping 
emphases, some of which do not acknowledge one another. What is in common with 
these approaches is that they consider datafication as a mechanism driving a new 
stage of capitalism, a specific form of informational capitalism (Castells, 1996) that 
is quickly becoming a significant underpinning of the contemporary society. Taken 
together, the literature analysing business data practices and data arrangements of 
the private sector is a description of the contemporary data economy imaginary. 
One of the commonly employed concepts in this literature is data capitalism. 
The concept broadly stresses the economic role of datafication, the commodification 
of data (Hintz et al., 2019) and data as a form of capital (Sadowski, 2019). For 
example, West (2019) examines data capitalism as a result of construing data as 
legitimate object of economic interest, tracking data capitalism’s development as a 
consequence of turning from an e-commerce model, premised on the sale of goods 
online, to the sale of advertisements based on behavioural profiles tied to personal 
data. Data capitalism’s economic logic “places primacy on the power of networks 
by creating value out of the digital traces produced within them” and “appeals to 
community and consumer power to mask the digital labour it relies on [and] calls 
into question the conflict between our needs for privacy and desires for community” 
(West, 2019: 21). 
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Surveillance capitalism as discussed by Shoshana Zuboff first in an influential 
article (2015) and later in a polemical book (2019), has become another key concept. 
Zuboff outlines the features of “a new economic logic based on fortune-telling and 
selling” (Zuboff, 2019: 88) that hinges on extracting data about individuals “for the 
purpose of knowing, controlling, and modifying behaviour to produce new varieties 
of commodification, monetisation, and control” (Zuboff, 2015: 85). Some of the data 
that firms extract about people are employed to improve service provided to people. 
Data in excess of this is, in Zuboff’s metaphor-rich terminology, behavioural surplus. 
For Zuboff (2019), “normal” and acceptable informational capitalism based on 
personal data turns into more dubious surveillance capitalism when behavioural 
surplus is employed to know more about people’s behaviour now and in the future, 
for the purpose of using that knowledge as a means to serve not people themselves, 
but others’ ends. The focus in Zuboff’s writing is on this specific, questionable mode 
of data exploitation, the economic incentives that drive surveillance capitalist firms 
to increase behavioural surplus, and on the social relations that the economic logic 
implies. Zuboff’s analysis highlights the mechanisms of data extraction, behaviour 
prediction, commodification of behavioural modification, and control, which she 
identifies as enabling the production of new markets for data-based products and 
services but hamper agency and self-determination by “exiling” people from their 
own behaviour. 
Other, less widespread concepts have also been employed to analyse 
contemporary informational capitalism. Scholarship on drone capitalism 
(Andrejevic, 2016; Richardson, 2018) focuses on the cascading logic of automation, 
describing how automatic data collection leads to the necessity of automating 
analysis, then decision-making, and ultimately action. Each step of automation 
seems to naturally and irrefutably lead to the next step due to scale increases, making 
it difficult to contest the logic. Some of the more critical accounts examine data 
relations through the lens of data colonialism (Couldry & Mejias, 2019; Thatcher et 
al., 2016), likening informational capitalism’s appropriation of data and the 
normalisation of their economic exploitation to “the predatory extractive practices 
of historical colonialism” (Couldry & Mejias, 2019: 336). 
Datafication as a basis for value creation and monetisation is perhaps nowhere 
as obvious as in digital platforms. Authors discussing platform capitalism (e.g., 
Srnicek, 2017) focus on digital platforms and their role in contemporary 
informational capitalism in arranging interactions so that data can be efficiently 
produced. Theoretically, two perspectives to platforms can be identified: from an 
engineering perspective, they are modular technological architectures; and from an 
economic perspective, they act as intermediaries of multi-sided markets (Gawer, 
2014). In a discursive sense, a strict understanding of platforms as either an 
engineering or an economic phenomenon has long since been relaxed to favour a 
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more everyday understanding as online services of various intermediaries (Gillespie, 
2010). Platforms make two or more groups meet and allow them to interact. To name 
some possibilities, users, customers, advertisers, application developers, content 
providers or service suppliers (Srnicek, 2017). Consumer-facing intermediaries 
include Google search, Facebook, Twitter, Uber or AirBnB. However, also Amazon 
Web Services or “industrial internet” services that embed computational and 
communicational capacities within manufacturing processes can be understood as 
digital platforms. Being situated in the locus of interaction between different actors 
or groups, platforms can also position themselves as the substrate where the 
interactions occur. It is, therefore, possible to datafy these interactions, and the 
platform can serve as the “extractive apparatus of data” (Srnicek, 2017: 48). 
Two economic characteristics are essential to the efficiency of platforms as the 
data extractive apparatus: network effects and cross-subsidisation. Services affected 
by network effects get more valuable to everyone as they get more users. In digital 
platforms, network effects can work by two mechanisms. The service can simply 
become more enticing as more users are involved; a social networking site becomes 
more useful the more participants it has, and similarly AirBnB improves along with 
more offerings to choose from. Network effects may also apply to data. The more 
users a service has, the more data it can collect, and the more raw material there is 
for personalisation or recommendation systems. If improved personalisation and 
recommendations lead to more users choosing the service, more data can again be 
collected which leads to even more improvements, still more users and so on (Rieder 
& Sire, 2013; Srnicek, 2017). Cross-subsidisation, in turn, refers to how platform 
companies subsidise losses incurred in one market in order to stimulate sales in other, 
profit-turning market (Rochet & Tirole, 2003). The purpose is to better leverage 
network effects. If the increase of users on one market makes services offered on the 
other market more valuable, there can be an incentive to cross-subsidise. In practice, 
consumer-facing online services often offer services for free to people, and expect 
profits from customers in markets where targeting service is sold to businesses. 
The above accounts of contemporary informational capitalism describe how 
firms encompass datafication on the mass scale within an economic logic. One of 
their main outcomes is that the emergent new form of informational capitalism 
results in a new asymmetric distribution of power. As Sarah Myers West 
summarises, while “communication and information are historically a key source of 
power (Castells, 2007), data capitalism results in a distribution of power that is 
asymmetrical and weighted toward the actors who have access and the capability to 
make sense of data” (West, 2019: 23). In contemporary informational capitalism, 
knowledge that is produced based on personal data is shaped to serve the interests of 
those actors who have the power in the sense of having the means to make use of 
data. Firms exploit this position of power to construct and control the markets in 
Tuukka Lehtiniemi 
34 
which the exchanges of data, value and money take place, and in the context of 
competition among firms, do this in a way that advances their own economic 
interests. Consequently, markets which determine who benefits from personal data 
are by design arranged such that users do not participate in them. This does not mean 
that people would not benefit from the use of their data; we obviously do, for 
example, in the form of highly useful digital services. Rather, the point is that the 
ways in which people can benefit are determined in the context of markets and 
exchanges that are shaped for firms’ profit-maximisation, and designed so that users 
do not participate in them. In short, the answers to the questions about how, by 
whom, and for what purposes knowledge is produced are already shaped by the 
imaginary of how the data economy functions. 
3.3 The social relations of data extraction 
Another commonality of the analyses of data economy’s economic logic lies in how 
they frame the production of data as data extraction (e.g., Couldry & Mejias, 2019; 
Sadowski, 2019; Srnicek, 2017; Zuboff, 2015; 2019). Terms such as ”collection” or 
“gathering“ conjure the image that data are already out there available for the taking 
(Sadowski, 2019: 6), and references to data traces or “data breadcrumbs” (Edge, 
2012) suggest that people only accidentally leave data behind as they go about their 
daily business. Extraction, in contrasts, brings the focus to the ways that people are 
targeted with purposeful processes that produce data. There processes are 
asymmetric in the sense that they tend to go unobserved by those targeted with them, 
and to produce data for purposes unknown to them (Andrejevic, 2014). 
Surveillance studies has a history of studying processes similar to data 
extraction, and this literature provides insight into the nature of data extractive 
processes. Surveillance, in a conventional sense, is defined as systematic, routine, 
and focused attention to personal details for a given purpose (Lyon, 2007; 2014). 
The purpose in question may include, for example, management, control, influence, 
or protection. When information technology is employed to automate surveillance, 
some authors (e.g., Raley, 2013; van Dijck, 2014) employ the concept of 
dataveillance, referring to surveillance by means of personal data systems (Clarke, 
1988), potentially on the mass scale to monitor large groups of people (Clarke, 
2003). Dataveillance tremendously enhances the efficiency of surveillance. As Raley 
(2013: 124) notes, it is not only that there is a difference in degree when dataveillance 
makes it more efficient and simultaneously less visible to systematically focus 
attention on personal details. There is also a qualitative difference; surveillance by 
means of dataveillance is not only descriptive, but also predictive and prescriptive 
(Raley, 2013) – that is, dataveillance makes it possible to not only monitor current 
and past behaviour, but also to form predictions about future behaviour, intentions, 
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and characteristics. In addition, predictions of future behaviour enable intervening 
in behaviour before the fact (Lyon, 2014) and to even modify behaviour, for example 
by constructing personalised choice environments that do not necessarily enforce or 
restrict choices, but rather nudge towards choices preferred by the designers of the 
choice environment (Yeung, 2016).  
Another qualitative difference to traditional surveillance is that dataveillance is 
not selective (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014; Lyon, 2014; van Dijck, 2014). Where 
surveillance has conventionally relied on targeting specific persons of interest, in 
dataveillance there is no difference between targets and non-targets of data collection 
(Andrejevic & Gates, 2014), since predictive processes require knowledge about 
both groups in order to reveal differences between them. Likewise, where 
surveillance presumes monitoring for specific purposes, dataveillance can be 
automatic and continuous, performed for unstated purposes that only become known 
later on (van Dijck, 2014). Initial non-selective dataveillance allows the selection of 
targets for intervention later on. 
Mark Andrejevic and Kelly Gates (2014) have identified three structural features 
of data extraction that have implications for social relations in the digital 
environment under the dominant data economy arrangements. The first of these is 
opacity, which can be thought to stem from data being inferentially fertile (Manson 
& O’Neill, 2007: 104). This is to say that data do not only contain specific pieces of 
information in a straightforward manner; instead, different correlations in and across 
different datasets may be uncovered by inference and data mining. These 
correlations may be un-intuitable and it can be impossible to find a common-sense 
explanation for them. However, it is, or at least it is imagined to be, enough to simply 
make use of their predictive power. Because of this opacity, knowledge derived from 
data is epistemologically oriented to serve those who produce them, rather than the 
people whom they target (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014). The second structural feature, 
speculativeness, refers to the potential value of the uses that data may be put in the 
future. Speculativeness stems from structural opacity; it is not possible to know the 
actual and potential uses of data ex ante, as new, valuable correlations may be found 
only when data are combined with other data. Therefore, justification to data 
extraction may only be presented ex post (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014). This leads to 
incentives to considered all data as signals to be analysed (Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier, 2013); as much data as possible should be recorded before even determining 
the full range of their potential uses (Lyon, 2014: 4). The third structural feature, 
asymmetry, stems from how dataveillance is reliant on infrastructural capacities to 
extract data and produce predictions (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014). It relies on the 
availability of data, as well as specialised means of production relying on proprietary 
expertise and capabilities (Zuboff, 2015) such as data management, automated data 
processing and computing power. Data-based knowledge is available only to those 
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who are capable of tapping into these resources. This asymmetry has been elsewhere 
characterised by Andrejevic as the “big data divide” (Andrejevic, 2014); data 
extraction does not only signify the separation between individuals and their data, 
but also a separation in the sense of the ability to analyse and make us of the data.  
What these structural features of data extraction imply for social relations in the 
data economy is that they institutionalise the lack of reciprocities between those who 
extract data, and those who are the targets of extraction. Even though personal data 
signal personal and potentially intimate details about people, data extraction is a one-
way process occurring in the absence of dialogue between people and those who 
extract data (Zuboff, 2015). Extracted data are assembled into representations of 
people that are constructed for the purpose of intervention (Haggerty & Ericson, 
2000); however, the intention of creating this representation influences how it is 
constructed, what data it includes or left out, and the kinds of intervention it enables 
(Dalton et al., 2016). Even if users are aware of data extraction and the consequent 
production of knowledge, these data and knowledge are not oriented to serve their 
interests. 
3.4 Formal institutions regulating data extraction 
Of the formal institutions providing collective rules of interaction between people 
and organisations doing data extraction, privacy-related regulation is perhaps the 
most obvious one. While there are differences between jurisdictions, an important 
regulatory approach both in the EU as well as the US is to protect people’s 
informational privacy based on the principle of informational self-determination, 
under which people are charged with making choices about personal data (e.g., Coll, 
2014; Solove, 2013). In practice, this means that data extraction requires providing 
people with information about it and asking their permission for it, a practice that we 
often come across in our daily lives, whether on- or offline. Under this regulatory 
approach, the right to informational privacy is a right to decide, and the exercise of 
this right means choosing one’s position in the spectrum between secrecy and 
transparency (Zuboff, 2015). The assumption is that “data subjects make conscious, 
rational and autonomous choices about the processing of their personal data” 
(Schermer et al., 2014: 171). If the benefit expected from revealing data outweighs 
the associated harm, an individual performing rational cost-benefit calculations 
would choose to reveal the data (Solove, 2013).  
Consequently, when data are extracted in accordance with privacy regulation 
based on informational self-determination, this would be a voluntary process on the 
part of the data subject. That companies provide their users with services and 
simultaneously extract data about them would, then, indicate that people have grown 
accustomed to the trade-off between extraction of data and free services (van Dijck, 
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2014). This would mean that people are comfortable with the exchange they are 
presented with, and consider the benefits they receive to outweigh the costs. Firms 
emphasise exactly this position; users always have the choice not to use their 
services, and that what we are witnessing is indeed people’s rational acceptance of 
trade-offs based on cost-benefit calculations (Schermer et al., 2014; Turow et al., 
2015a). However, empirical research based on surveys, experiments, focus groups 
and interviews has established that privacy emerges as citizens’ primary concern in 
the digital age, with people complaining that their rights and the ability to control 
their personal data are limited (e.g., Hargittai & Marwick, 2016; Hoffman et al., 
2016; Kennedy et al., 2015; Marwick & Hargittai, 2018; Selwyn & Pangrazio, 2018). 
Despite this, people often reveal private information for even small rewards and 
engage in dataveillance practices as voluntary participants, “prosumers” (Ritzer & 
Jurgenson, 2010) of sorts. To put it differently, although when asked, people claim 
to desire for and care about informational privacy, they nevertheless behave in ways 
that contradicts those claims. 
The inconsistency between expressed attitudes and observed behaviours is often 
called the privacy paradox (Norberg et al., 2007), and different explanations for the 
paradox have been provided (Draper & Turow, 2019; Kokolakis, 2017). One 
explanation was already described above: we are observing informed people who 
engage in privacy calculus, recognise privacy harms, and in the cases where the 
apparent paradox occurs, simply judge the benefits accruing from data collection to 
be larger than the associated harms (see Draper, 2017; Hoofnagle & Urban, 2014). 
Another explanation focuses on the bounds of rational decision-making that delimit 
privacy calculus (see Acquisti et al., 2015): people attempting to perform privacy 
calculus are affected by heuristics, emotions or misperceptions of costs and benefits 
of data disclosure, which cause them to misjudge the situation. A third type of 
explanation stresses that people are uninformed of the ways personal data are 
collected and used, and therefore simply unaware that they engage in behaviour that 
contradicts their stated intentions and preferences (see Barnes, 2006; Dommeyer & 
Gross, 2003; Park, 2013). An imaginative explanation based on quantum 
indeterminacy has also been offered: privacy preferences, like the observables in 
quantum physics, remain indeterminate until they are observed when the actual 
privacy decision is made (Flender & Müller, 2012).  
Privacy research has also highlighted various ways in which privacy calculus is 
not easily performed despite best of intentions. People are expected to provide 
consent for data extraction in conditions characterised by lack of transparency, 
context-dependent and malleable attitudes towards privacy, and oftentimes a lack of 
real choice over whether or not to reveal data (e.g., Acquisti et al., 2015; Schermer 
et al., 2014; Solove, 2013). Cost-benefit analysis on the exchange of data for services 
requires comparing two abstract things, the valuation of which is complicated to 
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begin with. To further complicate things, even if people had control over data they 
do voluntarily provide, they would not have control of the data that is produced on 
the basis of other data (Mai, 2016). Further, the terms of data extraction are largely 
imposed on the users (Degli Esposti, 2014), and the choice environment can be 
engineered to serve specific interests and to make meaningful consideration of 
privacy decisions difficult (Crain, 2018; Draper & Turow, 2019; Monahan, 2016). 
The framework based on informational self-determination is also fundamentally 
challenged because it focuses on individual choice and therefore fails to 
acknowledge collective dimensions of privacy (Baruh & Popescu, 2017). Due to 
these reasons, many have argued, it is challenging or impossible for people to make 
meaningful decisions on personal data, regardless of intentions to do so (see Article 
I). 
Sami Coll (2014) argues that a concern over loss of privacy, combined with a 
continuing understanding of privacy in terms of self-determination, leads to the main 
project becoming the education of people to protect themselves. People become to 
be seen as the first line of defence in need to be enlisted to guard their own privacy 
(e.g., Norberg et al., 2007: 120). A combination of the structural incapability for 
meaningful self-determination with a regulatory approach that nevertheless relies on 
self-determination can be viewed as the culprit of efficient dataveillance practices; 
people are nominally in control of their data and privacy, but some of that control is 
in practice transferred to those doing dataveillance. In other words, if the structural 
features of dataveillance lead to privacy self-determination being possible to only a 
limited extent, “the notion of privacy and the surveillance of data act as the ‘partners-
in-crime’ of the current growing digital economy” (Coll, 2014: 1253). Companies 
and organisations ask users to provide broad permissions for extracting and using 
data, and therefore simultaneously accumulate rights to make decisions on data use 
(Zuboff, 2015). If privacy is a decision right, dominant data arrangements 
redistribute these rights, concentrating them from people to companies.  
The development of dominant data arrangements has taken place ahead of 
meaningful new regulatory developments that could curb them. In light of how 
privacy protection acts as a force of co-opting individual control for the purposes of 
enacting efficient forms of data extraction, their development is not necessarily 
delimited, but rather made possible, by existing privacy regulations. In this sense, 
privacy regulation acts as an institution making the prevailing data arrangements 
possible. Regulation provides roles for people and the entities producing data, and 
rules for interaction between them, and these roles and rules work to make prevailing 
data extraction practices possible. 
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3.5 Resignation towards dataveillance 
People are the ultimate sources of personal data, and could in principle demand 
alternative ways of organising data relations in the digital environment. As discussed 
above, some explanations for why people continue to voluntarily participate in and 
allow data extraction have been uncovered in research on the privacy paradox. An 
alternative explanation for people’s apparently voluntary participation can be framed 
in terms of politics of collective imagination about dataveillance. I will here draw 
from two recently proposed sociological concepts, surveillance realism (Dencik, 
2018) and digital resignation (Draper & Turow, 2019). 
By surveillance realism, Lina Dencik (2018; also see Dencik & Cable, 2017; 
Hintz et al., 2019) refers to the contemporary social condition of the digital 
environment: the normalisation and common-sense nature of ubiquitous 
dataveillance, and the experienced inurement to prevalent dataveillance practices, 
whether by state or commercial actors. Dencik builds on Mark Fisher’s (2009) notion 
of capitalist realism, a framework for viewing capitalism’s effects on cultural 
production, politics, economics and thought. Capitalist realism refers to the sense in 
which capitalism is not just viewed as the only viable political and economic system, 
but also normalised to an extent that it seems to have become impossible to imagine 
alternatives to it. Dencik makes an analogous argument about surveillance in the 
digital domain. As an example of developments leading to the condition of 
surveillance realism, Dencik presents post-Snowden protests against state 
dataveillance, which did not result in widespread responses from the broader public 
due to a securitisation discourse that worked to justify and normalise the 
dataveillance practices as necessary responses to imminent security threats. Through 
such developments, and despite simultaneous widespread unease of dataveillance 
practices, infrastructures and systems, people have internalised their necessity 
(Dencik & Cable, 2017). Dataveillance infrastructures and practices have become 
normalised to the extent that their existence is the “pervasive atmosphere” (Fischer, 
2009) that limits thought and hampers possibilities of imagining alternative ways for 
organising relationships in the digital environment. 
In the condition of surveillance realism, people are resigned to the present state 
of affairs, and simultaneously alternatives do not seem plausible. To explain just this 
resignation on a detailed level, Nora Draper and Joseph Turow (2019) draw from a 
set of empirical findings on people’s attitudes towards data collection and privacy. 
These include a pervasive feeling that corporate data arrangements are unfair but a 
simultaneous sense of resignation over the matter (Turow et al., 2015a); people’s 
feeling of powerlessness to avoid privacy violations (Hargittai & Marwick, 2016); a 
reduced sense of control induced by what is seen as compulsory disclosure of data 
(Marwick & Hargittai, 2018); and the recognition of privacy risks and simultaneous 
uncertainty, mistrust and lack of power that render privacy protection behaviour 
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subjectively futile (Hoffman et al., 2016). These findings indicate that individuals 
engage in privacy protection or the opposition of dataveillance, but feel that those 
efforts are generally unsuccessful (Selwyn & Pangrazio, 2018). People desire to have 
control towards information about them, but feel unable to exercise it in a meaningful 
way. The inurement to dataveillance and the inability to meaningfully contest it are, 
according to Draper and Turow, key elements of the contemporary social condition 
in the digital environment. This social condition has not developed arbitrarily; 
instead, it is cultivated by specific, widespread corporate behaviours and 
communicative strategies that work to obfuscate the situation and convey a sense of 
normalcy around dataveillance practices (Draper & Turow, 2019). Examples of this 
cultivation include technological systems that mislead users by presenting them with 
the illusion of control (Monahan, 2016); transparency initiatives that suggest user 
empowerment to control data but in practice give little insight to the firm’s actual 
practices (Crain, 2016); and privacy policies that require extensive time to be 
familiarised with (McDonald & Cranor, 2008) and are difficult to understand due to 
jargon that limits comprehension and discourages careful reading (e.g., Pollach, 
2005). 
Both Dencik as well as Draper and Turow stress that the inurement does not 
imply that people would be passive or apathetic towards dataveillance. It is, rather, 
that their attitudes towards dataveillance reflect, and are negotiated in the context of, 
the way dataveillance systems are integrated in the modern society. These attitudes 
are nurtured by data-using companies by means of specific data arrangements in 
order to ensure continued possibilities of data extraction. The outcome is that 
people’s desire for more control does not lead to motivation to work towards change; 
people consider meaningful engagement with data arrangements and their politics 
too time-consuming, demanding, and ultimately futile. 
3.6 The data economy imaginary 
As Charles Taylor (2004: 25) suggests, practices and imaginaries should be 
understood to go hand in hand; here, the data arrangements that dominate our digital 
habitat go hand in hand with the dominant imaginary underlying the spread and 
application of data technologies. This is to say that the data arrangements discussed 
in this chapter should be simultaneously understood as the tacit understanding of 
how the data economy functions, what is normal and expected, and how things 
usually go between data economy’s actors. This understanding, in turn, is embodied 
in data economy actors’ taken-for-granted processes, procedures and ways of doing 
things. These data arrangements have become “a key underpinning of contemporary 
society, necessary to the successful operation of the economy […] Data collection 
practices are not merely normalised as inevitable component of information 
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infrastructures, but also justified through discourses circulating within the spheres of 
policy-making, media coverage and everyday interactions” (Hintz et al., 2019: 10).  
Based on this discussion, I highlight two interconnected aspects of the dominant 
data economy imaginary. The first aspect concerns the drive for the extraction of 
more data. Through dominant data arrangements, datafication is tied in with firms’ 
notions on how data and datafication are normally exploited economically. This is 
to say that certain cultural routines concern data arrangements, certain ways of 
producing data and new knowledge based on data are viewed as legitimate, and there 
are certain normal, taken-for-granted ways of using data in the production and 
monetisation of economic value. Data are viewed as a resource there for the taking, 
a form of capital that can be legitimately exploited in the creation of economic value. 
Data are associated with more efficient ways of conducting existing business, with a 
potential for highly successful, innovative and disruptive new forms of conducting 
business, with increased control of assets, customers, employees and processes, as 
well as with foresight into the future. These promises of data’s value are competitive 
in nature, in the sense that they contain promises of competitive edge against others. 
Conversely, neglecting data’s opportunities would mean less innovation, less 
efficiency, less control, and less foresight. Once this imperative is accepted, market 
competition orients companies to hone their systems – digital platforms, market 
relations, and policies that govern them – such that as much data as possible can be 
extracted, in ways that are deemed acceptable in view of the established data 
arrangements.  
The second aspect concerns the part that people play in the data economy as 
citizens, consumers and users. What has become the taken-for-granted shape of the 
data economy affects not only how companies operate, but also how digital 
technologies permeate people’s lives. The role for people is not that of a consumer 
making choices, nor an agentic citizen; rather, people are the sources of data and 
targets of data extraction. How data are used is decided on the basis of how they best 
serve those who have extracted them; these decisions are normally made in the 
context of markets facing paying customers, largely other businesses. These 
arrangements are made possible by the prevailing formal institution of privacy 
regulation. In the dominant data economy imaginary, the taken-for-granted response 
to the question of who decides what data are collected, what is learned based on it, 
who does the learning, and who decides who benefits, is “not people themselves”. 
The structural features of dataveillance – opacity, speculativeness, and asymmetries 
– tend to ensure maintaining “one-way mirror social relations” (Zuboff, 2019: 81) 
between firms and users. The operations and markets in the data industry are 
incompatible with the idea of empowering individual people through increased 
transparency and control (Crain, 2018), and the forms of knowledge generated by 
dataveillance “push against any attempt to delimit either the collection of data or the 
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purposes to which that data are turned” (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014: 192). 
Dataveillance permeates the digital domain to the extent that it is difficult to imagine 
alternatives to it, and companies cultivate the condition of digital resignation to 
maintain the present, taken-for-granted shape of things in the data economy (Dencik, 
2018; Draper & Turow, 2019). 
The dominant data economy imaginary is grounded on beliefs about datafication 
and about data arrangements that orient them to serve primarily companies’ interests, 
and this imaginary works to enable the continuation and expansion of data extraction. 
The two aspects highlighted above point out how the data economy imaginary is not 
just the imaginary of those commercial actors that utilise data for their own purposes. 
Rather, through how data economy’s arrangements permeate people’s lives, the 
dominant data economy imaginary also becomes to affect how people view 
datafication and how they expect things to normally work in the data economy. 
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4 Data Activism 
Langdon Winner notes in The Whale and the Reactor that our thinking is driven by 
an “almost religious conviction that a widespread adoption of computers and 
communications systems along with easy access to electronic information will 
automatically produce a better world for human living.” (Winner, 1986: 105). 
Indeed, the use of technologies that convert aspects of social life into quantifiable 
data has been largely accompanied by a rhetoric stressing their political and societal 
benefits (e.g., van Dijck & Nieborg, 2009; West, 2019). Similarly, much writing 
related to citizenship in the digital domain has been focused on citizens’ agency and 
empowerment that can be derived from the use of data-enabled digital tools (see 
Hintz et al., 2019: 21). However, like technologies generally (Feenberg, 1999: 7), 
data technologies are ambivalent in the sense that they are available for alternative 
developments with different social consequences. This is to say that with the 
widespread adoption of data technologies, we might or might not end up with a better 
world for human living. Citing Andrew Feenberg’s philosophy of technology, Helen 
Kennedy (2018) argues that what fundamentally matters for these alternative 
developments is the subject position of people in relation to data technologies: 
whether we are dominant or subordinate to technological systems. When looking at 
technological systems, the issue is not with just what can be derived from the use of 
data-enabled tools, but also the subject position citizens have in the data 
arrangements in which those tools are embedded. 
The development of data technologies has largely taken place under the radar, 
outrunning our understanding of what is at stake, meaningful ethical scrutiny, or 
functioning regulation that could come along with them (Zuboff, 2015). Recently, 
however, straightforward notions of citizens simply deriving agency and 
empowerment from digital tools have arguably been complicated by a gradual 
collective waking up to the political economy of dataveillance. Even if data 
technologies have thus far developed in a yet un-normed space, “the realm of human 
activity outside the state and the market […] is now slowly but steadily catching up 
and turning ‘big data’ to its own ends” (Milan & van der Velden, 2016: 59). 
As one outcome, data activism has emerged as a distinct category of civic 
engagement with data technologies. Data activism, broadly understood, refers to 
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civic engagement and political action that in some sense emerge in response to the 
uneven distribution of data access and data use capabilities in datafied times (e.g., 
Baack, 2015; Beraldo & Milan, 2019; Gutiérrez, 2018a; Milan & Gutiérrez, 2015; 
Milan & van der Velden, 2016; Schrock, 2016). Data activism has emerged 
alongside increasing citizen awareness of different kinds of potentials that data have: 
for social change, for surveillance, for economic exploitation or benefit, for control 
of others or the self. As will be discussed below, data activism may aim to interfere 
with, hijack, contest or re-appropriate (Beraldo & Milan, 2019) existing data 
arrangements. The aim can be preventing the use of data for the benefit of others, or 
making use of data to improve the citizens’ own condition. In other words, data are 
brought forward as the object of intentional action. Data activism, as Milan and 
Gutiérrez put it, “brings back into the data collection machine the fundamental 
elements of agency and politics” (Milan & Gutiérrez, 2015: 130); it is about citizen 
agency in datafied times. 
If technologies are ambivalent in the sense that they are available for different 
social consequences, the dominant data economy imaginary outlined in the previous 
chapter is but one possibility for how data technologies affect and permeate our lives. 
New data arrangements developed in data activism can amount to reconsideration of 
relations between technologies, people, firms, and states in the production of data, 
knowledge and value. In other words, they can act as underpinnings for an alternative 
data economy. 
This chapter discusses the continuously expanding scholarship on data activism, 
with a purpose of providing an overview of the ways in which data activism relates 
to the dominant data arrangements in the data economy. In addition, the aim is to 
situate the MyData initiative, described in Chapter 1 and empirically examined in 
Articles III and IV, in the broader context of data activism. 
4.1 Civic engagement and the digital environment 
Whereas data activism as such is new phenomenon due to its connection to novel 
data technologies, the social forces driving it are not new (Milan & Gutiérrez, 2015). 
Data activism may be viewed as a recent variety of advocacy, grassroots political 
action, and appropriation of information and communication technologies that are 
both motivated and made possible by digital technologies. These forms of civic 
engagement are connected with people’s rights, capabilities and roles as users, 
consumers and citizens – that is to say, they broadly concern digital citizenship, or 
citizen agency in the digital environment (Hintz et al., 2017; 2019). These forms of 
advocacy and citizen engagement indicate different ways of reacting or responding 
to the closing off and monopolising of knowledge production and value creation in 
digital environments.  
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Civil society’s engagement with, and in, the digital environment can take many 
forms. Some entail collective organisation of advocacy; nowadays the use of digital 
media naturally forms the basis for many forms of civic engagement, such as 
community building and organising work for both digital-specific campaigning and 
more general political causes (see Kaun & Uldam, 2017). Digital-specific political 
campaigns include, for example, digital rights activism that employs internet to 
defend values that are seen to lie at the heart of internet in a recursive manner 
(Breindl, 2013); the freedom of information movement that advocates 
communication freedoms, publicness of information, and state and corporate 
transparency, and the liberalisation and homogenisation of regulations across 
jurisdictions (Beyer, 2014); and the advocacy for rights of consumers to participate 
in the production of cultural content, promoting recognition of users’ agency in 
creating products that shape mass culture, and their legitimate claims over the 
content they create (Postigo, 2012).  
Other forms of citizen engagement entail the development of technologies in 
order to develop alternative forms of material culture. One example is the free 
software movement investigated by Christopher Kelty (2008), already mentioned in 
Chapter 2. The free software activism is based on a particular relationship between 
technology, governance and the internet, so that enacting societal change is 
combined with ideas about the correct role of technology in achieving that change. 
Sometimes promoting alternative forms of technology is directly combined with 
forming connections or collaborations with the private sector. In such cases, social 
change is sought through technologies that are developed and produced by 
commercial firms, the “open source” variant of the free software movement being 
one example (Hess, 2005). 
Highlighting the importance of data and information in contemporary politics, 
hackers and hacktivists act to counteract the power of governments to shape the 
internet and limit freedoms (Milan & Gutiérrez, 2015: 122). Civic hackers, for 
example, building on the ideas of freedom of information, deploy infrastructure and 
tools as a mode of “requesting, digesting contributing, modelling and contesting 
data” (Schrock, 2016: 584) for this purpose. Hacking may be seen as a form of 
citizens’ data agency (Pybus et al., 2015), which may be employed for resistance as 
well as the explicit forwarding of political causes such as improvement of 
governance.  
The alternative data and analytics practices developed and made known by the 
Quantified Self (QS) community exhibit a different take on civil society’s 
possibilities of engagement with datafication. The community engages in ‘soft 
resistance’ (Nafus & Sherman, 2014) towards dominant data practices; it welcomes 
commercial actors, but it simultaneously questions who gets to aggregate data, how, 
and for what purposes. The community remains, therefore, ambiguous in terms of its 
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valuations, so that the values of sharing that are essential to the movement can thrive, 
but this can happen alongside the simultaneous commercialisation of self-tracking 
(Barta & Neff, 2016). 
4.2 Data activism as a heuristic tool 
As was pointed out above, data activism can be viewed as forming a response to the 
complications of straightforward notions of citizens simply deriving agency and 
empowerment from data technologies. Milan and Gutiérrez (2015) and Milan and 
van der Velden (2016) consider data activism as civil society’s response to the 
uneven distribution of data and capabilities, indicating diverse social practices that 
manifest a critical attitude to datafication. Understood in this broad manner, data 
activism can include heterogeneous forms of activism and activist tactics. Data can 
be the issue of political struggle in their own right, or rather tools for struggle over 
other issues (Beraldo & Milan, 2019). Nevertheless, data activism starts from the 
recognition that as data and information are increasingly important in contemporary 
society, access to data is power. In data activism, citizen empowerment is seen to 
emerge from citizens’ exercise of control over technologies (Milan & Gutiérrez, 
2015; also see Rodriguez, 2001). In this way, data activism represents a potential 
challenge to existing data power relations. For data activism, “technology is 
simultaneously the means to provoke change in society and a site of struggle in its 
own right” (Milan & Gutiérrez, 2015: 127) due to the politics and power relations 
embedded in technology. Milan and van der Velden (2016) expand on these notions 
by considering data activism as civic engagement and political action that engage 
with new forms that knowledge production takes. In relation to dominant modes of 
datafication, data activism aims to create novel and alternative data arrangements 
and new responses to Zuboff’s (2015) questions about who can learn based on data, 
and who decides about this. Data activism develops innovative ways of relating to 
datafication, the production of knowledge, and their consequences.  
Given this broad characterisation of data activism, rather than a “definition” of a 
specific form of social action, Milan and colleagues consider data activism as a 
heuristic tool to explore how people politically engage with the production and use 
of data (Milan & Gutiérrez, 2015; Milan & van der Velden, 2016). Being a heuristic 
tool means that data activism is a concept that can enable understanding of a 
phenomenon; it is an artificial construct that acts as a lens through which to examine 
how activism evolves with respect to datafication. The concept is not even expected 
to be stable, but instead susceptible to revisions through empirical research (Milan 
& van der Velden, 2016).  
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4.3 Data activism and social justice 
Kennedy (2018) explicitly ties data activism in with a notion of justice; data activism 
“seeks to challenge existing data power relations and to mobilise data in order to 
enhance social justice” (Kennedy, 2018: 18). In this view, data activists aim at the 
development of more just practices of data collection and use, as well as policies that 
govern such practices. These more just data arrangements, of course, need to involve 
normative notions of injustices to be addressed. In scholarship on data justice 
(Dencik et al., 2016; Taylor, 2017), social harms resulting from contemporary data 
arrangements are seen to exacerbate existing social injustices, as well as to produce 
new ones. Jonathan Cinnamon (2017) usefully analyses injustices produced by 
surveillance capitalism by framing them in terms of Nancy Fraser’s (2008) notion of 
parity of participation. This analysis can be employed to highlight different ways in 
which data activism can address injustices. 
Fraser’s (2008) suggestion is to submit all justice claims to the normative 
principle that everyone should be permitted to participate as peers in social life. 
According to Fraser, injustices that hinder parity of participation in social life occur 
in three dimensions: they can concern the economic maldistribution of resources that 
prevents some from participating, socio-cultural misrecognition that affords some a 
lower status in the society, and political misrepresentation that denies political voice 
and possibilities to redress injustices. In Cinnamon’s (2017) analysis, 
maldistribution of data results from data extraction practices which separate people 
from their data. As a result of data extraction, data are accumulated by corporations 
that can then access and use data on an aggregate level, something that data subjects 
themselves cannot do. These mechanisms were already extensively discussed in 
Chapter 3. According to Cinnamon, data maldistribution can be seen as the initial 
injustice. After people are separated from their data, further injustices can be 
produced when those data are used by others in ways that have consequences on 
people’s lives. Socio-cultural misrecognition is one such further injustice 
(Cinnamon, 2017). The separation of people from their data makes it possible to 
employ data for profiling, social sorting and other forms of categorisation based on 
data analysis. The injustice of misrecognition occurs when people are categorised in 
ways that produce status inequalities that are consequential in their lives. The third 
dimension of injustice is intimately related to the second one; it concerns 
misrepresentation, or how people or groups are rendered voiceless to contest 
injustices and engage as peers in democratic society. According to Cinnamon, the 
mechanisms that propagate this injustice are related to the inability to meaningfully 
access data that people are initially separated from, as well as to contest the unjust 
categorisations done based on the data.  
This analysis of surveillance capitalism’s injustices points out ways in which 
data activism can challenge injustices of data arrangements: by means of removing 
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obstacles that stand in the way of parity of participation in social life. Some forms of 
data activism can focus on data distribution, that is, address the injustice of data 
maldistribution. Others can focus on the consequences of maldistribution down the 
line, that is, socio-cultural misrecognition based on data, or political 
misrepresentation leading to the inability to challenge observed injustices. This, 
again, points to the various forms that data activism can take, as will be further 
discussed below. 
4.4 Varieties of data activism 
Paraphrasing Winner’s (1986: 105) above-quoted disdain at how our thinking is 
driven by trust in computers and communication technologies, data activism can be 
thought to be premised on contesting the almost religious conviction that datafication 
will automatically lead to a better world for human living. However, even drastic 
differences between forms of data activism are visible in how this contestation 
unfolds. One issue is whether datafication is seen as something that needs to be 
avoided, or alternatively as a potentially positive force that needs reorientation. 
Starting from one of the first theoretical outlines of data activism (Milan & Gutiérrez, 
2015), this distinction between attitudes toward datafication has been noted in two 
“ideal types” of data activism: reactive and proactive data activism (also see Beraldo 
& Milan, 2019; Milan & van der Velden, 2016).  
Reactive data activism 
Reactive tactics posit the extraction, analysis and monetisation of data as a threat to 
individual rights, and consider datafication as something dubious, a thing to be 
avoided. Considered as a response to the injustices arising from dominant data 
practices, reactive data activism is focused on data distribution. It attempts to prevent 
the production of data, and therefore also the injustice of data maldistribution, in the 
first place. While the aim is to avoid potential harms, this avoidance also means 
bypassing any positive outcomes associated with data use. Reactive data activism 
involves self-protection against dataveillance through technical means: anonymity, 
obfuscation and encryption (Milan & van der Velden, 2016). On the practical level, 
this may include employing and promoting secure online practices, such as the TOR 
browser, using tracking protection in web browsers or VPN tunnelling in the internet 
connection, email encryption protocols such as GPG or PGP, or end-to-end 
encrypted messaging software such as Signal. Examples that can be viewed as 
reactive data activism also include employing alternative platforms such as 
DuckDuckGo for search and Mastodon for social networking, as well as general 
promotion of open source alternatives to popular web services. Abstaining from 
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Facebook use or removing mobile apps (Perrin, 2018) in the wake of Cambridge 
Analytics revelations in 2018 also fall in this category. Besides self-protection, 
organising events to help people with safer online communication (Kannengießer, 
2019) or urging people to remove their Facebook accounts (Biggs, 2018) can also be 
examples of reactive data activism. 
Reactive responses are largely efforts to intervene in social problems on the level 
of individual behavioural change and, as alternatives to dominant data arrangements, 
are dependent on acts of individual resistance (Dencik, 2018). Reactive data activism 
focused on only one service or platform also risks ignoring the broader political 
economy of dataveillance. Its more technical modes are reliant on individuals’ 
technical skills and know-how, and as such have not been successful at moving 
beyond expert communities (Dencik et al., 2016). Abstention from popular search, 
communications and social networking platforms are essentially acts of individual 
media refusal (Portwood-Stacer, 2013) and as such are a limited tactic of political 
engagement. Platforms for messaging or networking, as well as online search, 
recommender systems and other services reliant on large amounts of user data, are 
also subject to network effects which makes less-popular alternatives also less 
valuable to use. More generally, even if reactive data activism is empowering for 
individuals who engage in what they consider as privacy-preserving activities, 
“individual actions infrequently aggregate to facilitate changes in industrial 
infrastructure that result in collective empowerment or systemic change” (Draper & 
Turow, 2019: 10) due to their failure to undermine powerful systems. 
Proactive data activism 
Where reactive data activism starts from the conviction that datafication is ultimately 
harmful – at least given the political economy of data in which it is firmly embedded 
– and therefore the best thing to do is to avoid it, proactive data activism, the other 
archetype mentioned above, starts from a more positive outlook for datafication. 
Rather than resisting datafication, or even only attempting to mitigate its harms, 
proactive initiatives consider datafication as a potentially positive force. Proactive 
data activism views datafication as “an unprecedented, powerful opportunity to 
provoke social change” (Milan & van der Velden, 2016: 67) and “sees people’s 
active engagement with technologies a pathway to empowerment, equal 
participation and action” (Milan & Gutiérrez, 2018: 58). The focus is on taking 
advantage of data, data technologies or data infrastructures, and on appropriating 
them for advocacy goals to serve data activists’ ideas of desirable change. 
A further way to make sense of differences between proactive forms of data 
activism is to analytically distinguish between data as a repertoire of action, and data 
as an issue at stake (Beraldo & Milan, 2019). The first instance, data as a repertoire, 
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is evidenced by proactive initiatives that make use of data by processing, analysing, 
visualising and crunching them, for the explicit purpose of furthering some well-
defined social ends or specific advocacy goals. Milan and Gutiérrez discuss data 
activism as a field of action that emerges at the intersection of communicative 
processes in the form of different kinds of media activism, and information-related 
professions such as data analytics and journalistic investigation. They stress the 
significance of technology to manipulate data, and consider data activists as 
“interpreters of data, acting as facilitators in the contemporary data-rich public 
sphere” (Milan & Gutiérrez, 2015: 126). This viewpoint to data activism stresses the 
aim of making data serve concrete social aims; data activism is about making data 
serve the ends of advocacy. Depending on the case, gaining access to the data may 
involve different kinds of activism, such as whistle-blowers, employing open data, 
crowdsourcing data, appropriating existing data or creating data (Gutiérrez, 2018a).  
Concrete examples include attempts to impede environmental threats through the 
promotion of data transparency, data collection, data sharing and visualisation 
(Milan & Gutiérrez, 2018); and using crowdsourced crisis data for humanitarian 
assistance, effectively creating new spaces for debate and action (Gutiérrez, 2018a; 
2018b). The use of citizen and civil society data projects as advocacy instruments to 
affect data collection by official institutions on issues such as killings by police, land 
registries, water supply and literacy (Gray et al., 2016) also fall in the category. 
Further examples in connection to citizen engagement include civic hackers who 
request, digest, contribute to, model, and contest data, and make use of open data in 
an attempt to guard the public against injustices (Schrock, 2016). Stemming from 
how these proactive initiatives and projects employing data for social change ends 
have defined their goals, they have specific targets in correcting the injustices of 
misrecognition and misrepresentation. 
In contrast, some proactive data activism initiatives are rather oriented at 
considering data as the issue at stake (Beraldo & Milan, 2019). Open data activism 
provides one example. While some open data activists may also have a more specific 
social change goal in mind, in which open data itself rather becomes a repertoire of 
action, open data’s general premise is that data produced by public authorities should 
be technically and legally free to use, distribute and reuse (Baack, 2015; Kitchin, 
2014). Open data falls under the heuristic of data activism. It has emerged as a 
reaction to how datafication has resulted in an uneven distribution of power and 
knowledge that favours companies and governments and hinders public agency 
(Baack, 2015). In terms of challenging the unjust distribution of data, this premise is 
grounded on the belief that positive societal and economic transformations, 
unknowable at the moment, will take place once data maldistribution is attended to. 
Open data activists explicitly identify data maldistribution as a problem by regarding 
the availability of raw data as a prerequisite for generating new knowledge, so that 
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the monopolisation of data leads to the monopolisation of knowledge production 
(Baack, 2015). Consequently, open data activists attempt to balance the distribution 
of power and knowledge in society by turning data from a proprietary resource held 
by governments into a public resource benefiting the society at large. They are 
committed to the general aim of democratising data and knowledge production, 
rather than a set social change objective that can be supported by a specific kind of 
data manipulation. Aided by open data policies, others are then expected to access 
and make use of open data to forward specific social change objectives. In order for 
this to be possible, new kinds of technical infrastructure are required that make 
opening data possible (Kitchin 2014, 57). In addition, open data activists see the 
necessity of developing intermediaries, including new technologies, that make 
knowledge production possible (Baack, 2015). If infrastructure in considered as 
technical forms that make the flows of other things possible (see Larkin, 2013), open 
data activism could be considered an “infrastructural” form of data activism, as it is 
about the enablement of data arrangements that make movements of data possible, 
and those movements can be harnessed by others to further their own ends. 
Considering these rather different forms of civic engagement that may be 
regarded as proactive data activism, looking at the phenomenon from different 
viewpoints and focusing on different empirical cases will highlight a variety of 
aspects. Miren Gutiérrez (2018a: 49–106) discusses how the phenomenon can be 
theoretically viewed through the lenses of, for example, communicative action, data 
journalism, citizen media, social movement studies, citizen monitoring in the public 
sphere or technology activism. Gutiérrez then empirically classifies cases of 
proactive data activism as, for example, skills transferrers who in essence make data 
activism of others possible, producers of tools and platforms for data activism, 
catalysts who provide financial and other resources for data activism projects, 
producers of data journalism content and visualisations, and campaigners and 
advocates. An empirical data activism case can exhibit a combination of these 
attributes, and any individual data activists may engage in more than one of the 
modes of action. 
4.5 Data activism and the private sector 
The relationship to the private sector can be another issue differentiating between 
data activism initiatives. In some cases of data activism, industry involvement has 
been considered as inherently dubious and suspect. Reactive data activism focus on 
avoidance of data extraction exhibits an adversarial attitude towards the private 
sector and, in the post-Snowden era, towards the state-industry complex (Dencik, 
2018; Milan & van der Velden, 2016). For other initiatives, the relationship with the 
private sector may be more nuanced. Open data, for example, can support liberal 
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democratic values by providing mechanisms for more just governance, but also 
libertarian agendas by providing justification for privatisation and deregulation 
(Schrock, 2016). Analysing open government data initiatives, Bates (2013) 
highlights how political processes can restrict the counter-hegemonic potential of 
open data and instead shape it to support the marketisation of public services. Critics, 
including both practitioners as well as researchers, have more broadly objected to 
the involvement of corporations in open data, citing concerns over dubious political 
alignments and the potential for co-optation (Schrock, 2016). In a similar vein, 
Johnson (2014) points out that open data exists only in relation to the political 
economy and socio-technical arrangements, and instead of promoting more just data 
arrangements it may lead to further inequities. This is, in part, due to the asymmetries 
between capabilities to do things with data. In practice, data may be open to 
commercial enterprises, but not citizens (Johnson, 2014). Research has, however, 
pointed out that data activists are cognisant of some of these issues and the factors 
underpinning them (Baack, 2015; Schrock, 2016). Nevertheless, these critical views 
on open data highlight a broader concern for data activism; when activism agendas 
and commercial realities are in tension with one another, activism focusing on data 
distribution may serve agendas and imaginaries of other beyond the activists 
themselves. 
Milan and van der Velden (2016) point out also a conceptually different form of 
private sector involvement. If data activism promotes alternative technologies and 
policies associated with them, it may involve some form of collaboration with private 
sector actors. This notion is based on the concept of technology- and product-
oriented movements, or TPMs, discussed by David Hess (2005): mobilizations of 
civil society organizations that include alliances with private-sector firms. According 
to Hess, such collaboration can serve pragmatic ends; when data activism’s goals 
require the development and production of alternative technologies, it may resort to 
private sector firms to provide them. Firms can be motivated to collaborate with data 
activists in order to seek opportunities such as securing or expanding markets for 
their outputs. In its attempts to mobilise new data arrangements, data activism may 
therefore concern firms as participants and beneficiaries. 
4.6 MyData as data activism 
The discussion above points at the conclusion that data activism is an umbrella 
concept, covering a wide array of critically-oriented approaches to datafication (see 
Gutiérrez & Milan, 2019). Here, datafication is understood as a societal 
phenomenon, so that a critical approach to datafication does not necessarily mean 
being critical of the technical processes of transforming aspects of people’s lives into 
quantified data per se. Instead, data activism can approach datafication from the 
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point of view of not only technical but also political, philosophical, ethical or 
economic considerations. As discussed above, the field of data activism can imply 
different relationships to data economy’s existing arrangements such as the 
commercial data use, institutions regulating such use, as well as their governance. 
Different ways to categorise data activism were identified above, including reactive 
and proactive data activism; data as action repertoire for activism and data as stakes 
of activism; the different social injustices that data activism aims to resolve; as well 
as data activism’s relationship to the private sector. These categories are analytical 
rather than empirical (Beraldo & Milan, 2019); for example, some open data activists 
may consider data as both stakes and a repertoire, lobbying general open data 
practices for the purpose of aiming at distinct goals by means of consequently opened 
data. Rather than a strict definition to help with delineating whether or not something 
is data activism, I follow Milan & van der Velden (2016) and consider data activism 
as a heuristic to make sense of forms of engagement and political action spurred by 
datafication. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Finnish-originated data governance initiative, 
MyData, forms the empirical context of this thesis. While the initiative is not 
necessarily critical towards datafication as such, it is critical towards the political-
economic aspects of data governance and control of data; that is, its goals concern 
who can learn from data and who decides about this. Keeping well in mind that the 
different categories of data activism are analytical rather than empirical, if we make 
use of the heuristic to understand MyData, what does the initiative look like? How 
could we position MyData in the space of data activism spanned by the analytical 
categories? 
On the spectrum of reactive and proactive data activism, MyData falls in the 
proactive end, in the sense that datafication is seen as a potentially positive force, an 
opportunity to provoke social change. While the belief is that desirable outcomes for 
people, businesses, and the society at large will emerge once people are in control of 
how data are used, the primary aim is on the level of data governance rather than on 
any specific desirable outcomes. The initiative is oriented towards data, and rather 
than being an action repertoire that enables promoting other activist goals, data 
themselves are what is at stake. MyData can be considered as an infrastructural form 
of data activism in a similar sense as open data. The goal is to set up new data 
arrangements that make possible the movement of data under new principles, and 
these arrangements, then, may be employed by others to further their own goals. 
Viewing data activism as promotion of more just data arrangements, MyData 
can be distinguished via the injustices it aims to resolve. This issue is discussed in 
Article III. The primary injustice is data maldistribution, the unjust distribution of 
data that denies people the resources to participate in the digital environment on an 
equal footing. With the goal of placing people in control of the uses of their data, 
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MyData is focused on releasing data from a proprietary regime to new uses, and 
therefore redistributing data, and benefits derived from them, from data-gathering 
organisations to people. At the same time, the aim is to resolve another form of 
maldistribution, that is, the uneven distribution of personal data between those firms 
and organizations that are positioned as primary data collectors, and their less data-
endowed counterparts.  
In order to achieve its aim to increase people’s capabilities to act in relation to 
their data, MyData collaborates with private sector actors producing data-related 
technologies and services, some of which are explored in Article II. This 
collaboration highlights MyData’s likeness to TPMs (Hess, 2005), where 
collaboration serves both the ends of a social movement advocating alternative 
technologies and policies associated with them, as well as the ends of private sector 
firms producing these technologies. With an eye on serving firms’ economic 
interests in personal data, the initiative explicitly aligns its interests with commercial 
data use; as proclaimed in one white paper, “[MyData] combines digital human 
rights and industry need to have access to data” (Poikola et al., 2015: 4). Having 
individuals control their personal data is expected to make possible also new kinds 
of commercial uses of those data, a dual aim explored in Articles III and IV.  
Given how it has from the early stages been involved in Finnish policy agendas, 
and given the role of private sector in MyData-related technology development, the 
initiative could obviously be approached with other lenses in addition to, or in place 
of, data activism, such as with more focus on the field defined by either technology-
related policy (i.e., the state) or technological entrepreneurship and business (i.e., the 
market). Here, a comparison to a better-known example of data activism, open data, 
can provide insight. Like MyData, open data involves different stakeholders with 
different goals. On one level, open data refers to a specific model of data governance, 
and data can be said to be “open” if it is subject to this governance model (Kitchin, 
2014). The issue at stake can be the promotion of open data as a general principle of 
organising public sector data arrangements (e.g., Baack, 2015). Some data activists 
leverage open data principles in order to access certain datasets to forward specific 
activist ends (Schrock, 2016). Open data is also a policy implemented by different 
government actors within their own data arrangements (e.g., Kitchin, 2014: 50). 
Simultaneously, open data allows a role for private sector actors in making use of 
the data becoming available as a result of open data policies (e.g., Bates, 2013; 
Johnson, 2014; Kitchin, 2014). As a result, open data is something that can be useful 
for the forwarding of varied ideological ends (e.g., Bates, 2013; Schrock, 2016). In 
a similar way, MyData could be approached in many ways; for instance, as a budding 
technology or competition policy concept, a definition for a data governance model 
or for a certain subset of personal data, or as a means of defining a potentially 
emerging field of data business. Noting these other possibilities, which might be 
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pursued elsewhere, I employ the heuristic of data activism to investigate the MyData 
initiative and the technology development related to its goals. This means focusing 
on MyData’s aims to affect citizens’ capabilities to act in relation to their personal 
data, and to have a say in how their personal data are employed for production of 
economic value. 
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5 Research Approach 
This thesis is based on research originally published in Articles I–IV. Each of the 
articles had a distinct research approach and research questions. Taken together the 
articles contribute towards two research aims of the thesis, which are reflected in 
three central research questions. 
The first research aim is to investigate what data activism aiming to have people 
control their personal data is about, and to understand its political and ideological 
underpinnings. The first two research questions reflect this aim. These questions are 
framed in terms of the literature on collective imagination. The point of departure is 
that multiple imaginaries about the data economy exist, potentially in tension with 
one another, or possibly in a more dialectical relationship. In Chapter 3, I outlined 
the dominant imaginary about data economy’s data arrangements based on data 
studies literature, highlighting particularly the position imagined for citizens and 
consumers. In Chapter 4, I discussed literature on data activism, considering it as a 
form of civic engagement producing alternative imaginaries for the data economy. 
In light of the dominant data economy imaginary and alternative imaginaries 
produced in data activism, the data economy can be viewed as a field of contestation 
over the collective imagination. The first research question and its sub-questions 
address the interplay of dominant and alternative imaginaries: 
1. How do alternative data economy imaginaries and the dominant 
imaginary compare with each other? 
a. What new positions are imagined for citizens and consumers in 
the alternatives? 
b. How is this repositioning imagined to intervene in data 
economy’s economic logic? 
In light of the discussion in Chapters 2 and 4, the politics of imagination concerns 
also multiple alternative imaginaries that can be developed in data activism. There 
are two levels of contestation that I am interested in: data economy as a field of 
contestation over the collective imagination, and data activism as a field of 
contestation over the alternative imaginary. The latter level is reflected in the second 
research question and its sub-questions: 
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2. How do different alternative imaginaries developed in data activism 
compare with each other? 
a. What tensions emerge between alternative imaginaries developed 
in data activism? 
b. What affects the success of alternative imaginaries, that is, their 
expansion outside data activism? 
The second research aim of this thesis is to develop, through the understanding of 
the empirical phenomenon, a position on the imagined alternative data arrangements. 
From a standpoint informed by data studies scholarship reviewed in Chapter 3, 
datafication and the dominant data arrangements in the data economy have far-
reaching consequences that deserve to be addressed. In light of this literature, it 
seems justified that the researcher, in addition to observing attempts to shape 
different pathways for the data economy in a detached mode, becomes involved in 
those attempts in a more engaged mode. As Schrock (2016: 583) points out, data 
activism represents a moment where meaningful change may occur, and we should 
be attentive of these moments. From the standpoint informed by the data studies 
scholarship, however, it would be unjustified to engage with data activism in a 
manner that simply accepts the agenda, the problem settings and the normative 
notions of data activists, and therefore risks under-problematising them. An observer 
of data activism practice does not require particularly honed critical faculties to 
identify problematic aspects in the imagined rearrangements of the digital 
environment. The second aim of this thesis is to approach data activism in a way that 
does not only critically pick apart the developed imaginaries and does not only 
engage in data activism practice either. Rather, the aim is to open up a space for the 
exploration of its notions of desirable data futures. This research aim is normative, 
but rather than committing to a predetermined agenda, the aim is to produce 
normativity in relation to data activism’s aims and approaches. This is reflected in 
the final research question and two more specific sub-questions: 
3. How can we identify and promote societally desirable data economy 
imaginaries? 
a. Which alternative data arrangements may be considered 
desirable? 
b. How can desirable data economy imaginaries be promoted in data 
activism? 
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5.1 Research approach of the original publications 
In this section, I provide an overview of the research approach taken in Articles I-
IV, including the research questions, research setup, empirical data, and methods. 
Summary of the research approach, along with key findings, is provided in Table 2. 
A more detailed discussion of the articles’ findings will follow in Chapter 6. 
Articles I and II are outcomes of mapping of a phenomenon emerging under 
various labels during the research process. The articles concern new technologies 
that rely on, in a fundamental sense, a similar understanding of problems, their 
possible solutions, and the desired economic and social order that was to result from 
this technological intervention. In terms of the broader research aims of this thesis, 
they provide insight into the field under study, as well as critical insight into the 
imagined alternative data arrangements. In Articles III and IV, the focus was shifted 
from investigating the developed or imagined technologies, to empirically 
investigating MyData, which was gaining momentum as a data activism movement 
working towards social change. In connection with the research aims of this thesis, 
the articles document and analyse the data economy imaginaries underpinning 
MyData. Article IV also details one attempt to engage with data activism in a way 
that is both critical and constructive. 
Article I: Consent intermediaries 
“Can the obstacles to privacy self-management be overcome? Exploring the consent 
intermediary approach” was co-authored with Yki Kortesniemi and published in Big 
Data & Society. The research was motivated by the identification of a recurring 
concept in ongoing initiatives aiming to have people control their data. Our research 
project had done a mapping of emerging services going by names such as “personal 
data management platforms”, “personal information management systems”, 
“MyData operators” or “personal data spaces”. While their practical 
implementations and stages of maturity varied, we found that these services could 
be viewed as middlemen of consent decisions. They offered to bring the decisions 
under one control point through which individuals grant, view and withdraw 
permissions to collect and use data. In Article I, we called these services by the 
moniker consent intermediaries, or CIs. As discussed in Chapter 3, privacy self-
management relies on individuals being informed and making decisions based on 
subjective analysis of this information, but such analysis is anything but 
straightforward in the contemporary context of the data economy. We asked whether, 
how, and to what extent such a CI could aid with the challenges posed to privacy 
self-management. At the outset, an approach based on introducing a new 
intermediary technology appears to rely on a technological solution to a problem 
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Table 2. Summary of the research approach and findings of Articles I–IV. 
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whose roots lie in the cost-benefit based model itself. However, as we write in Article 
I, “for the moment, we will live with the model of informed consent, as in many 
jurisdictions it is codified in legislation” (p. 2). Further, it seems reasonable to 
assume that some technologies can better help users cope with the decisions they 
face. In addition, apart from CIs, also other practical suggestions to improve consent 
processes have been presented, such as expiry dates for consents (e.g., Custers, 
2016), calling for further discussion on implementing consent in datafied times. This 
motivated us to explore this technological solution encountered in the empirical field 
to analyse its merits, limited as they might be, to a problem that is to some extent 
technical, but at its core more fundamental. We therefore explored the potential of 
CIs in a positive nature. 
Article I can be described as conceptual research where the “focus is on 
integration and proposing new relationships among constructs” so that “the onus is 
on developing logical and complete arguments for associations rather than testing 
them empirically” (Gilson & Goldberg, 2015: 127). It did not aim to develop new 
theory, nor did it engage in the analysis of empirical data, apart from focusing on a 
concept identified in the empirical field of study. The research was based on 
observation and analysis of already available information, i.e. research literature, 
with the aim of understanding the merits and deficiencies of a proposed alternative 
approach to implementing privacy self-management. The method of analysis was the 
categorisation of obstacles identified in existing literature, and then reflecting the 
proposed solution against the categories. 
Article II: Personal data spaces 
“Personal data spaces: An intervention in surveillance capitalism?” was authored by 
myself and published in Surveillance & Society. Personal data spaces, or PDSs, are 
intermediary services that promise to empower people to take control of processing 
of personal data by providing their users with a data storage service coupled with 
data management interfaces. Article II focused on three exemplars of such services: 
the “personal cloud server” Cozy Cloud, the “digital life management system” 
Meeco, and the “personal data store” OpenPDS. The first two are commercial 
products of two relatively small start-up companies; the third is a spinoff of a 
research project at the MIT media lab. The start-up firms remain up-and-running in 
2019, while the research spinoff has online presence but seems to be discontinued or 
in hibernation. The developers of the three analysed exemplars have varying 
practical solutions for data storage and sharing. Despite this, between them they 
exhibit a common belief that people should be able to exercise more control over 
their data, and that this would lead to valuable outcomes for the people involved. 
Common beliefs also include the idea that there needs to be an intermediary service 
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through which control of data by the user becomes possible. PDSs seem to propose 
a potential intervention in dominant data practices by promoting new capacities for 
their users to act towards data. In the article, the three exemplary PDSs are 
approached as representations of an alternative imaginaries for the data economy. 
The point of interest were the interventions their developers were attempting to 
achieve to the economic logic currently dominating the data economy. I delineate 
these social imaginaries by first asking what agency towards data PDSs offer people. 
I then compare this imagined agency to the dominant data arrangements as identified 
in data studies literature. The aim is to examine how these services propose to 
transform the economic role of people in value creation from personal data. 
Empirically, Article II was based on explorative interviews with three PDS 
developers, the developers’ open-ended responses to a policy questionnaire collected 
by the European Commission, informal discussions with numerous PDS developers, 
personal use experience of two PDS services that were publicly available for use, 
and information available in public sources including the websites of the PDS 
services, instruction documents, media appearances of PDS developers, and a 
research publication on one of the services available at the time (de Montjoye et al., 
2014). Data for the article were collected in 2015 and 2016. The interviews were 
specifically set up for research purpose, so that the interviewees agreed to participate 
in this research, and to the recording of the interviews. An external service provider 
was used to transcribe the recordings. The questionnaire material was gathered by 
the European Commission for the primary purpose of providing background 
information for a roundtable discussion. A report based on this data has been 
published by the Commission (European Commission, 2016). The Commission 
gathered the material with the pretext that results will be shared with participants of 
the roundtable, i.e. potential commercial competitors. Research use of the 
questionnaire responses was secondary; the Commission personnel shared the 
material for research purposes with the members of a research project I was involved 
in, and members of the project also took part in the roundtable. The analysis was 
initially guided by a broadly defined interest: to identify how the services envisioned 
features and connections to the broader data economy. The publicly available 
material, use experience of the services, and informal discussions made up 
background material that both guided the analysis as well as informed the case 
descriptions presented in the article. During the course of analysing the interview 
transcripts and questionnaire responses, I further focused to the ways that the 
services were imagined to afford their users agency over data. This part of the 
analysis was based on open coding using Atlas.ti. The materials were coded with a 
focus on what end-users were doing, or imagined to be doing, with the PDS. The 
coding was iterated, so that in the end the four aspects of imagined agency for PDS 
users, as presented in the article, were reached. 
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Article III: Data agency at stake 
“Data agency at stake: MyData activism and alternative frames of equal 
participation” was co-authored with Jesse Haapoja and published in New Media & 
Society. In the context of this thesis, the article switches focus from the technologies 
under development to data activism. The article takes as its starting point the notion 
that data activism attempts to shape and mobilise more just data arrangements. We 
build on the notion that justice requires arrangements permitting all to participate as 
peers in social life. Data activism, in this view, is about identifying and removing 
obstacles to equal participation in the digital environment. MyData activism, 
similarly to some other forms of data activism, involves private sector actors to 
achieve, in practice, the imagined more just data arrangements. Firms involved in 
data activism, in turn, seek policy and market support for their products and services. 
Here, data activism becomes to concern firms as participants and beneficiaries. In 
article III we analysed collective action frames constructed in the first MyData 
conference, which became a formative event for the MyData movement. In the 
conference, actors including data activists, firms, and policymakers attempted to 
shape MyData to suit their activist, commercial, or policy ends. In this context, a 
professional conference is a venue for contestation between different future visions, 
and an environment of selection between alternatives. The collective action frames 
inform us how injustices and their remedies are framed in the context of data activism 
that involves commercial actors as participants. In the article we asked what 
injustices hamper equal participation, what are their remedies, and whose interests 
deserve consideration. 
The article is based on empirical data collected at the three-day conference 
organised in August 2016. Having participated in a thematically related research 
project, we were involved in a minor task in conference organisation, arranging a 
workshop aimed at academic researchers. This, and our general proximity with the 
conference organisers, allowed the collection of two datasets during keynotes. The 
first dataset consists of transcriptions of video recordings of 12 keynote talks and 
their follow-up discussions, totalling some seven hours of professionally produced 
video material. The videos were transcribed for analysis by an external transcription 
service provider. The second dataset consists of about 750 anonymous, mostly tweet-
size messages sent by the conference audience members by means of a backchannel 
software (Nelimarkka et al., 2016). The software allowed audience members to use 
their mobile devices to send questions, comments and specifically requested ‘lessons 
learned’ during keynotes. Video recordings of keynote presentations are also 
publicly available. Compared to our dataset, the published recordings exclude 
follow-up discussions and responses to questions asked by the audience. All 
messages sent via the backchannel software were anonymously public during the 
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event, and from the software logs we likewise received only anonymous data. No 
confidential data was handled during data collection and analysis.  
As an analytical framework for keynote presentations, we employed the 
identification of collective action frames (Benford & Snow, 2000). Frames in general 
offer a schema for highlighting certain aspects of a situation, functioning as modes 
for articulating strategy to be undertaken. Following Snow and Benford (1988), 
collective action frames diagnose the issue in need of change and who is to blame, 
prognose solutions and how to achieve them, and motivate collective action. Using 
Atlas.ti, we initially identified sections that represented collective action frames and 
concerned participation in the data economy. Both authors first separately identified 
and classified these sections with an open coding scheme, and we then 
collaboratively and iteratively reclassified them until reaching the six frames 
presented in the article. We included in the analysis only frames that were either 
widespread among the keynotes, or that were contested. The audience interactions 
allow investigating the success and reception of framing efforts (Snow & Benford, 
1988). For this purpose, we identified agreement and tension arising in response to 
frames identified from the keynotes. This means that the analysis was first performed 
on the keynote talks, and when we had identified the frames employed in the talks, 
we analysed audience comments in relation to these frames. 
Article IV: The social imaginaries of data activism 
“The social imaginaries of data activism” was co-authored with Minna Ruckenstein 
and published in Big Data & Society. The article employs the framework of social 
imaginaries to investigate MyData. In contrast to Article III that was focused on a 
single formative moment, Article IV is based on participant-observation with data 
activists over the longer term. Studying an initiative such as MyData means dealing 
with a work-in-progress and uncertain futures in the making; this meant that in our 
research we engaged in an ongoing observation and dialogue when interacting with 
MyData activists. Via this engagement, we realised that data activism is about 
alternative futures in the making in two senses. It is not only that activists working 
in the initiative envision data futures as alternatives to the future they view as 
problematic, but that we face alternative data future visions also within the initiative. 
The starting point was that alternative social imaginaries can coexist simultaneously 
in the context of one data activism initiative. From here we had two aims. The first 
aim was to unpack different future imaginaries that are present in data activism, 
aiming to clarify the political and social alternatives that different social imaginaries 
ascribe to the notions underlying data activism. In practical terms, we do this by 
outlining two alternative social imaginaries at play; one that was represented by 
technology developers and one that we ourselves, as social scientist, represented. 
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The second aim was to produce insights that can be employed for re-articulating the 
aims of data activism, attempting to rework the different imaginaries into a shared 
dialogue. Towards this end, we discuss how to merge the two imaginaries in the 
work of reimagining data-related governance structures and knowledge practices. 
Empirically, Article IV draws from longer-term participant-observation and 
working together with developers and data activists between 2014 and 2018. The 
main context for this participation were three research projects in the fields of 
personal data, health and knowledge work, and the participation consisted of 
countless everyday interactions, discussions at project meetings, and formal and 
informal interviews. Alongside activities in the research projects, we took on 
participant-observer roles in a 450-member (in Autumn 2018) Facebook discussion 
group called “MyData working group”. The group consists of civil servants, 
activists, technology developers and start-up entrepreneurs. During the course of 
four years, I also participated in the Finnish MyData industry alliance, where a 
national MyData model was being developed through pilot projects. Further, we did 
fieldwork in our roles as organisers, presenters and observers at three international 
MyData conferences in Helsinki in 2016, 2017 and 2018. The empirical materials, 
therefore, consist of material produced during the participation, including meeting 
presentations, field notes, emails, social media posts, reports, white papers and plans, 
published documents referenced in the article. The empirical work done for Articles 
II and III was part of the same longer-term research process, and their empirical data 
also informed Article IV. 
5.2 Research approach of the thesis 
The order in which the articles appear in this thesis corresponds to the chronological 
order of conceptualising and carrying out the research work underlying them. The 
order also corresponds to the breadth of the problem setting. Article I addresses a 
specific problem that is motivated by emerging intermediary technologies. The 
problem setting is the most specific one in the sense that it is laid out in terms of 
privacy literature, and connected the relatively narrow understanding of the issue at 
hand in terms of privacy management. Article II continues with a partially 
overlapping problem setting by continuing to examine intermediary technologies. 
However, instead of understanding the issue at hand in terms of privacy, it broadens 
the view to encompass data economy’s economic logic. Article III again broadens 
the view, continuing with the economic logic but expanding from intermediary 
technologies to considering how problems and their solutions are framed during the 
formation of a data activism movement. Finally, Article IV provides the broadest 
view by focusing on the different social imaginaries underpinning data activist work, 
and it can be viewed as an expansion of the notion of alternative frames in Article 
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III. Considered via the research questions of this thesis, the problem settings of the 
articles are partially overlapping, with each subsequent article covering parts of the 
problem setting of the previous articles. 
The insight gained during this process of expanding the problem setting has not 
only increased scholarly knowledge about the empirical field, but has also informed 
different modes of relating to the empirical field and the normative commitments 
encountered in the field – in this sense, the articles trace a path of alternating between 
different modes of this researcher’s engagement in the field. Here I do not intend to 
claim that the specific modes of engagement taken in the course of the research 
would have been planned when the work on this thesis was started. Rather, the point 
is that during the research, I started to understand that the “messy” (Law, 2014), 
dynamic and at times slippery nature of the object of research necessitated assuming 
different positions in relation to it. At times, the object of research seemed to change 
as soon as an approach was taken. It seemed to me as if I was looking at one of the 
inkblot cards of the Rorschach test; if I would show it to someone else, or look at it 
at a different time, it would transform into something else altogether. Is the empirical 
phenomenon about privacy in the digital environment, as the approach taken in 
Article I suggests? Yes, but it is not about privacy only. Is it about market agency, 
as the findings of Article II suggest? Not only, and especially not always, and not to 
everyone, as Article III shows. Further, the vision about the future that brings 
different actors together in data activism allows for a considerable amount of 
interpretive flexibility, as discussed in Articles III and IV, also making it possible 
for the actors to come together in the first place. 
The empirical phenomenon guided the research strategy of alternating between 
modes of engagement, and also guided the choice of those modes in the course of 
empirical work. I argue that this has made it possible to produce more insightful 
knowledge about the field of data activism. There is also another point to make about 
engagement. As John Law writes about objects of social scientific interest, “since 
social (and natural) science investigations interfere with the world, in one way or 
another they always make a difference, politically and otherwise. Things change as 
a result. The issue, then, is not to seek disengagement but rather with how to engage. 
It is about how to make good differences in circumstances where reality is both 
unknowable and generative” (Law, 2004: 7). The modes of engagement taken in the 
course of this research reflect my modest attempt at seeking research methods that 
can, as Law suggests, “imagine and participate in politics and other forms of the 
good in novel and creative ways” (Law, 2004: 9) and that can help, in addition to 
learning more about realities, also “participate in the making of those realities” (Law, 
2004: 10, original emphasis).  
The relationship between the researcher and the researched is a topic of long-
standing discussion in social sciences. For example, one of Karl Marx’s Theses on 
Tuukka Lehtiniemi 
66 
Feuerbach proclaimed that the point of scholarly work was not to interpret the world 
but to change it; Max Weber, in contrast, while maintaining that social sciences are 
necessarily value-laden, argued in the lecture Science as a Vocation that ”the prophet 
and the demagogue“ do not belong on the academic platform (Zuiderent-Jerak, 2015: 
1; 5–6; also see Reiss & Sprenger, 2017). According to these two potentially 
oppositional positions, the scholar should either aim at actualising an explicit 
political position through scholarly work (in Marx’s case, this political position 
would be related to correcting a particular power dynamic observed in the society); 
or should avoid furthering utilitarian and political ends in their work (in Weber’s 
case, this was a matter of trying to abstain from furthering political ideas as far as 
possible). 
The former of the two corresponds to a specific “critical” mode of scholarly 
work. In the critical mode referred to here, there is a practical and explicitly 
normative goal and commitment to identify and overcome dominant power 
dynamics, providing “bases for social inquiry aimed at decreasing domination and 
increasing freedom in all their forms” (Bohman, 2016). Theories that are in this sense 
critical have emerged, for example, in connection to social movements that identify 
and oppose forms of domination or oppression of human beings in the modern 
societies. In the field of scholarship related to the data economy, particularly 
surveillance studies and data studies can have this orientation. As I have drawn 
extensively from these scholarly fields, a certain philosophical orientation towards 
this mode of scholarship is embedded in the approach of this thesis.  
The latter of the two is closely related to the view that objectivity is an ideal that 
scientific inquiry should strive for. At least some views of scientific objectivity seem 
at odds with the critical mode of scholarly work; however, it should be noted that the 
goal of objectivity can be conceived of in several ways (Reiss & Sprenger, 2017). 
Objectivity can be seen to imply faithfulness to facts “out there”, or to require that 
personal biases are absent from scientific observation and reasoning. Alternatively, 
objectivity can be taken to mean that scientific claims and practices are objective 
only to the extent they are free of moral, political and social values. A critical 
orientation in the above sense should not, for example, preclude objectivity in the 
sense of faithfulness to facts, nor should it be a reason to give free reign to personal 
biases when interpreting results. It does, however, mean that this scholarship is 
indeed not free of moral, political or social values, as such values are explicitly built-
in in the research itself. However, there are good grounds to ask whether any 
research, particularly given the object of research in the social sciences, can be fully 
free of moral, political or social values. 
One means of navigating between critical and objective modes of scholarly work 
is engaged scholarly practice that is often understood as taking an “insider” 
perspective in the empirical field of study. Engagement is presented as a way to go 
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beyond the dualism between critique and objectivism, and to produce scholarship 
that is relevant to the field, but at the same time scientifically rigorous (Zuiderent-
Jerak, 2015). During the work towards this thesis, there was a strong push, or perhaps 
rather a pull, towards a more engaged researcher position. In the multi-disciplinary 
MyData-related research projects that I participated in, both the project requirements 
as well as the data activism practitioners expected the social scientist to not be a 
detached observer, but to participate in and constructively engage with the empirical 
field. Such requests for constructive participation echo demand for design input from 
social scientists long experienced in the fields of human-computer interaction and 
systems design (e.g., Anderson, 1994; Hughes et al., 1994). This is not necessarily 
problematic. Like data studies scholarship, data activists recognise the far-reaching 
consequences of datafication, which enables new approaches for making sense of 
the world that in turn affect the production of knowledge, business practices and 
governance. This would indicate that it can be in alignment with scholarly 
commitments to engage in the data activism field and to examine its critical potential 
to rework and re-imagine processes related to datafication. At the same time, a 
critical commitment makes it is necessary to turn the analytical apparatus also 
towards the imagined alternatives. Approached in a too straightforward manner, 
engagement in data activism practice can mean contributing scholarly knowledge to 
pre-set problem definitions as they are encountered in the empirical field. This kind 
of engagement produces a legitimacy problem for a researcher with a “scholarly 
attachment to complicating underlying assumptions” (Zuiderent-Jerak, 2015: 8). It 
can lead to a limited variety of intellectual positions that the researcher can assume, 
as well as to delimiting the scholarly imagination when it comes to relations with the 
empirical field (see Jensen & Lauritsen, 2005). 
The problem facing a researcher, informed by data studies scholarship, acutely 
aware of the power relations in the field as well as their own position in relation to 
the configurations of power and knowledge (Jensen & Lauritsen, 2005: 60), and in 
principle sympathetic to the data activists’ normative commitments, is this: how to 
produce scholarship that is rigorous as well as relevant to the field, but at the same 
time does not under-problematise engagement? The research done in this thesis 
provides one possible response to this question: by maintaining a critical approach, 
but shifting between modes and depth of engagement. In Why has critique run out 
of steam, Bruno Latour remarks of the potential power of critique and of the role of 
the critic: “the critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles […] the 
one for whom, if something is constructed, then it means it is fragile and thus in great 
need of care and caution” (Latour, 2004: 246). Contending with the problematics of 
knowledge and power in social science – particularly the knowledge of the 
researcher and the relationship between the researcher and the practice – Casper 
Jensen and Peter Lauritsen note that “we need many more ways of linking with 
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practices, and not methodical, theoretical or reflexive techniques for severing the 
existing ones” (Jensen & Lauritsen, 2005: 72). Throughout this research, my aim has 
been to find a balance between knowledge production, critique and engagement – to 
not just “debunk”, but to also “assemble”, in a way that both produces knowledge 
that is relevant in the context of the data studies literature, and is also relevant for 
practitioners. Articles I–IV represent my humble attempts to do this. Each article 
maintains a commitment to problematising encountered assumptions to a more or 
less pronounced extent, but at the same time there is a clear shift between different 
modes of engagement between them. 
Of the publication in this thesis, Article I is most “engaged” in the sense that it 
contributes knowledge to problem definitions that were encountered in the empirical 
field. The research took off with the aim of analysing the effectiveness of the 
proposed solution to the problem; the commitments encountered in the field were 
accepted, and their merit analysed while remaining within the defined problem 
space. Nevertheless, rather than simply contributing knowledge to the pre-set 
problem definition, such as identifying “factors” that facilitate change or “barriers” 
that hamper change (Zuiderent-Jerak, 2015: 8), the article ends up suggesting that 
the problem space itself is ill-defined. Research reported in the article, then, did not 
remain content with the encountered problem definitions; based on the analysis, it 
also led to the problematising of the encountered definitions. Articles II and III move 
towards more critically-oriented production of knowledge of the empirical field and 
analysing different aspects of what the empirical field is about. The research reported 
in the articles is firmly committed to problem definitions that do not emerge from 
the empirical field, but from data studies scholarship. Of the publications in this 
thesis, their mode of relating to the empirical field is the most “distanced” – however, 
this is not to claim that I would have been a detached outsider-observer of the data 
activism field during the research. Instead, the point is the position taken with respect 
to the production of knowledge, which is oriented at serving interests emerging from 
scholarly commitments rather than from the empirical field.  
Article IV presents research that both engages with the empirical field, and 
problematises this engagement. It attempts to find a way to combine the problem 
definitions encountered in the field with the problem definitions emerging in critical 
scholarship, in effect attempting to reconfigure the encountered problem space. 
Therefore, during the research, we gained also a role in shaping and mobilising data 
activism. Our attempt at shaping data activism was obviously informed by our 
commitment to a critical scholarly position. However, rather than aiming to take data 
activism into a predetermined direction, we aimed to “open practical and analytical 
space for the exploration of the sociotechnical future currently in the making” 
(Article IV: 9). This meant that in order to produce new knowledge, we needed to 
“come up with ingenious solutions to the problem of how to become interesting 
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enough” (Jensen & Lauritsen, 2005: 72) for data activism practitioners. The 
approach taken in Article IV can link with practice in a way that Jensen and Lauritsen 
suggest: research that is “about exploring, not alone but with others, how diverse 
agencies could become more expressive in the invention of the future,” that is, 
“exploring common futures with practices” (Jensen & Lauritsen, 2005: 73; original 
emphasis). The research in Article IV can also be conceptualised as something 
resembling Teun Zuiderent-Jerak’s (2015) situated intervention. Situated 
intervention is “a scholarly approach in which intervening aims at producing 
sociological knowledge by situating such interventions in sociologically unpacked 
normative complexities” (Zuiderent-Jerak, 2015: 23). Significantly for our research, 
a situated intervention as discussed by Zuiderent-Jerak does not signify something 
that happens from the “outside” and that is separate from the practice it targets; 
instead, it is accepted that involvement in the field unavoidably has consequences 
for the researcher’s normative conceptions about the field that result from it. 
Intervention, then, is made in order to produce scholarly knowledge about the field 
under study, with awareness that this also produces normativity with respect to the 
field. While Zuiderent-Jerak discusses situated intervention in the context of material 
reconfigurations of medical practice, our modest intervention in data activism 
practice was more discursive than material in nature. Nevertheless, the purpose of 
our involvement in the practices under study was similar: to initiate a change in them, 
with the aim of learning something. 
This alternating between modes of engagement in the articles is reminiscent of 
what researchers do with triangulation in different contexts. Triangulation refers to, 
for example, using two or more methods or theories (Jick, 1979) to interpret or 
examine complex empirical phenomena, or using several means to ascertain validity 
of research (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Triangulation, in a general sense, “may be 
used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives but also 
to enrich our understanding by allowing for new or deeper dimensions to emerge” 
(Jick, 1979: 603). In a similar sense, different modes of engagement with the 
empirical field can allow the enrichment of understanding and the emergence of new 
dimensions of the empirical field. Viewing the field from the standpoint of different 
commitments also allows for reflexivity not only in terms of interpreting empirical 
data and interpretation of the analysis process, but also in terms of the researcher’s 
relationship to the researched. As I have discussed, triangulating with engagement 
positions can lead to more comprehensive production of knowledge about the field, 
as well as the production of a position with respect to the normative commitments 
encountered in the field. 
 70 
6 Findings 
In this chapter, I discuss the findings of Articles I–IV from the perspective of the 
research aims and research questions of this thesis. Details beyond what is presented 
here can be found in the original publications. In addition, the articles’ contributions 
towards addressing the research questions are summarised in Table 3. 
6.1 Article I: Consent intermediaries 
In Article I we discuss personal data control services as an abstract category of 
intermediary services we called consent intermediaries. For an individual user, the 
intermediary service aims to unite the provisioning of consents under one control 
point, providing an access point through which individuals grant, view and withdraw 
permissions to collect, share, access and use data. As the frame of analysis, we 
consider these intermediary services from the point of view of cost–benefit 
evaluations on data disclosure.  
In the article we first identified from literature findings on difficulties that 
currently hinder performing cost-benefit analysis on the collection and use of 
personal data. These difficulties are listed in Table 4. Many of them are related to a 
considerable information asymmetry: non-experts know little about collected 
personal data, what is done with the data, or the business operations of the data 
industry. Put together, they affect cost-benefit analysis by making it hard to appraise 
the situation and by diminishing the possibilities of making preferred decisions. We 
then analysed the extent to which a data control intermediary can help overcome 
these difficulties. We argue that there lies some potential in leveraging the 
intermediary position to provide various aides for making cost-benefit analyses. 
First, it is possible for an intermediary service to employ consent metadata across 
users to provide people with recommendations, predictions, ratings and similar 
decision aides. Second, some of the routine decisions could be automated by an 
intermediary service acting on behalf of the user in limited situations, such as by 
automating certain decision. People could, for example, choose to automatically 
follow recommendations made by privacy advocates. Third, the intermediary service 
could offer a way to leverage the data economy’s dependency on people as data 
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Table 3. The articles’ contribution to the research questions of the thesis. 
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sources to collectively bargain or pressure for more favourable data arrangements. 
As Table 4 shows, some of the more practical difficulties hampering cost-benefit 
analysis can in principle be solved by these means. Some of the more conceptual 
difficulties, in contrast, arise from the privacy self-management model focusing on 
individuals and private cost-benefit analysis on data, and as such likely remain 
insuperable. The remaining difficulties remain somewhere in between; clever design 
could mitigate, but likely not fully resolve, them. 
Table 4. Privacy self-management difficulties and the potential to overcome them discussed 
in Article I. 
The difficulty What it is about Potential to overcome it 
The timing and 
duration of 
consent 
Consent is provided beforehand and 
indefinitely in hope of immediate benefits, 
while harms may develop gradually over time 
and are affected by future data technologies 
In principle solvable; a 
practical problem of making it 
feasible to revisit decisions 
and revoke consent 
Non-negotiability 
of consent 
Consent is typically a “take it or leave it” 
choice made in terms that are dictated by the 
service provider 
In principle solvable; a problem 
of negotiating power 
The scale 
problem 
There are many consent decisions to make 
and it is virtually infeasible to be informed in 
all of them 
In principle solvable by making 
each decision easy enough 
The aggregation 
of data 
Collecting together data over individuals and 
contexts, and their subsequent analysis, 
leads to the revelation of latent data 
Challenging but possible to 
mitigate by increasing 
awareness of latent data 
Downstream use 
of data 
Personal data are transferred to new parties 
as a result of intentional and unintentional 
“leaks”: e.g., data sales, data brokering, 
hacking, and governmental surveillance 
Challenging but possible to 
mitigate by providing 
information on consented and 
traceable data flows 
Cognitive 
demands 
Making rational cost-benefit analysis is 
affected by the limitations of human decision-
making: limited resources, heuristics, 
reasoning shortcuts, etc. 
Challenging but possible to 
mitigate by changing the 
nature of decisions by, e.g., 
partial automation 
Social norms 
Consent decisions are embedded in a 
network of social relations that regulate 
behaviour and in effect restrict choices 
Cannot be resolved within the 
individuated self-management 
model 
The social nature 
of data  
Personal data does not concern only one 
individual, and therefore privacy decisions 
affect others; conversely, our privacy is 
affected by the decisions of others 
Cannot be resolved within the 
individuated self-management 
model 
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In Article I, the framing of the problem was a particular conception of privacy – the 
self-management of informational privacy based on individual cost-benefit analysis. 
Precisely due to this framing, the article’s findings contribute towards the broader 
research interest of this thesis. The difficulties we identified as hampering cost-
benefit analysis, and the extent that they are amenable to circumvention by means of 
introducing a data control intermediary, inform us more generally of personal data 
as an object of value exchanges. As discussed in the article, individuals are ill-
positioned to determine how such exchanges will eventually play out, and will 
remain ill-positioned even if they are provided an intermediary technology aiming 
to help in performing valuations. Personal data, in other words, are not easily 
amenable to individual calculations of value. The article also points out how 
decision-making power is transferred in various ways to the service occupying an 
intermediary position between people and firms. The intermediary could organise 
collective action and data governance, which could work favourably for individuals. 
Alternatively, the intermediary could affect the behaviour of its users via discreet 
nudges, default choices, or limitations of options, leading to the possibility of 
coaxing users towards specific behaviours.  
6.2 Article II: Personal data spaces 
Article II is an analysis on three exemplary data control intermediaries, called 
personal data spaces or PDSs, as outcomes of alternative social imaginaries of how 
the data economy should work. The analysis focuses on what people are imagined 
to do with the aid of these services, or more specifically, what kinds of agency 
towards data do they are imagined to afford people. The second interest is in how 
these forms of agency intervene in dominant ways of producing and monetising 
value in the data economy. The lens employed in the article was constructed based 
on Shoshana Zuboff’s (2015) description of surveillance capitalism, and the 
imagined new forms of data agency were examined in relation to surveillance 
capitalism’s data arrangements. 
The analysis highlights four aspects of agency imagined to be made possible by 
PDSs: collecting data, intermediating data, controlling data analytics, and signalling 
subjective data. Collecting data happens through users’ actions of inclusion, 
exclusion, and moderation of data in the PDS; data may be uploaded, input, collected 
by sensors or devices, or transferred from elsewhere. The purpose of collecting data 
is not only to store, view, curate and reflect on data, but also to allow doing things 
with data. One such thing is intermediating data between primary data sources and 
third parties. In practice, this means providing third parties with access to data that 
are initially transferred into the PDS from other services. In effect, data move from 
one party to another via the PDS. Another one is controlling analytics run on data. 
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PDSs allow performing analytics so that “raw” data are processed within the service, 
and only processed data or analysis results are shared with third parties. In addition, 
users are imagined to signal subjective data to third parties. Users are imagined not 
only to transfer existing data into the PDS, but to create and store data on interests, 
preferences or intentions that are timely and relevant from the user’s point of view, 
and then share these data with third parties.  
Based on the analysis in Article II, data agency is aimed at intervening in data 
economy’s dominant arrangements in different ways. Table 5 lists the key features 
of this imaginary of an alternative data economy.  
Table 5. The data economy imaginary underpinning PDS services examined in Article II. 
What users are 
imagined to do 
How it is imagined to intervene in dominant data 
arrangements 
Users control data 
collection 
Through accumulating data in a personal repository, decisions on 
data collection and storage become subject to reciprocities, 
negotiations and feedback. Users are in control of what data are 
accessible, processable, shareable and available. Decision rights 
on data use are to remain with the data subjects. 
Users supply data 
Users are expected to allow third parties to access data when this 
provides beneficial outcomes, and have the incentive to seek new 
uses for their data in exchange for benefits. Through the market 
mechanisms, this is imagined to open up data resources to new 
service providers. 
Users as gatekeepers 
From the perspective of third parties, value production process 
would not begin with the extraction of data about people. Instead, 
it would begin with gaining access to data already stored and 
under the user’s control. Here, people are imagined to act as 
gatekeepers for third-party data use. 
Users produce 
intermediate products 
Data processing and value production performed by third parties 
does not necessarily happen with “raw” data, but with already 
processed data. Users become participants in value creation by 
turning data into something resembling intermediate products. 
Users delimit knowledge 
production  
By controlling analytics performed on data, users limit undesired 
uses of data by pre-empting knowledge production based on data 
by third parties. This pre-emption is another form of keeping 
decision rights concerning data with the user. 
Users as sources of 
knowledge 
By signalling subjective data, users become the direct sources of 
knowledge that service providers currently aim to produce based 
on data. The need to produce knowledge via data analytics is 
circumvented, and the quality and accuracy of services based on 
predictions and recommendations is improved with these data. 
 
Findings 
 75 
The imagined data agency reflects efforts to reshape the economic role of users in 
the data economy. Users remain the sources of personal data that keep the data 
economy running, but in an altered sense; users have new roles in different points of 
the value chain. They are suppliers of “raw” data, data-based intermediate products, 
or pieces of knowledge that can be thought of as the final products of data processing. 
An explicit aim of providing these forms of data agency is to increase the quality, 
accuracy and intimacy of data, in order to achieve more efficient personalisation and 
more accurate targeting. In this respect, the goal is to intensify datafication. While 
the quality or quantity of data that businesses can access is expected to increase, so 
is the ability of users to exercise control over the uses of data. 
It is, therefore, clear that in this imaginary of the data economy, the commercial 
use of data is not shunned. Datafication is posited as given, and with the said 
interventions, datafication is imagined to lead to desirable outcomes. Commercial 
data use currently happens in the context of markets oriented to serve advertisers and 
other businesses. The alternative data economy imaginary exhibited by PDSs 
contains a reorientation of these markets in order to change who benefits from 
datafication; the data markets are to be consumer driven, and users could reap more 
of the produced benefits and be able to align themselves more efficiently with the 
market. The assumption is that new opportunities for valuable services emerge as 
users peruse market offerings for desirable uses for data, and exchange data for 
things they desire. Here, personal data effectively turn into an object of exchange. 
User involvement and empowerment is expected to happen through market 
mechanisms, which are assumed to ensure that services are designed for users to 
choose from. In the data economy thus envisioned, people are to be active, data-
supplying and benefit-demanding, subjects and participants in value creation. For 
companies, this imaginary provides an alternative pathway to market success. A 
company could thrive by promising valuable services and analytics based on 
consumer-provided data. 
In terms of the research objectives of this thesis, Article II identifies an 
alternative imaginary for the data economy, one based on a market-oriented view of 
data control and data agency. It provides a detailed articulation of the elements of 
this market agency, and how it relates to the dominant data economy imaginary. 
6.3 Article III: Data agency at stake 
Article III switches the focus from the technologies under development to 
considering a data activism initiative, and examines the tensions that emerge 
between activist and commercial interests in a situation when commercial actors are 
involved in data activism. The empirical context is the MyData conference. We 
identify collective action frames constructed by keynote speakers and the reception 
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of these frames by the audience. This informs us on the different ways of framing 
the obstacles to equal participation in the data economy, and the means of their 
removal. An overview of the identified collective action frames is presented in Table 
6. 
Based on our analysis, dominant data arrangements were framed as limiting 
participation of both people and firms in the data economy. For people, the primary 
obstacle hampering equal participation was their inability to act in relation to their 
personal data. For firms, the primary obstacle was access to data, which hindered 
commercial opportunities of everyone except those that had the capabilities to amass 
data in proprietary databases – namely, data economy’s dominant firms. Not 
surprisingly for a MyData-themed conference, a wide agreement was present 
regarding framing the means of resolving these problems: the development of data 
arrangements that provide people with data agency, or the capability for intentional 
action in relation to data. Developing such data arrangements was framed to be 
possible due to two concurrent developments. First, technological evolution was 
making it possible to provide individuals with data-related tools on par with those 
possessed by firms. Second, the evolution of formal regulation, particularly EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation and its data portability rights for individuals, 
was providing the opportunity to access and utilise personal data held in proprietary 
databases. Data agency would make it possible for people to participate in data 
collection, data sharing and data processing, transforming personal data to serve 
people’s own, rather than only firms’, interests. Simultaneously, these technologies 
were framed as a means to redistribute data between firms, as people would redirect 
data to uses that they considered beneficial. This would lead to data access and 
related business opportunities for firms presently lacking that access. 
Table 6. The collective action frames and their features identified in Article III. 
Frame Reception of the frame 
Keynotes employing 
the frame 
Participation enablers Technical & legal tools Agreed on 9 
Means of participation 
Agency for individuals Agreed on 8 
Redistribution of data Agreed on 9 
Aims of participation 
Beneficiaries Contested 3 
Market symmetry  Contested 4 
Fundamental rights Contested 2 
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Our analysis, therefore, identified agreement on individual data agency as being 
ultimately at stake. The agreed-on goal for MyData was to transform people into 
agentic individuals who manage their lives on- and offline and become fully-fledged 
participants of a datafied society. This agreement was reached without specificity on 
what the modes and aims of participation should be. The main contested issue 
concerned what participation involves. Here, data agency was framed either 
narrowly in terms of market choice, or more broadly in terms of data citizenship.  
Framing data agency in terms of market symmetry meant narrowing 
participation down to market exchange. Participation signified primarily the ability 
to choose between alternative uses for personal data at the marketplace. People, 
similarly to firms, could then consider personal data as an economic asset via which 
to advance their own interests. The solution to data economy’s woes was to provide 
people with the means to exchange their data for whatever suits their private 
interests. The promise for firms was a level playing field where access to people’s 
data would be gained by providing them with enticing services. Here, the ability of 
firms to exploit data for competitive advantage would not stem from an 
advantageous position making efficient data extraction possible, but from success in 
fair competition. 
Framing agency in terms of citizen participation meant transforming people not 
solely into market participants but into digital citizens more broadly understood, with 
rights, entitlements and the ability to participate in governance of data use. This 
frame presents a broader of participation in the economy than market participation; 
the economic could be considered not only as meeting market demand but, more 
generally, as the production of things that meet the needs of humans. Framed in this 
way, data activism aiming at alternative data arrangements should first consider 
which data arrangements allow meeting human needs and then develop data-related 
technologies aiming at those data arrangements. This could involve the inclusion of 
other kinds of value derived from data, in addition to the competitive value gained 
from data that others do not have. 
The alternative frames of participation are particularly informative considering 
how the presence of firms relates to the goal-setting of data activism. Framing 
participation in terms of market agency was easily transformed to serve commercial 
data uses and allowed for the articulation of competitive benefits for the associated 
firms. When data agency must serve both activist and commercial interests, and 
market agency is readily transformed to serve commercial data uses, what is at stake 
risks being reduced to participation in data markets. Particular framings of data 
agency can thrive when data activism’s agenda beyond enhancing agency remains 
open. In the article, we conclude that redressing injustices beyond distributive ones 
and deriving value from data beyond competitive advantage may hinge on data 
activism developing a normative agenda for what participation in a datafied society 
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should involve, and also on articulating citizenship-oriented data agency in more 
concrete terms. 
Viewed in connection to the research objectives of this thesis, the frame analysis 
of Article III shows how individual data agency is a basis for alternative data 
economy imaginaries. In line with Article II, it identifies a market-focused imaginary 
that envisions users as participants in data markets. However, Article III also 
identifies an alternative, citizenship-oriented imaginary that provides alternative, 
broader content for data agency. 
6.4 Article IV: The social imaginaries of data 
activism 
Article IV continues with investigating MyData activism. Based on participation in 
research projects with data activists, it analytically separates two different 
imaginaries emerging from MyData activism. These are a technological imaginary 
most closely represented by technology developers, and a socio-critical imaginary 
that we ourselves had internalised through training in the social sciences, and that 
we also associated with data activism. The article has two related aims: first, to 
clarify the kinds of political and social alternatives that different social imaginaries 
ascribe to the notions underlying data activism, and second, to rework these 
imaginaries into a shared dialogue.  
The notion of individuals having lost autonomy and being exploited by the 
techno-economic system that is the data economy is inherent in how MyData frames 
the problem at hand. As the article points out, the core ideas of the MyData vision 
have particular resonance with Winner’s (1978) formulation of reverse adaptation, 
wherein the human adapts to the power of the technological system and not vice 
versa. Through a Winnerian lens, MyData can be viewed as being concerned with a 
gradual loss of control over technological arrangements. Individuals lack the power 
to control the system through markets or through regulations such as data protection 
and antitrust. What ultimately comes under threat is human autonomy; when the 
technological system treats humans as mere means to an end, humans are 
instrumentalised as sources of data rather than treated as ends as such. The 
technological imaginary underlying attempts to develop alternative data 
arrangements favours new data infrastructure as a corrective measure. Accordingly, 
the promoters of MyData aim at tackling reverse adaptation by suggesting that 
people need correctly positioned technology to be capable of self-determination. In 
the technological imaginary, an alternative distribution of data – or, more 
specifically, an alternative distribution of decision rights and capabilities related to 
data – generates personal and social advantages by way of economic transactions. 
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MyData is therefore seen as giving rise to new business models, with economically 
more balanced use of personal data as their driving force. 
The socio-critical imaginary, in turn, questions the effectiveness of technological 
correction. It is informed by the critical stance characterising social scientific 
inquiry, drawing particularly from data studies and critical political economy to 
question the optimistic and future-oriented imaginary of technological advancement. 
In the article we outline the problematics inhering in the articulation of citizen and 
consumer agency in terms of individual-centric data infrastructure. Most centrally, 
is this not simply another iteration of Winner’s reverse adaptation? Does it lead, as 
its advocates hope, away from reverse adaptation or does it, through expanding 
datafication, encouraging further reliance on data utilisation, and further opening of 
data to monetisation and competition, actually end up strengthening the current 
system? MyData’s central tenets are symptomatic of a belief that individuals can 
control the market, if only technology is developed correctly. Here, an obvious risk 
of reverse adaptation lies in the belief that markets ostensibly harnessed to serve 
individuals would in fact allow them to control the system. A socio-critical 
imaginary orients us to treat the expanding commodification of personal data as a 
risky effort to protect human autonomy. 
Table 7. Suggestions for combining socio-critical and technological imaginaries for future 
data activist work presented in Article IV. 
Collective data 
governance 
A functioning digital service environment requires governance of technical 
and operational rules. They could be coupled with explicit governance of 
data usage and exploitation, abiding to collectively agreed notions of 
acceptable an undesired data use 
Production of 
data commons 
Aggregate proprietary personal data and other data sources into data 
commons. The intended uses of data commons are intrinsically linked to 
the collective needs of the communities producing and governing them. 
Therefore, MyData can aid specific collectives in claiming personal data to 
benefit the community instead of only the individual. This adds a societally 
oriented layer to its technological infrastructure.  
Learn and benefit 
from existing 
initiatives 
Collective data governance, as well as data commons, could benefit from 
existing initiatives. These include the tradition of cooperative-based 
governance, as well as collaboration with social movements to 
demonstrate, in practice, how data can shape knowledge practices and 
generate advocacy and public benefits. 
 
Article IV argues that these different imaginaries inform different kinds of 
engagements with production of information and knowledge. In particular, they have 
different relations to individual control of personal data. When viewed through the 
technological imaginary, MyData is an ambitious political project advancing human-
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centricity. In terms of the socio-critical imaginary, it risks falling short from reaching 
its aims of empowerment and citizen-centricity. Well-executed MyData principles 
could nevertheless aid in promoting more just and sustainable data practices. To be 
more promising, we argue that data activism like MyData should explicitly outline 
intended aims for technology development, and take a normative stand on desired 
and undesired objectives of data usage. With this in mind, Article IV synthesises a 
productive relationship between the two social imaginaries, combining the 
infrastructure-level technological vision with explicit knowledge practices and 
clearly enunciated societal outcomes. As discussed in the article, towards this end, 
we performed a situated intervention in MyData activism by initiating discussions 
on “our data” with the aim of promoting collective engagement through data 
activism. Based on this work, the article discusses some examples of future data 
activist work to explore these possibilities. These are listed in Table 7. 
Of the articles in this thesis, Article IV provides the broadest view into data 
activism. It contributes to the aims of this thesis by, first, connecting the 
technological imaginary animating data activism with the market-oriented imaginary 
identified in the previous articles; second, identifying problems inhering in the 
solutions developed based on this imaginary; third, developing further the notion of 
citizenship-based imaginary; and fourth, discussing how more sustainable data 
economy imaginaries can be developed both conceptually as well as in practice. 
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7 Discussion 
The dominant data economy imaginary consists of notions about how firms make, 
and should make, use of datafication in value creation. Chapter 3 highlighted two 
central and interrelated aspects of the dominant imaginary. The first concerned the 
understanding of data as an economic resource, and how the use of data is related to 
competitive success in the data economy. Data are considered as a resource out there 
for the taking, and their exploitation for economic profit is considered as a legitimate 
mode of operation. Further, in order to use data for competitive advantage, a firm 
needs to take hold of data and prevent others from making use of them. When these 
notions about data are accepted, there are not many incentives for a commercial actor 
to forego the opportunity to extract and exploit data, as this would give edge for 
competitors. This is one of Jens Beckert’s (2016) arguments about fictional 
expectations: collective imagination pushes actors under competitive pressure to 
accept and act according to what are presumed as normal and expected modes of 
action. Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy (2017) call this the data imperative, and 
it incentivises embracing data economy’s dominant data arrangements and modes of 
operation. The other aspect discussed in Chapter 3 concerned the role that these data 
arrangements shape for people as users, consumers, citizens and participants in the 
data economy. The role is that of the target of data extraction and, therefore, the 
source of data and the target of behavioural prediction and modification (Zuboff, 
2015). The use of personal data affects things that matter in people’s lives, and no 
doubt has also positive outcomes both individually and societally. These outcomes, 
whether beneficial or harmful, are however shaped by others’ interests, often 
commercial ones, that may or may not be aligned with people’s own. In short, under 
data economy’s dominant data arrangements, people’s agency towards data and their 
possibilities to participate in processes that determine how data are used are limited. 
In order to further respond to the research questions of this thesis, this chapter 
discusses how, in light of the finding of Articles I–IV, the alternative data economy 
imaginaries developed in data activism compare to this dominant imaginary. The 
alternative imaginaries investigated here start from problematising some of the 
taken-for-granted notions about the data economy, aiming to combine notions of 
citizen empowerment and firms’ commercial interests towards data. As the findings 
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discussed in Chapter 6 show, the aim is to resolve two asymmetries in the data 
economy. The first asymmetry is the one between people and firms or other 
organisations that collect and use personal data. Here, the asymmetry concerns 
capability of accessing and using data. Organisations are capable of making use of 
data to further their own ends, whereas people’s capacity to do so is limited. The 
second asymmetry is the one between those organisations that can access data for 
their value creation efforts, and those that do not. This asymmetry stems from a 
favourable position that currently allows only some to accumulate data. Online 
platforms, for example, are well-positioned to accumulate data; acting as 
intermediaries of interactions between others, they not only make possible but also 
datafy those interactions.  
As discussed in the articles, both asymmetries are imagined to be resolved by an 
alternative, in a distributive sense more symmetric data economy, consisting of a 
new ecosystem of services making use of personal data. Different service providers 
are imagined to occupy niches in the ecosystem as, for example, data producers, data 
users, intermediaries or infrastructure providers. Gradual expansion of the new 
ecosystem is imagined to lead to a data economy where individuals are a central node 
and control point of data flows and exchanges. Co-operation with actors that 
commercially utilise personal data is therefore part and parcel of the imagined 
alternative data economy.  
The following sections are roughly organised around the themes of the research 
questions 1–3 of this thesis. To expand on research question 1, I begin by discussing 
data agency as the notion running through the findings of the articles. After that, I 
focus on two alternative data economy imaginaries that are both based on the notion 
of data agency, but nevertheless imagine different modes of societal participation 
implied by data agency. I refer to these two alternatives as the market imaginary and 
the citizen imaginary. Continuing with a further discussion on research question 2, I 
will outline the politics of imagination of these alternatives. The potential for success 
of the two alternatives, in the sense of their potential for expansion to broader 
agendas beyond data activism, will also be discussed. Following up with the themes 
of research question 3, I will finish with problematising some aspects of the 
developed imaginaries, and propose an outline of what may be considered, based on 
this research, as a more desirable data economy imaginary. 
7.1 Data agency and the politics of imagination 
Data activism examined in this thesis is in agreement on the issue at stake: data 
agency, understood as the individuals’ capacity to act intentionally in relation to 
personal data and their collection and use by different actors. Broadly understood, 
notions about people’s agency in datafied times are present in other data activism 
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initiatives. The concern with turning data to serve people’s own ends can serve as an 
impetus for data activism in the first place, and this general aim underpins open data 
activists in Stefan Baack’s (2015) research, Andrew Schrock’s (2016) civic hackers, 
as well as different ways of using data as advocacy instrument discussed, for 
example, by Jonathan Gray and colleagues (2016) and Stefania Milan and Miren 
Gutiérrez (2018; Gutiérrez, 2018a; 2018b). In MyData activism, however, data 
agency can be viewed to explicitly concern participation in an economic sense, so 
that the aim is to improve people’s condition by developing alternative data 
arrangements corresponding to an imaginary in which individuals are data 
economy’s empowered actors and participants.  
The pursuit of data agency in this sense implies that people’s current position in 
relation to the techno-economic system of the data economy is seen to be 
subordinate. A subordinate subject position and qualities associated with it, such as 
passivity or helplessness, are far from proper agentic individuals who are imagined 
to manage life and carry the associated responsibilities (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). 
Here, the subject position in the data economy is particularly a question of 
participation in decisions concerning data and knowledge production, and the 
existing, or dominant, data arrangements are seen to delimit people’s possibilities of 
participating in these decisions. The means to alter individuals’ subject position – an 
alternative technical and commercial service ecosystem based on the notion of 
individuals controlling their data – underlines that the question of agency becomes 
to concern the kinds of technology that are available. This suggests that certain kinds 
of data technology are viewed as a condition for having agency in a datafied 
environment. In the imagined alternative data economy, people are agentic 
individuals managing their lives in situations that involve personal data – in datafied 
times, increasingly many situation in their lives both on- and offline.  
Despite the agreement on data agency being at stake, however, this research has 
identified two alternative modes of participation that were imagined to be the 
outcomes of individual agency (Article III). I argue that these modes of participation 
correspond to two alternative imaginaries about people’s role in the data economy: 
the market imaginary and the citizen imaginary. The market imaginary essentially 
foregrounds agency as individual market choice. People are imagined as active 
participants in the data economy in a very specific sense; they make choices on the 
market about the collection, sharing, and use of their personal data. Individuals 
peruse market offerings and make choices in order to improve their lives and achieve 
better outcomes for themselves. Individuals, in other words, make personal data 
serve their own ends. The citizen imaginary, in contrast, frames economic and 
societal participation more broadly than as participation in data markets. In this 
imaginary, the enactment of individual control to personal data via new data 
technologies is viewed as a condition for realising data agency, but by itself an 
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inadequate means of enabling participation in the data economy. Where the market 
imaginary relies on market forces for data governance, the citizen imaginary views 
reliance on market governance as an insufficient or even dubious means to address 
data economy’s asymmetries and to ensure favourable outcomes. In the citizen 
imaginary, data agency is understood as a form of civic agency, related to the 
capability to participate in the processes that determine how, and for what purposes, 
data are used. Where the market imaginary focuses on private benefits and relies on 
the market to provide societally desirable outcomes, the citizen imaginary 
foregrounds the use of data for collectively, in addition to privately, beneficial 
outcomes.  
The division between these two alternatives is not exclusive to data activism 
examined in this thesis. It is aligned with a division identified by Barbara Prainsack 
(2019), who discusses the arguments about addressing data economy’s power 
asymmetries as falling into two main strands: arguments for either individual or 
collective control. In line with the market imaginary, the individual control advocates 
identified by Prainsack argue that data agency and societal participation are enacted 
by “the implementation of ever more granular ways of informing and consenting 
data subjects” (Prainsack, 2019: 2). In contrast, similarly to the citizen imaginary, 
Prainsack’s collective control advocates emphasise that ”increasing individual-level 
control over personal data is a necessary but insufficient way to address the 
overarching power of multinational companies and other data capitalists” and, 
instead of individual control, “foreground the use of data for the public good” 
(Prainsack, 2019: 2). 
Examining the market imaginary and the citizen imaginary vis-à-vis the 
dominant imaginary about the data economy provides a view of the data economy 
as a field of struggle over the collective political imagination. For actors involved in 
this struggle, some future states of the data economy are more advantageous than 
others (see Beckert, 2016), and future imaginaries are an entry point to economic 
power now and in the future. Aims to establish a particular version of the data 
economy as the future, that is, the data economy that is not just potential but that 
becomes the only one possible, gives rise to interest struggles over the collective 
imagination. This contestation can be framed in terms of Patrice Flichy’s (2007) 
framework of the technical imaginaire discussed in Chapter 2. The examined data 
activism is based on a vision about alternative technologies producing and using 
personal data. This vision acts as what Flichy calls a watershed utopia, which can 
accommodate alternative readings of the situation. These variations of objectives are 
connected to choices made during the design of data technologies, so that technology 
development becomes an arena of contestation. A widely accepted exemplar about 
a material realisation of the initial vision could allow convergence towards one 
particular form of technology. Such an exemplar, however, is not available; no 
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project has, yet, developed into something that developers and end-users could 
converge to follow. Beyond imagining people as agentic individuals in relation to 
personal data, the technology vision drawing data activists and other actors together 
does not provide a response to how, exactly, data economy’s asymmetries should be 
dealt with. The specifics are up for grabs and, therefore, the object of interest 
struggle.  
In the context of data activism studied in this thesis, the politics of imagination 
play out in two ways. First, the imaginary of agentic individuals managing their lives 
is in tension with the dominant data economy imaginary. Both the market imaginary 
and the citizen imaginary emerge as alternatives, or at least interventions, to the 
dominant imaginary. Second, to the extent that market and citizen imaginaries are at 
odds with one another, the politics of imagination play out as contestation within the 
field of data activism. 
7.2 The market imaginary 
The market imaginary about people’s role in the data economy essentially depicts 
agency as the capability of market choice. The market imaginary was discussed 
throughout the four articles. Articles I and II examined end-user technologies 
imagined to act as intermediary services via which people exercise control towards 
personal data. They reflected a certain control-centricity in the imagined users’ role 
in the data economy; in essence, the imagined role is a more efficient iteration of the 
principle of privacy self-management (Article I). People are imagined to participate 
in the management of data resources and data flows, basing their decisions on the 
benefits and costs accruing from data use. Article II described in detail what market 
agency is about, its implication for value creation processes, and the intervention it 
makes in the dominant data arrangements. As discussed in Articles III and IV, this 
reliance on market forces was not a feature of service developers’ imaginaries only; 
it prevailed also more broadly in data activism examined in this research. Article IV 
detailed how data activism’s technological intervention was imagined to create new 
market arrangements to counter the reverse adaptation (Winner, 1978) that is viewed 
as making people serve the ends of the techno-economic system. 
When the market imaginary is compared to data economy’s dominant imaginary, 
the alternative or the intervention concerns participation in data economy’s markets, 
the terms under which market participation happens, and who gets to decide about 
these things (Article II). Unsatisfactory societal developments are viewed as 
deficiencies in how the markets operate, and they are to be corrected by making 
markets operate more efficiently. The reliance on market forces as an optimal way 
to encourage favourable developments is also more generally embedded in dominant 
imaginaries about the development of the information society (Mansell, 2012). This 
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is, of course, also in line with markets being widely imagined as a correct way to 
bring order to human and social activities (Aspers, 2011). 
In the context of data activism examined in this thesis, the market imaginary is 
premised on intervening in data economy’s market arrangements by shaping people 
into agentic market actors. Here, reliance on market forces is present in two 
interrelated ways. First, individual data agency is imagined as a means for the 
individuals themselves to gain access to more of the proceeds of datafication. 
Individuals perusing the market’s offerings can choose to make data available to 
exactly those service providers that offer the best service available. Similar rhetoric 
has been employed to justify extensive dataveillance practices in the dominant data 
economy imaginary. For example, Joseph Turow and colleagues report a retailer 
describing how a customer “wants to go to a retailer that understands her, is really 
relevant to the lifestyle she’s living, and really does pay attention” (Turow et al., 
2015b: 474). In the context of the dominant data economy imaginary, the corollary 
for a retailer facing competitive pressures is the acceleration of dataveillance, which 
ostensibly makes it possible to better understand the customer. In the alternative data 
arrangements of the market imaginary, the competitive pressure is imagined to work 
differently. As data are made available by customers themselves in order to receive 
better services, the competitive pressure would not be towards more extensive 
dataveillance, but rather the improvement of service promised to the customer. As 
discusses in Article II, the increase in the quality and intimacy of data is imagined to 
lead to better service via more detailed and more accurate personalisation or 
targeting. The corollary for the individual is the incentive to become an active 
participant in this process by making extensive personal data available to the 
provider promising the most enticing services in return for those data – after all, who 
would want to forego optimal service? Shoshana Zuboff’s questions about who can 
learn from data, and who decides about this (Zuboff, 2015; also see Chapter 1) are 
in the market imaginary answered with “agentic individuals decide based on 
subjective benefits”.  
The second sense of reliance on market forces becomes apparent when market 
choices of individuals are imagined to lead to systemic effects in the data economy, 
as discussed in Articles II–IV. When individuals make their own choices on sharing 
their data with third parties promising new, beneficial services, the data economy is 
imagined to be opened up for competition between firms. Individuals become the 
conduits through which third parties can gain access to data produced about people 
by the primary data collectors. This makes possible the secondary use of personal 
data by third parties. Access to data capital would not be dependent on a favourable 
position allowing the extractions of data and their accumulation as proprietary 
resources, nor on access to the technological means to extract data. Instead, the 
capability to access data would be determined by competition in the provision of 
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enticing services for end-users. For commercial actors, the idea of rational 
individuals making choices on their personal data provides a potential means to 
compete with other firms and gain access to data resources. 
Under the market imaginary, societal change is sought through the expansion of 
data markets, and the aim is to subject data collection to more efficient market 
governance. The two asymmetries to be addressed – the asymmetry between people 
and firms à la Mark Andrejevic’s “big data divide” (2014) on the one hand, and the 
asymmetry between data economy’s kingpins and the less powerful organisations on 
the other – are both imagined to be resolved by increasing individual capabilities to 
make choices on data use. The market competition resulting from individual choice 
is imagined to resolve data lock-ins and dissolve data-enabled monopolies. The new 
data arrangements having individual market agency as their driving force, do not 
only settle into the existing data markets, but rather link data agency to new business 
models and new means for firms to gain access to data. It is, therefore, not simply 
that market agency towards data is imagined to lead to empowered individuals in the 
data economy; rather, individual empowerment goes hand-in-hand with the 
advantages that the market is imagined to produce for individuals and the society at 
large. The market acts as the mechanism of governance that ensures more just data 
arrangements, as they are imagined to be the ones that will ultimately survive in 
market competition.  
The reliance on market forces in producing favourable outcomes is based on an 
understanding of data’s value in terms of data being a scarce economic resource; 
commercial actors are imagined to benefit from data as competitive advantage that 
can be derived from access to data that others do not have (Cinnamon, 2017). The 
economic value these actors are imagined to produce with personal data is similar to 
value produced in the data economy currently: personalisation, profiling and 
targeting; optimising systems; managing and controlling things; modelling 
probabilities; and building stuff (Sadowski, 2019). The demand made in data 
industry’s marketing material cited by Jathan Sadowski (2019: 3) – “we need to 
understand data as an asset and turn it into value” – was repeated, in spirit if not 
exactly verbatim, in the empirical material analysed in Article III. The aim is to make 
the data economy more efficient, in the sense of producing more value, as well as 
more balanced, in the sense of who gets to tap into that value. In the market 
imaginary, personal data remains to be considered as an asset, but not only for some 
well-positioned firms. Through competition in service provision data can become an 
asset for other firms as well, and through choices on the market for people 
themselves. In this sense, the market imaginary does not question the data industry’s 
dominant economic rationale, but rather transforms it to serve the ends of data 
activism. 
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Finally, while new technologies are imagined to be instrumental for data agency, 
their development is not independent of the institutional context, namely data 
protection regulation. The development of new data arrangements, and the market 
arrangements associated with them, relies on regulatory opportunities, and data 
activists aim to ensure that those opportunities are made use of (Article III). The 
particular regulatory reform that data activism benefits from is the EU GDPR and its 
data portability rights, which are viewed as a means to gain access to personal data 
that has so far been held by organisations for their own purposes. In the market 
imaginary, formal regulation is viewed as an opportunity that makes it possible to 
open up data markets for competition. By relying on market forces as discussed 
above, data activism can leverage that competition to forward its own ends. New 
institutions of data protection, such as data portability, are here imagined to act as 
enablers that can serve data activism’s ends. This enablement is thought to work both 
ways; the innovations made in the context of data activism are imagined to realise 
further effects of the instruments of data protection regulation, such as increased 
competition. 
7.3 The citizen imaginary 
The citizen imaginary was in this research identified in relation to the market 
imaginary, and it was not as extensively articulated in the empirical material. 
Compared to the market imaginary, the citizen imaginary extends the notion of 
people’s agency from individual market participants towards civic agency and 
participation grounded in citizen rights, collective governance, and the common 
good. A notion about data agency oriented towards the collective is not exclusive of 
individual autonomy; rather, in place of an imaginary of individuals as atomistic 
market actors, the citizen imaginary is premised on data citizens who are self-
governing but whose autonomy includes the possibility to organise collectively (see 
Evans, 2017). This notion of data agency was identified in Article III, and further 
discussed in Article IV. In practical terms, civic agency in relation to data could 
include democratic governance or collective negotiations over the use of personal 
data, and over the sharing of value produced with personal data, as well as forms of 
individual and collective action undertaken to reach these ends. Here, attention is not 
solely on who gains the benefits of personal data use, but also on processes that 
determine which uses are ultimately desirable, agreeable or undesirable. Potentially, 
data governance in this sense could apply to collective rather than individual data 
resources, as in the case of governance of data commons or governance based on 
data cooperatives (Article IV).  
The commons, here, are not understood in terms of things that are freely 
available for all. Rather, commons are referred to in the sense in which Elinor Ostrom 
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(1990) discusses them: as property arrangements that allow for collective 
governance over norms and rules of access as well as collective enforcement of 
sanctions. Commons in this sense are not free for all, but are grounded on the social 
systems that define and regulate them (Arvidsson, 2020). In the case of collectively 
governed data commons based on personal data, personal data would be in some 
sense aggregated over individuals and transformed into a resource to be employed 
for the benefit of the community of people whom the data concern. This could mean 
a common good of a specific community, or the public good. 
In this research, the market imaginary emerged as the primary imaginary, and 
the citizen imaginary emerged as a reaction to observed deficiencies of the market 
imaginary. The citizen imaginary is not necessarily a strict alternative to the market 
imaginary; it can rather be viewed as its expansion, so that forms of collective data 
governance would be applied to curb the excesses of the data markets. Nevertheless, 
in the empirical material, the two were clearly at odds with one another. In Article 
III it was discussed that the division between the market imaginary and the citizen 
imaginary were present already in a formative event of the MyData community. In 
article IV it was discussed how we, as researchers, were involved in the production 
and expansion of the citizen imaginary by our small intervention, situated in data 
activism. 
One reason for the tension between the two imaginaries is that the values they 
embrace are contested. In this sense, the key dividing line runs between individual 
and collective values. The market imaginary embraces values based on individual 
choice, competition, effectiveness, individual benefit and property rights. It favours 
an understanding of data as a scarce resource, and understanding data’s value to be 
connected to turning that resource into economic value via productive activities 
oriented to serve demand on the market. The citizen imaginary, in turn, embraces 
values based on collective governance, common or public good, and citizen rights. 
While the understanding of data as an economic resource underlies the citizen 
imaginary, it allows for accommodating a broader range of values, such as the 
application of data to improve human capacities, the cohesion of communities, and 
the non-material qualities of life (see Cinnamon, 2017). In general, collective 
resources such as commons can come with their distinct logic of value, owing to the 
meanings attached to them and the social relations that allow them to function as a 
resource; as Adam Arvidsson (2020: 8) formulates, they “become valuable to the 
extent to which they can contribute to the distinct goals and aims that are inherent in 
the process […] that sustains them”. One should not expect collectively governed 
data resources to be different in this regard. In this sense, they should not be 
considered only as a form of data governance but also a way of making data valuable 
for those involved. 
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7.4 The success of alternative imaginaries 
Two alternative imaginaries about participation in the data economy emerge from 
data activism, potentially in tension with one another. Can we expect one to be more 
successful than the other, in the sense of extending from data activism to broader 
agendas beyond data activism, that is, in moving from one socio-political setting to 
another (Jasanoff, 2015b)? The ultimate success of either imaginary is an open 
question, but based on this research, the market imaginary has a number of features 
that can make it better-positioned in this regard. 
First, the market imaginary seems to better resonate with technology developers 
– that is, people who implement material realisations of the imaginary. The initial 
driving force for data activism examined in this thesis is a community of open data 
activists, technologists, start-up entrepreneurs and researchers. As discussed in 
Article IV, the technology experts tend to build upon an imaginary favouring 
technological correction of what are viewed as societal problems, and upon beliefs 
about free-spirited individuals benefiting from advances in information technology 
(Article IV; Barbrook & Cameron, 1996; Wyatt, 2004). Accordingly, individuals are 
imagined to control the market once they are provided with the technological 
capabilities to do so. The combination of these tendencies seems to favour the market 
imaginary and the development of tools and infrastructures to be used for making 
decisions on data, controlling data sharing, and participating in data exchanges. 
Second, the regulatory opportunity supports the market imaginary. As discussed 
in Chapter 3 and Article I, formal privacy regulation frames data extraction as a 
matter of personal information concerning individuals, and decisions that individuals 
make on that personal information. The new data portability rights provided by 
Article 20 of the EU GDPR similarly focus on individuals, and particularly on their 
rights to access data in machine-readable format. When data activists (Article III) 
and like-minded service developers (Article II) leverage data portability as means 
towards their own ends, it is necessary for them to build on the notion of individuals 
as decision-makers, and to provide individuals with tools that allow them to act as 
conduits for data flows. The individual-centric framing of data portability seems to 
naturally serve technological solutions premised on a market-oriented notion of data 
agency. This is not to say that leveraging data portability rights would preclude 
framing data agency in terms citizenship and civic agency. Nevertheless, the 
alignment of formal regulation and the market imaginary highlights that the state can 
have a role in supporting a particular imaginary of an alternative data economy 
through regulatory efforts. For the state, formal regulation on data portability, 
combined with actors turning those regulation into market opportunities can be a 
means to address the competitive situation in the data economy.  
Third, the market imaginary concurrently serves the aim of individual 
empowerment and the prevailing commercial interests towards personal data. 
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Accomplishing change in the data economy is not only a matter of developing end-
user services that offer features imagined to empower individuals as actors in the 
data economy, and hoping that such services become significant enough to be 
meaningful. Such services require an environment within which they can function, 
and are dependent on a compatible network of regulatory frameworks, markets and 
other institutional arrangements, widely enough accepted data practices, and 
technologically and semantically interoperable data sources and endpoints, to which 
the new services can connect. For example, an end-user service promising to 
aggregate and sell its users’ data cannot function if it cannot access and transfer or 
copy user data, nor can it work if markets for its products do not exist or do not work 
economically (Charitsis et al., 2018). Likewise, the service needs to offer something 
for those involved. In other words, it needs to be a “compromise that can be used 
associate multiple partners sufficiently loosely for everyone to benefit, but 
sufficiently rigidly […] to function” (Flichy, 2007: 10–11). As discussed in Articles 
III and IV, MyData activism’s chosen tactic to address this problem is to develop a 
gradually expanding commercial and technical ecosystem of services to which new 
MyData-related initiatives can attach. To function economically, the ecosystem 
needs to offer something for all parties involved. Based on the research in this thesis, 
these requirements are served by a particular understanding of data agency: the 
individual capacity to act in the market for data-based services. While the long-term 
economic and commercial viability of this imagined ecosystem of compatible 
services remains an open question, it nevertheless offers something for commercial 
technology developers and other firms: a promise of access to currently unreachable 
data resources. The ideas of individual data agency, the possibility to implement 
them by means of technology development, and the requirement to offer something 
for the commercial actors involved neatly come together in the market imaginary, 
while the citizen imaginary had fewer concrete promises to offer for service 
developers. Such offers could nevertheless be made. As one example, data commons 
can be specified and governed in a manner that delimits but does not preclude their 
economic exploitation (Arvidsson, 2020; Prainsack, 2019). 
Fourth, the market imaginary is better aligned with the context of contemporary 
capitalism, where the politics of imagination are subject to the dominance and 
resilience of capitalism and the legitimisation and continuation of its institutions and 
practices (Dencik, 2018; Fisher, 2009). This resilience can be seen in the prevalence 
of market metaphors in the discussion of the Internet since the 1990s (Wyatt, 2004) 
and in the reliance on market forces in the development of the information society 
despite the availability of alternative imaginaries, such as those based on information 
commons (Mansell, 2012). The present research highlights how in the data economy, 
the resilience concerns some of the underpinning notions of data capitalism, 
including data as a resource for the production of economic value, and access to data 
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as a determinant of competitive success. The market imaginary exhibits the 
resilience of capitalism’s practices and institutions in that individual agency is 
imagined as something that relates to existing personal data market arrangements, 
and participation in those markets. The role imagined for the individual, the value 
that is imagined to be derived from personal data, as well as the expansion of 
datafication and the data markets represent interventions that in a sense intervene in 
and reorient, instead of overhauling, replacing or fundamentally transforming, the 
data economy.  
In light of this discussion, it is not surprising that the forms of agency imagined 
by the developers of new data technologies and arrangements such as personal data 
spaces in Article II are oriented at construing users as market participants. 
Identifying ways to connect with the data economy’s existing arrangements, these 
services seek to intervene in data economy’s value production processes and attach 
to things that produce economic value, not construct them anew from scratch. 
7.5 Desirable data futures 
The presence of both market and citizen imaginaries highlights that data agency turns 
out to be a malleable objective, allowing imagining alternative forms of participation 
in the data economy. This malleability opens up the possibility for data activism 
examined in this research to serve different interests while promoting data agency, 
highlighting the potential for divergent societal outcomes. The above discussion 
points out that the forms of data agency and participation based on the market 
imaginary have the potential to be more successful. What should we make of this 
potential success? As discussed in Article II, the market imaginary shapes 
technology development within the data activism field towards ensuring smooth data 
flows and developing data control interfaces and tools for end-users. What would be 
the outcome when such technologies are implemented and released into the wild in 
the context of data economy’s prevailing power structures?   
Relying on market governance to ensure favourable outcomes means relying on 
at least two assumptions. The first assumption is that once data become more broadly 
available, as a result of new regulatory opportunities and data activists and firms 
making use of these opportunities, markets start providing beneficial services for 
people to choose. The second assumption is that people are capable of choosing to 
use just these beneficial services. However, based on this research, the possibilities 
for making meaningful individual decisions on data is dubious. Article I pointed out 
some of the problems inhering in the view of personal data as a private asset to be 
exploited for personal benefit. In addition, to be an effective means to provide market 
agency, the ability to control personal data needs to be a determinant of market 
power. The structural incompatibility of the data industry with the empowerment of 
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individuals through increased control (Crain, 2018; Draper & Turow, 2019) suggests 
that a capability to formally control data is not necessarily a strong determinant of 
power in data economy’s markets. As discussed in Article IV, those in less 
advantageous positions might be the first to end up being exposed. Those short of 
financial means may be willing or forced to give up their data and privacy in 
exchange of goods and services, and privacy might become a prerogative to which 
only the wealthy can aspire to. The less endowed could be the most reliant on 
becoming data contributors in exchange for basic services, such as internet access, 
housing, electricity, healthcare or insurance. Apart from financial means, the 
dividing line for this new personal data divide might also be, for example, financial 
literacy or technological savvy. 
Considering the alignment of commercial interests and the market imaginary, 
these reservations do not necessarily matter. Whether or not people in a real sense 
gain agency in data economy’s markets, construing them as market actors may 
provide firms with access to more, and more nuanced, data (Article III). Like 
transparency that may act as a Trojan horse via which other political goals are 
pursued (Levy & Johns, 2016), empowerment through individual data control may 
similarly advance more effective data collection and commodification. Instead of 
empowering people, the individual ability to control data flows may put them in a 
position where they end up sharing more intimate details of their personal lives, with 
the pretext of individuals being in charge. At the same time, this could mean more 
competition between firms in the data economy. The market imaginary can then 
serve the commercial ends of firms involved, with people’s data being exploited by 
a new group of commercial actors. 
Even this view might be an optimistic one; it deserves to be asked which 
commercial actors can really benefit from the economic and other opportunities 
created by the innovations of data activism. As pointed out in Article II, data 
economy’s dominant actors have experimented with concepts that resemble PDS 
initiatives, highlighting their capability to adapt to new regulations and to occupy 
new positions opened up by societal developments. Article III identified the issue of 
beneficiaries of data activism’s innovations as one of the unresolved tensions in the 
formative event of MyData activism. One possibility, here, would be to view any 
interest in individual data agency as a potential for a change for the better. The other 
possibility would be to rather view it as unwanted co-optation of data activist ideas 
by data economy’s kingpins. Later interactions with MyData proponents, including 
discussions spurred by Article III, have indicated that this tension remains to be 
resolved. 
These considerations highlight the market imaginary’s limited potential to 
transform people into agentic individuals managing their lives. It is therefore 
tempting to look at the citizen imaginary as the alternative. Instead of individual and 
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market control, it is built on ideas of collective or democratic data governance and 
common good aims. Compared to the market imaginary, the citizen imaginary 
implies different orientations for technology development in data activism. The 
citizen imaginary, being based on notions of civic agency, could focus technology 
development towards equipping individuals with the tools needed for collective 
action and decision-making. It is not focused only on individuals as data sources and 
data’s beneficiaries; it rather contains the idea of offering data citizens the means to 
bind themselves to collective undertakings that can offer better protection against 
data economy’s exploitation than atomistic and individual-centric notions (Evans, 
2017). The outcomes of personal data extraction and use can be understood as 
collective rather than personal issues (Article I), and the citizen imaginary better 
allows taking into account the interests of people, collectively understood. It is 
perhaps better prepared than the individual-focused market imaginary to help taking 
into account those situations in which people’s decisions on data are fundamentally 
concerned with data about others (Janasik, 2019). This also means the citizen 
imaginary could better allow taking seriously what people themselves would 
consider to enable “living better with data” (Kennedy, 2018). In light of this 
discussion, the citizen imaginary looks like a promising starting point for developing 
more sustainable data economy arrangements.  
Despite the above reservations on the market imaginary, something also speaks 
in favour of the notions of individual control. Namely, it is difficult for people to 
contest data economy’s arrangements without having the ability to express choice 
on the use of their personal data to begin with. Even if data control tools do not imply 
free choice or ensure people’s capability to intentionally participate in the data 
economy, they might nevertheless be a starting point for promising data 
arrangements. This is to say that while a desirable data economy imaginary might 
start from enacting individual control it does not view this as an end in itself; rather, 
it hinges on realising that data control technologies and market governance are not 
sufficient by themselves. Instead of laissez faire and reliance on the market 
governance, individual control of personal data could here be combined with explicit 
collective governance of the use of data for knowledge production, and the purposes 
the new knowledge are used. In terms of practical technology development, such 
combining could result in equipping individuals with institutions needed for 
governance based on collective action (see Evans, 2017) in the data economy. 
In addition, the previous section’s observations on what makes the market 
imaginary successful should be taken seriously. The factors that can make it 
successful could be learned from in order to begin constructing a desirable data 
economy imaginary. First, the imaginaries of technology developers will necessarily 
take part in and affect the formation of the data economy. Criticising their 
imaginaries and assumptions is important, but our experiences with data activism in 
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Article IV highlight that for criticism to be effective, something practical needs to 
be offered that steers the development of technology in a more sustainable direction. 
Second, the market imaginary is aligned with the prevailing commercial interests 
towards personal data. In other words, a successful imaginary about the data 
economy needs to be meaningfully situated in the current political economy of data 
(see Sharon, 2018); an imaginary that completely denies prevailing economic 
interests towards data situates itself outside of it. The third, a related but broader, 
point is that the dominance and resilience of capitalism and its practices suggest that 
it easier to find support for ideas that can be framed in a way that resonates with the 
institutions of markets and market competition, and that foreground market 
participation.  
Following this line of thinking, a successful data economy imaginary includes 
something that resonates with different actors having an existing stake in the 
situation; a data economy imaginary can extend to broader agendas if it attaches to 
things that currently produce economic value (Jasanoff, 2015a). To see how this can 
be done in practice, data arrangements based on the citizen imaginary and the 
enactment of civic agency in the data economy require more practical 
experimentation in the field of data activism.  
Two rough outlines of ideas stemming from the research done for this thesis 
might serve as pointers towards future data activist work. First, there is the idea that 
individuals use data control technologies to share personal data for secondary data 
uses, potentially including commercial ones. These data uses are collectively 
governed, for instance, so that personal data are shared into data commons or some 
other data resource that is under collective governance (Article IV). A potential 
context for this idea would be data commons formed for the purpose of furthering 
collective interests of a social group that sustains them: for instance, a patient group 
sharing a condition, or a group of citizens living in the same area. Scholarly work on 
governance of data commons has pointed out that despite there being many proposals 
for data commons, there nevertheless are not many proposals on commons 
frameworks that would be suitable for data (Prainsack, 2019). There is a long history 
of employing commons as resource for market activities, and the history of 
appropriating commons to serve others’ ends is equally long (Arvidsson, 2020). The 
existing commons frameworks could be learned from, and new ones developed 
through practical experimentation. 
The second idea concerns data intermediaries, such as the PDSs of Article II. 
The users of a data intermediary could collectively govern the rules according to 
which it operates. Guided by a collective decision-making process, the intermediary 
could take a normative stance towards the data exchanges it facilitates; instead of 
acting as a hands-off and supposedly neutral facilitator, the intermediary would set 
binding rules that all parties connected to the intermediary need to follow, in effect 
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governing the outcomes of data use. Practically, the rules might resemble the terms 
of a license: for instance, it might be permissible to use the intermediated data only 
a specific purpose, for only a limited time, and only under an explicit audit 
mechanism. This model of operation could also constitute a form of collective 
bargaining, in which the intermediary service negotiates on the terms of data use, 
exercising power on behalf of its users over those actors it bargains with.  
The fact that citizen imaginary emerged from data activism itself seems like a 
promising starting point for these and other experiments on more collective notions 
of data agency. Necessary elements for experiments on citizen agency in datafied 
times are therefore already present in data activism examined in this thesis. 
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8 Conclusion 
Doing research on data activism has meant dealing with a continuously evolving 
phenomenon that is pulled into different directions by political-economic interests. 
As a consequence, its aims and means are constantly framed differently by different 
actors. This means that the research approach needs to be able to handle the 
messiness (Law, 2004) produced by the empirical field – otherwise, more mess will 
be made. My approach to make sense of the mess has been to vary the engagement 
position in relation to the empirical field, in effect triangulating with engagement 
positions to examine the empirical phenomenon from multiple perspectives and to 
enrich understanding of it by allowing the emergence of new features. The 
engagement positions taken during the course of this research have made it possible 
to explore different problem definitions, and to problematise and re-articulate them. 
Varying the engagement position has proved fruitful, as it has allowed taking new 
perspectives guided by the phenomenon as well as the production of a position with 
respect to the normative commitments encountered in the field. 
The dynamics of this empirical field are an intimate part of its messiness. The 
dynamics mean that the variations of engagement positions are fundamentally 
dependent on the context of research; a different entry point might have produced 
different kinds of engagement, which could have affected the findings. This means 
that while the picture produced may be rich, even multi-dimensional, it is still a series 
of snapshots that are framed in a specific way. If I were to start this research now, 
the picture would be different; others with other entry points would produce still 
other pictures. This is an inherent feature of this research approach, as well as of the 
empirical field. Many pictures, limited as they are, nevertheless make it possible to 
better understand the whole. I therefore conclude with implications for future 
research on data activism and the data economy, and practical implications for data 
activism. 
The expansion of the alternative imaginaries about data economy to the wider 
social imaginary is dependent on how they can fit in with existing norms and moral 
values. To be successful, the alternative should connect with things that produce 
economic and social value and with existing structures, whether social or material 
(Jasanoff, 2015b). Notions about an alternative data economy resonate well with 
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contemporary public discourse on technology firms’ role in the society as the 
providers of the infrastructure of our daily lives: on the powerful position they have 
gained in shaping things that matter in our lives, on what this implies for democratic 
agency and its future, and on practical solutions such as personal everyday choices 
on technology use, and on antitrust regulation of the technology sector. At least 
anecdotally, we are witnessing an increasing social and political demand for 
alternatives, and increasing demand for and implementation of regulatory responses 
to the developing situation. This thesis has highlighted ways in which such 
alternatives are produced in the field of data activism.  
The unifying feature of the imaginaries of data activism under study in this thesis 
is that increasing agency and participation is imagined as an entry point into an 
alternative data economy. The pursuit of data agency in the data economy, 
understood as the capacity to act towards the processes of data production and 
utilisation, is what unifies this data activism and allows its consideration as one thing, 
despite all the messiness. This pursuit is made possible by both technological and 
regulatory opportunities, viewed as enablers of shaping people as agentic actors in 
the data economy. Data agency is a specific entry point into imagining an alternative 
data economy; other entry points have been proposed elsewhere, including antitrust-
motivated breakup of large technology companies, setting up new authorities for 
regulatory oversight, or taking stronger regulatory measures towards data as 
monopolistic resource. If these proposals are carried forward, current and new forms 
of data activism might leverage them as means to their ends. 
This research has identified divisions and tensions that underlie the agreed-on 
objective of data agency. They are visible particularly with respect to the form of 
participation that data agency is imagined to imply. The main findings are outcomes 
of this interpretive flexibility in the aims and means of data activism, which result in 
an ongoing contestation over the meaning and value of what is being promoted. This 
flexibility supports alternative imaginaries, which can leverage the same 
technological and regulatory opportunities while embracing contested values and 
working towards divergent visions of the future data economy.  
These alternative imaginaries are connected to the issue of whose aims and 
purposes data activism promotes. While the data activism studied here aims at 
people’s active engagement in the data economy, this aim is not necessarily the aim 
of laypersons, but rather that of a community consisting of experts such as digital 
rights activists, technology developers and entrepreneurs. The division between the 
interests of laypersons and experts concerns data activism generally. In the absence 
of well-grounded ideas about what people consider enabling them to lead better lives 
with data, data activism relies upon the judgments of technical elites on what 
alternative data arrangements should be like (Kennedy, 2018). For example, ideas 
about people making use of data control interfaces in order to gain the best possible 
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personal outcomes from their data rely on the notion of people as willing and capable 
of managing data as part of their everyday lives. The techno-political goals and 
decisions on matters that concern the lives of people become to be defined and 
delimited by interests driving the expert community, and their imaginaries about how 
the world works and what is normal. As the research in this thesis has pointed out, 
when these actors include commercial firms, the interests promoted can become 
further delimited by not simply profitability concerns, but also specific imaginaries 
about the data economy.  
Tensions identified in data activism might in the longer run work to undermine 
the broader resonance of the developed data activism imaginaries, or could tend to 
pull apart the movement that has emerged around the notion of people’s active 
engagement in the data economy. As the discussion in this thesis has highlighted, the 
innovations of data activism could be co-opted to serve the interests of data-hungry 
commercial actors, including data economy’s current kingpins. Other movements 
aiming at societal change by means of technologies and products developed in the 
private sector indicate one possible outcome: a division between more radical and 
more commercial-friendly wings (Hess, 2005). The tensions might alternatively 
dilute the contested aspects into something that defies a strict definition and that can 
be accepted by actors driven by different interests (see Flichy, 2007). All of this 
suggests a precarious balancing act for data activism. Being too far removed from 
the dominant imaginary of the data economy could lead to one obscurity, remaining 
decidedly outside the mainstream and having no effect in the data economy’s 
dominant arrangements. On the other hand, being too aligned with the dominant 
imaginary about the data economy could lead to another obscurity, appropriation and 
assimilation into the dominant data arrangements, much like privacy and its 
protection (Coll, 2014). 
The data economy imaginaries developed in MyData activism are connected to 
the particular institutional and regulatory context from which they emerge. Having 
its origin in Finland, MyData is based on assumptions about formal institutions such 
as data protection, and society’s informal institutions such as a high level of trust 
among individuals, commercial actors and the state. Globally, however, the data 
economy’s institutional conditions are different. While the Nordic imaginary about 
how the society functions is embedded in MyData activism, distinct imaginaries are 
connected to datafication elsewhere (Milan & Treré, 2019). When an initiative based 
on individuals controlling efficient data flows is transferred from the Nordics across 
contexts and jurisdictions, its dependencies with the local context can become 
apparent. Without the aid of regulatory instruments available in the Nordics, such as 
data portability, the innovations of data activism might cease working, necessitating 
the lobbying of regulatory reforms before embarking on technology development 
that can leverage regulations. If the support of specific informal institutions of the 
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society is removed, data activism may be seen to serve different purposes altogether 
(see Taylor, 2018), and in place of potential for citizen empowerment, there might 
instead be the potential for efficient surveillance, state control or unguarded exposure 
to the market. As data activism’s innovations are dependent on the institutional 
setting, transferring them is not only the transfer of technological innovations. While 
this points at the need to be cautious when removing data activism’s innovations 
from their original context, it contains also another lesson: the Nordic context may 
be an origin for potent ideas about alternative data arrangements. The interplay 
between alternative data economy imaginaries and broader, collectively held notions 
about institutions and shared understandings of social and economic order certainly 
merits further research.  
To conclude, I highlight two considerations for future social-scientific 
scholarship on data activism that emerge from this research. The first consideration 
is that critical engagement can take a productive role in the context of technological 
activism, doing more than critique. The experience with MyData has been that 
activists are enthusiastic about new perspectives, but to be effective these 
perspectives should involve something that can involve practical activist work. This 
could obviously mean contributing to new technology development, but it could also 
mean something much more abstract, such as the articulation of complex matters in 
ways that help with the activists’ self-understanding. When social-scientific work 
produces meaningful insights for activists, those insights may immediately find their 
ways into practical activist work. While things might start living their own lives in 
surprising ways, this nevertheless means that critical social-scientific work can have 
concrete effects on data activism practice.  
This is to say that critical engagement can be constructive. The second 
consideration is related to why it should be. Technology developers shape things that 
have implications on our lives, whether we want it or not. The research in this thesis 
points out how imaginaries underpinning data activism can work towards different 
societal outcomes, and critically oriented scholarly work can pick apart and 
distinguish these differences. This research also highlights ways of purposefully 
combining elements of the different imaginaries and opening up spaces for exploring 
something new. The role for critical but constructive scholarship can be to identify 
and kindle imaginaries that are more promising in terms of leading towards a more 
desirable data economy, a data future that we would rather live in.
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Can the obstacles to privacy
self-management be overcome?
Exploring the consent intermediary
approach
Tuukka Lehtiniemi1 and Yki Kortesniemi2
Abstract
In privacy self-management, people are expected to perform cost–benefit analysis on the use of their personal data, and
only consent when their subjective benefits outweigh the costs. However, the ubiquitous collection of personal data and
Big Data analytics present increasing challenges to successful privacy management. A number of services and research
initiatives have proposed similar solutions to provide people with more control over their data by consolidating consent
decisions under a single interface. We have named this the ‘consent intermediary’ approach.
In this paper, we first identify the eight obstacles to privacy self-management which make cost–benefit analysis concep-
tually and practically challenging. We then analyse to which extent consent intermediaries can help overcome the
obstacles. We argue that simply bringing consent decisions under one interface offers limited help, but that the potential
of this approach lies in leveraging the intermediary position to provide aides for privacy management. We find that with
suitable tools, some of the more practical obstacles indeed can become solvable, while others remain fundamentally
insuperable within the individuated privacy self-management model. Attention should also be paid to how the consent
intermediaries may take advantage of the power vested in the intermediary positions between users and other services.
Keywords
Personal data, informed consent, privacy self-management, privacy, cost–benefit analysis, consent intermediary
Introduction
The production of personal data – any information relat-
ing to an identified or identifiable natural person
(European Union, 2016) – seems to be ever increasing
as activities performed with information technology
have become daily routines, and companies use Big
Data analytics to produce potentially detailed pictures
of us. This extensive use of personal data can benefit indi-
viduals themselves, as personalisation can make services
more valuable to use, and business models based on pro-
filing oftenmake services available free of charge. But the
associated cost is the impact on privacy as people reveal
more information about themselves to service providers.
EU legislation has long held privacy as a fundamental
right of the individual (Wachter, 2017) and places
strict limits on the processing of personal data.
The new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
(European Union, 2016) states that personal data may
only be processed based on one of the following six
grounds: it is required by a legal obligation, it is carried
out to protect a vital interest of the individual, it is car-
ried out for the public interest, it falls within a legitimate
interest of the data controller, it is necessary for the
performance of a contract, or it is based on the consent
of the individual. The informed consent approach, which
is also used in many other jurisdictions, allows people
the freedom to agree to many types of data processing.
However, with a contract, processing is limited to data
which is strictly necessary for its fulfilment, and for the
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other bases, the individual can either do nothing or can
at most object to some of it.
In this article, we focus exclusively on consent-based
processing as it places the greatest demands on the indi-
vidual’s ability to make informed decisions. People are
expected to manage their privacy by weighing the
subjective costs and benefits of data collection in each
case (Solove, 2013). In practice, however, many are
neither well informed on the uses of their personal data
nor feel in control of it (European Commission, 2015;
Turow et al., 2015). A fundamental dilemma underlies
the concept of informed consent: meaningful cost–benefit
analysis on personal data is anything but straightforward
in the context of Big Data analytics, data aggregation,
and opaque data flows. But for the moment, we will live
with the model of informed consent, as in many jurisdic-
tions it is codified in legislation. This has sparked an
ongoing discussion about how to make the model
work better. For example, Custers (2016) discusses
expiry dates for consents and calls for further discussion
on the issue of consents in the Big Data era, a call to
which we respond with the present article.
Within the last few years, a number of initiatives to
give people better control over their personal data have
started to appear. Proponents of personal information
management systems (PIMS) (Abiteboul et al., 2015;
European Commission, 2016) recognise the current
inability of people to meaningfully control the uses
of their data, and seek to redress the situation with
personal data stores and features for managing data
use permissions. We consider these emerging services
consent intermediaries (CIs). With CIs, people them-
selves still manage their own privacy, but the intermedi-
ary consolidates all management to a single place.
In this article, we investigate the concept of CIs and
ask two questions: (1) to what extent can CIs help
people in making informed privacy decisions and (2)
is it even possible to overcome all of the obstacles?
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: we first
review the privacy self-management model and identify
eight obstacles which currently stand in the way of
informed privacy decisions. We then proceed to describe
the CI approach and analyse its potential to tackle these
obstacles. We find that CIs form a platform for building
tools to help with the more practical obstacles, but
obstacles arising from the privacy self-management
model’s individuated nature are not as easy to solve
without relaxing the model’s individuated assumptions.
Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of
the CI approach.
Privacy self-management
The right to informational privacy is essentially a decision
right. Zuboff (2015), for example, conceptualises it as the
ability to choose one’s position along the spectrum
between secrecy and transparency. Altman (1975)
refers to the same phenomenon as boundary regulation
of privacy and publicness. Solove (2013) refers to the
current approach of privacy regulation as privacy
self-management; people have the right to notice of the
upcoming collection and use of personal data and have
the choice whether or not to consent to such processing.
Armed with these rights, people are expected to make
privacy decisions based on cost–benefit evaluations
and to disclose data only when the benefits outweigh
the costs.
Privacy self-management has to take into account
the highly divergent preferences people have on the
desirable position along the secrecy-transparency
spectrum. Westin’s well-known classification identifies
privacy fundamentalists, who have high privacy con-
cerns, pragmatists, who have some concerns but favour
individual choice, and the unconcerned, who have low
concerns and tend to trust data collectors (Hoofnagle
and Urban, 2014). Further, individuals’ preferences
on privacy can change over time, and are also highly
context-dependent (Acquisti et al., 2015; Coll, 2014;
Hoofnagle and Urban, 2014).
Privacy self-management relies on individuals being
informed and making decisions based on subjective
analysis of this information, and it therefore places a
lot of faith in their rational capabilities. But in practice,
decision-making is only partially the result of rational
cost–benefit analysis. Decisions are also affected by
social norms, emotions and heuristics (Acquisti et al.,
2015), and people are only boundedly rational
(Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001), due to limitations in
information, cognitive capabilities, and available time.
Therefore, individuals are often not that well-informed
when consenting; they do not always read privacy poli-
cies (Custers, 2016) and can operate under misinformed
assumptions about these policies’ purpose and contents
(Turow et al., 2015). In a recent Eurobarometer, only
18% of respondents reported reading privacy policies
fully and 49% partially, length and complexity being
typical reasons for not reading them (European
Commission, 2015). In fact, many habitually accept
consent dialogues without even glancing the provided
information (Bo¨hme and Ko¨psell, 2010).
Unsurprisingly, people do not feel in control of
personal data but nevertheless see no alternatives to
disclosing data in order to gain access to services
(European Commission, 2015). The feelings of power-
lessness to contest the data collection practices speak of
the same issue (Andrejevic, 2014). To overcome the
experienced lack of control, people employ implicit
control mechanisms to regulate the quantity and qual-
ity of data, including maintaining multiple or pseud-
onymous profiles, providing incorrect information,
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and refraining from providing data whenever feasible
(Snell et al., 2012). Overall, however, people’s actions
seem to demonstrate the privacy paradox: despite indi-
cating concerns about privacy, they part with intricate
details about their private life – in other words, behav-
ioural intentions towards privacy are not reflected in
actual behaviour (Norberg et al., 2007). One explan-
ation is that broad attitudes to privacy may measure
different things than contextual decisions (Acquisti
et al., 2015). Another could be that when people do
consider the costs and benefits of the options provided,
if the cost of achieving better privacy is high – for
example the inability to use a social networking site,
or a significant effort to configure the privacy settings
– people do not always see the benefits of better privacy
as worth the cost.
We can conclude that even if the privacy self-man-
agement model expects people to behave rationally, this
is not always the case. It is therefore worth exploring
whether the proposed new ways of consenting can help
people make better privacy decisions.
Obstacles to privacy self-management
In this section, we distil findings from literature review
into eight obstacles which summarise the challenges of
privacy self-management. Our aim is to categorise and
reformulate these findings so that they can be used
to evaluate the effectiveness of attempts to improve
privacy self-management. The obstacles are summarised
in Table 1.
Timing and duration. A challenge with privacy is that it is
an outcome of long-term information management, but
the practical implementations of privacy self-manage-
ment do not currently support this (Solove, 2013). The
point of decision occurs when the collection of personal
data is started, and individuals are then expected to
assess all future harms and benefits. Decisions on dis-
closing personal data are also made in isolation from
other similar decisions, and often they are made with
the aim of gaining immediate benefits. And while imme-
diate harms may be insignificant, long-term harms can
develop gradually over time. Having to make the
decision before the outcomes arise is arguably a
feature of most human decision-making, but with
personal data, the timing poses particular difficulties
due to the inherent dynamics arising from the
advancement of data analysis technologies (Custers,
2016). As harms and benefits may arise by mechan-
isms which are not discernible, or do not yet even
exist, the consequences of a disclosure decision are a
moving target. Yet a consent, once given, is typically
in effect indefinitely.
Non-negotiability
The current implementation of notice and choice is usu-
ally based on terms dictated by the service provider
(Custers, 2016), and users have to accept these terms
in full to use the service. The other option, obviously, is
not to use the service. This Hobson’s choice does not
match the preferences of those who are willing to agree
to some subset of the terms in exchange for some subset
of the service. Also, once the choice is made, the terms
of personal data use are largely fixed. For example, the
privacy settings within a service often only affect the
visibility of personal data to third parties rather than,
for example, what data gets collected. However, post-
consent negotiations of sorts can arise when an organ-
isation attempts to impose new terms which a large
portion of the users find unacceptable. This is evidenced
by the stir which Spotify’s new privacy policy caused
and the consequent changes made by the company
(Kastrenakes, 2015). In addition, data protection regu-
lation in the EU, for example, provides the possibility
of withdrawing consent at will. But in practice, recon-
sidering a decision is impractical and potentially inef-
fective. When providing consent is an all-or-nothing
decision, withdrawing consent involves ceasing the use
of the service altogether. It also involves removing data
Table 1. Obstacles to privacy self-management.
Timing and
duration
Estimating harms is difficult due to timing
of decisions and the typically unlimited
duration of the consent (Custers, 2016;
Solove, 2013).
Non-negotiability The terms are not negotiable enough
(Custers, 2016).
Scale Privacy self-management does not scale
well enough (McDonald and Cranor,
2008; Solove, 2013).
Aggregation Data is aggregated and analysed to produce
new data, leading to implicit disclosure
of latent data (Mai, 2016; Solove, 2013).
Downstream
uses
Data flows to parties and purposes not
foreseen at the time of consenting
(Anthes, 2015; Crain, 2016; Turow
et al., 2015).
Cognitive
demands
The cognitive limitations of all human deci-
sion making hamper cost–benefit analysis
(Solove, 2013).
Social norms Pressure to conform can strongly affect
the decisions people make (Acquisti et al.,
2015; Andrejevic, 2014; Zuboff, 2015).
Social data Privacy decisions are framed as individual
choices, but the data and the decisions
also affect others (Lampinen et al., 2011;
Schneier, 2010; Taylor et al., 2017).
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in the service provider’s databases, but having data
deleted has turned out to be a complex issue (Custers,
2016). Interestingly, the upcoming GDPR (European
Union, 2016) addresses the current situation by stating
that the availability of a service cannot be contingent on
the individual consenting to data processing which is not
essential to the service.
Scale
A practical obstacle to decision-making is that privacy
self-management as currently implemented does not
scale too well. Making people better informed in their
decisions cannot be achieved simply by convincing
people to read privacy policies better (Solove, 2013),
because there is just too much information to study,
and there are too many decisions to make. An estimated
80–300 hours are needed to familiarise oneself with just
the privacy policies of the websites an individual visits in
a year (McDonald and Cranor, 2008), and including
other data-collecting entities only increases the time
required. Also, as we will discuss below, some of the
obstacles are due to people not being fully aware of the
complex consequences of the decisions they make – and
the more people are made aware of the consequences, the
more problematic the scaling problem can become.
Aggregation
Data-collecting entities often aggregate personal data
across individuals and contexts, which can lead to reve-
lation of new data through data analysis. We contrast
this latent data to openly expressed and exhaust data
(Kitchin, 2014). Openly expressed data is consciously
provided by individuals about themselves, for example
filled in a form, and exhaust data is produced by obser-
ving activities, for example, clickstreams on a website.
Latent data, however, is fundamentally different; it is
produced from other data by using inference techniques
and is therefore implicitly shared alongside other data.
Yet an explicit consent is never provided for latent data
(Mai, 2016). Inference can produce seemingly uncon-
nected results by treating the input data as proxy data
for the unavailable information. Then, for example,
demographic data can be deduced from location
history alone (Bellovin et al., 2013). Aggregation also
happens across not just numerous sources of data but
also across individuals. Therefore, the costs and benefits
of my disclosure decisions are affected by the decisions
of others. So even if each disclosure decision were well-
considered in isolation, the aggregation of data can lead
to the overall effect being undesired. The production of
latent data also hinders the effectiveness of refraining
from disclosing data, as it may still be deduced from
other data (Custers, 2016).
Downstream uses
Unexpected movements of personal data to new parties
are to a large extent opaque to the individuals, compli-
cating meaningful decision-making. We refer to these
movements as downstream uses of data. There are mul-
tiple reasons for these movements. In downstream data
markets, data brokers sell personal data compiled from
public records and nonpublic sources, often without the
knowledge of the individuals involved, even though
they may have consented to such uses of data by the
primary data collectors (Anthes, 2015; Crain, 2016;
Turow et al., 2015). Changes in business models of
data-collecting companies may result in new uses of
the data contradicting the individual’s’ expectations
from the time of decision, an example being direct-to-
consumer personal genome testing and the subsequent
medical research use of the collected data (Alba, 2015;
Seife, 2013). Another reason for downstream uses is
malicious actions of third parties. Well-known exam-
ples include publication of data hacked (Zetter, 2013)
or otherwise collected (Zimmer, 2016) from dating
services, resulting in personal data about customers
being put to unforeseen uses. Personal data collected
by private companies can also end up being aggregated
in governmental databases, and superficially innocuous
pieces of personal data may end up being highly con-
sequential in practice. The upcoming GDPR, again,
places some limitations on downstream uses of data,
stipulating that all processing must have a legal basis.
Cognitive demands
People’s ability to make informed and rational choices
about personal data is not on par with requirements of
privacy self-management, and people can end upmaking
bad decisions with respect to disclosing personal data,
regardless of the information and tools they have in
use. The cognitive limitations hampering privacy self-
management have been summarised by Solove (2013)
as follows. To begin with, people are not very well
informed about the decisions they make because they
do not read privacy policies. If they do read them, they
have difficulties understanding them. If they do under-
stand them, they lack the necessary knowledge to make a
truly informed choice. And even if they are well-informed,
their decision-making capability is limited by difficulties
which generally riddle human decision-making.
Social norms
As observed above, the decision not to disclose per-
sonal data often means non-participation in activities
which include collecting data. As many online services
are regarded an integral part of modern life
(Andrejevic, 2014; Zuboff, 2015), non-participation
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may simply be infeasible regardless of privacy prefer-
ences or subjective concerns over data disclosure.
Thus, decision-making on personal data is subject to
social norms (Acquisti et al., 2015) which regulate
individual decisions. Another way of saying this is
that private cost–benefit decisions to disclose data are
embedded in a network of social relations, and looking
at them from an individuated, under-socialised point of
view is misleading (Granovetter, 1985). These norms
are further reinforced by each individual decision; the
more people conform, the harder it becomes to deviate
from the norm regardless of the individual judgement
of costs and benefits. Norms may also be at odds with
attempts to implicitly control the quality and quantity
of data once consent has been provided.
Social data
Privacy self-management frames the decision-making on
personal data as an individual choice based on private
cost–benefit analysis, despite personal data often also
conveying information about others. Schneier (2010)
uses the term incidental data to denote data which other
people’s activities leak about you. Any data about my
interactions or relationship with you is also data about
you. Health or genome data may implicate relatives in the
case of hereditary diseases, shared photos can convey
information about others, and consumption data may
by nature concern a household. Decision to share loca-
tion data may help predict the future locations of others
(Bellovin et al., 2013), and the combined effect of two
people sharing location data may reveal details about
their relationship. In particular, latent data produced by
Big Data analytics may by nature concern a group rather
than individuals (Taylor et al., 2017). Privacy can, by
various mechanisms, be affected by the choices others
make (Lampinen et al., 2011) and the outcomes of
data-sharing decisions are, therefore, not only private.
To summarise the obstacles, privacy decisions are
made in a situation described by considerable informa-
tion asymmetry; non-experts know little about collected
personal data, what is done with the data, or the
business operations of the data industry (Zuboff, 2015).
Altogether, the obstacles affect privacy self-management
by first making it hard to appraise the situation and
then by diminishing the possibilities of actually making
preferred decisions.
Next, we proceed to describe the CI approach and
analyse its potential to tackle these obstacles.
Consent intermediaries
The last few years have seen an emergence of initiatives
and services whose aim is to provide people with better
control over the collection and sharing of their personal
data. A report by the European Commission (2016) on
PIMS included commercial service developers such as
the personal cloud server Cozy Cloud (2017) and the
personal information control services digi.me (2017)
and Meeco (2017), as well as research-originated initia-
tives such as the networked personal data indexing
device Databox (Chaudhry et al., 2015), personal data
stores Hub of All Things (Hub of All Things, 2017) and
OpenPDS (de Montjoye et al., 2014), and the personal
data management model MyData (Poikola et al., 2015).
All of these services aim to provide more control to per-
sonal data and allow people to share their data with third
parties, but two different means to achieve this can be iden-
tified: storage spacesaccumulatepersonal data fromvarious
sources, whereas permission-management services only keep
track of where data is stored. While their practical imple-
mentations and stages of maturity vary, conceptually these
services propose to act as Consent Intermediaries (CIs)
between individuals and data-using entities. From the per-
spectiveof individuals,CIs aimtoconsolidate theprovision-
ing of consents under one control point, providing an access
point through which individuals grant, view and withdraw
consent to collect and use data. From the perspective of the
services, CIs enable the outsourcing of privacy manage-
ment. The CI, therefore, consolidates the consenting prac-
tices of many services and the consenting decisions of
multiple individuals, in a conceptual change to the
current dispersed practice as shown in Figure 1.
CIs strive to provide individuals with better control
over their personal data, which is expected to lead to
better privacy and larger benefits from their data.
A recent opinion published by the European Data
Protection Supervisor (2016), for example, sees the
PIMS services, backed up by GDPR, as potentially
leading to the empowerment of users. Yet empower-
ment and control might be illusory if making sense of
the consequences of data disclosure decisions does not
become easier than it currently is. In addition, CIs also
introduce a new party in the consenting process, which
may also have its own aims and incentives.
Analysis
We start by looking at the changes the intermediary
may bring to the consenting process, and then go
through how these changes could help overcome the
obstacles. We conclude the analysis by addressing the
nature of privacy self-management obstacles.
How could a consent intermediary change
consenting?
Simply bringing consents under one control interface
has the potential to make privacy self-management
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easier. It can help individuals make sense of the whole,
be aware of past decisions, and take them into account
in future decisions. This is particularly true if the CI
presents consents in a comparable format. An overall
view can help in situations in which privacy manage-
ment fails due to individuals not being aware of
the totality of their own decisions, which is, in light
of the identified obstacles, a part of the problem but
does not cover nearly all of its aspects.
Bigger changes can happen if the CI takes advantage
of its intermediary position and builds new tools to aid
decision-making, for example, by employing concepts
which are already commonly used in other online ser-
vices. Without an intermediary between individuals and
data users, it would be much harder to build these tools.
First, online services and marketplaces routinely
employ recommendations, predictions, ratings, and
crowdsourcing to provide their users tailored informa-
tion. In smartphone platforms, users give permissions
to applications they install, and making privacy-con-
scientious decisions requires accounting for how the
applications likely use those permissions. Liu et al.
(2016) propose a ‘privacy assistant’ which provides per-
sonalised recommendations for application permissions
based on user profiling. It is possible to apply a similar
approach to the more general issue of providing con-
sent. An intermediary service can leverage consent
metadata, including information contained in consents
themselves, and information on other users’ actions
regarding consents to provide more information at
the point of decision. In experimental settings, timely
presentation of privacy information has been found to
lead to more privacy-protecting decisions (Kelley et al.,
2013), and designs which highlight the implications
of decisions have been found to have a similar effect
(Harbach et al., 2014).
Second, there are several ways to automate actions
based on, for example, rules and profiles. With a CI, it
might be possible to automate some practical consent
decisions. This might include straightforward recom-
mendations based on preferences; users indicate their
preferences, and the intermediary then recommends
actions based on them. Privacy preferences can also be
deduced automatically using data analysis, as has been
done for privacy settings on Facebook (Fang and
LeFevre, 2010) and for mobile applications (Liu et al.,
2016). In the context of mobile applications, recommen-
dations for access permissions by experts (Rashidi et al.,
2015) and crowdsourcing (Agarwal and Hall, 2013) have
also been proposed. With consents, individuals could
similarly choose to automatically follow the recommen-
dations formed collaboratively by engaged users or
provided, for example, by a privacy advocacy group
or a commercial provider.
Third, companies are fundamentally dependent on
individuals as their data sources, and this position
Figure 1. The conceptual change of the consent intermediary approach.
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could be leveraged for more favourable terms of data
use. Currently, the position of individuals is charac-
terised by low bargaining power over these terms.
Attempts to balance similar asymmetries are in many
other contexts based on the disadvantaged parties orga-
nising as a collective actor rather than as individuals,
including well-known examples of consumer interest
lobbies and unions in labour market negotiations.
The CI could act as a platform for collective action to
balance these power asymmetries by leveraging the pres-
ence of others in the same decision-making situation.
How could these changes help overcome
the obstacles?
Timing and duration. As noted above, making informa-
tion on consents viewable from a single point has the
potential to increase individuals’ awareness of the long-
term aspects of privacy management. This could help
individuals make decisions in a more systematic
manner, particularly by mitigating the timing issue in
the sense that the long-term effects of decisions can be
better taken into account. Making sense of the whole
can also be made possible by making use of consent
metadata. For example, an individual might be made
aware of all actors who have access to certain kind of
data. It would be straightforward for the CI to employ
nudges to revisit previous decisions (Liu et al., 2016) to
see whether they still accurately represent current pref-
erences. Prompts to re-evaluate consent might be issued
periodically or be based on changed conditions such as
the provision of new consent for similar purposes.
Nudges and prompts could bring benefits similar to
those of proposals for periodically expiring consents
(Custers, 2016; Mayer-Scho¨nberger, 2011), but would
likely also exhibit similar problems; for some, they
would likely be just another forced click of an ‘agree’
button without much thought (Custers, 2016).
Non-negotiability. Broad, non-negotiable consents make
sense to many companies, as their business models
drive them to make privacy policies as general as pos-
sible in terms of the quality, quantity and possible uses
of personal data (Custers, 2016; Srnicek, 2017).
Implementing negotiability of privacy policies, for
example, by using smart contracts, may be costly in
service design sense. Also, tweaking privacy policies
before accepting them increases the decision-making
effort required from individuals, and customised con-
sents lead to the production of additional metadata and
complicate data management (Custers, 2016). Despite
the incentives for non-negotiable consent, there is noth-
ing which fundamentally prohibits negotiations. To the
extent that the lack of negotiations is attributable to
each individual having low bargaining power against
data collectors, individuals could organise as a collect-
ive entity to leverage the dependence of organizations
on them as data sources. We argue that such collective
action is difficult to achieve without some kind of coor-
dinating entity, and the CI could act as one. Introducing
an intermediary between individuals and data-collecting
entities would, in any case, affect the power balance of
the situation, and in the best case this would help indi-
viduals have a say over the terms under which their data
is used. However, it seems safe to assume that the inter-
mediary might leverage its position also for its own bene-
fit, which may or may not align with the interests of the
individuals.
Scale. Given the amount of effort expected from indi-
viduals, the scale problem seems difficult to overcome.
However, we argue that it is not a problem of principle
but is largely due to how privacy self-management is
implemented in practice. Making each decision simple
enough, or gathering many small but similar decisions
under one higher-level decision, would make the whole
decision-making effort more manageable. Automation
and aides which help identify important decisions would
work in this manner. Practical questions include whether
or not it is possible to simplify decisions enough while
fulfilling both the expectations individuals have of the
ability to affect each decision, and the requirements
data protection regulations place on the way consent
is provided.
Aggregation. Data aggregation is an obstacle which is
difficult to tackle in principle, as latent data emerges
only ex post, after decisions have been made. The rela-
tionship between disclosed data and the consequences
of this disclosure are therefore obscured, and latent
data can make meaningful analysis of costs and benefits
impossible. While it is likely impossible to fully over-
come this obstacle, some improvements to the current
situation can be envisioned. Making people aware of
known outcomes of data aggregation, based not only
on their own but also on others’ past decisions, could
help them become better informed about potential
latent data. Consent metadata can, for example, be
aggregated across individuals and used to provide
information on what data others have chosen to dis-
close. Simply explaining the likely purpose of a mobile
application’s permission request has been found to play
an important role in privacy decisions (Liu et al., 2016).
Metadata can also be used to form predictions of likely
consequences of disclosure decisions without access to
the actual disclosed data, for example, predicting the
potential revealing of contextual data based on location
data alone, if others have already provided contextual
and location data (Bellovin et al., 2013). Such conse-
quences are, of course, a moving target, and predictions
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would necessarily be coarse, but they might still be
better than the heuristics individuals currently have
to rely on.
Downstream uses. To the extent that downstream uses of
data happen with user’s consent, it is possible in prin-
ciple to make it easier to take these uses into account in
privacy decisions. For example, by combining consent
metadata with other data sources, the network of data
flows originating from the initial data collectors could
be tracked in a manner similar to tracing the relation-
ships of online ad platforms (Helmond and van der
Vlist 2016), and visualising them might make sense-
making easier. Naturally, the possibility of increasing
transparency is limited to data flows which are con-
sented to and trackable – excluding, for example,
downstream uses through surveillance or data leaks.
In addition, structural constraints of the data industry,
such as opaque business practices and analytical layers
which separate data sources from data uses, limit
efforts to increase transparency (Crain, 2016).
Cognitive demands. The cognitive limits of human deci-
sion-making fundamentally restrict cost–benefit ana-
lyses. An obvious way to tackle this problem is to
make decisions less demanding. On-time provision of
relevant information could make it less demanding to
be informed, but all efforts to make now-opaque con-
sequences of data disclosure transparent run the risk of
making each decision even more complex. Here, as in
the context of the scale problem, one solution facili-
tated by a CI is to change the nature of the decisions;
instead of considering each decision separately, an
overall decision could be made on privacy management
principles. The CI would offer a limited choice of more
or less conservative privacy profiles, and then would
recommend actions based on those profiles. At the
extreme end, technically nothing prevents totally auto-
mated consenting, so that the intermediary would
automatically provide consent on behalf of the individual
or revoke consent from services no longer in use.
Such solutions, however, may be at odds with current
privacy regulations.
Social norms. The adherence to social norms makes an
individual’s privacy decisions dependent not only on
their private costs and benefits, but also on others’
expectations about those decisions. Tools which help
evaluate the consequences of disclosure affect the pri-
vate aspects of decisions to disclose data, and to the
extent that social norms regulate those decisions,
tools do not help. The obstacle that norms place in
the way of privacy self-management is, therefore, insu-
perable within the individuated model, regardless of the
privacy management tools developed. Of course, it
should be kept in mind that norms with respect to the
disclosure of data are not fixed, and they may change
over time.
Social data. There is a fundamental inconsistency
between privacy self-management and the social
nature of personal data. Social data makes my privacy
dependent on the choices of others (and vice versa). My
goals and privacy preferences might be contradictory to
those of others, and the private benefits someone draws
from disclosing social data might, from their perspec-
tive, overcome the private costs imposed on others.
While the interdependencies of decisions and the
consequences of my decisions on others can be made
more visible by using tools similar to those discussed
above, no amount of awareness will solve this funda-
mental tension.
How difficult are the obstacles?
A key dilemma in all the discussed improvements to
privacy self-management is that tools should help
individuals take more complexity into account, and
at the same time render decision-making easier.
By revealing more of the consequences of data pro-
cessing, we make the individual better informed, but
this also makes decisions cognitively more demanding.
Therefore, it seems to us that progress could best be
made if CIs provided privacy management features
on all of the three fronts described above. While not
all the privacy self-management obstacles can be
overcome, evaluation aides, decision automation and
collective action have the potential to lead to better
privacy self-management.
Based on our analysis, we can also deduce something
about the nature of the privacy self-management
obstacles. Some of them seem to be more practical in
nature, and potentially solvable by developing tools for
privacy management. Timing and duration, non-
negotiability and the scale problem can, in principle,
be solved by rethinking practices and providing new
kinds of privacy management tools. While we consider
these problems to be solvable in the sense that they are
practical, it does not mean that they are easy to solve.
At the other end of the spectrum, obstacles which
feature social dimensions exhibit fundamental tensions
with the individuated privacy self-management model
and are therefore insuperable, unless the individuated
principle of the model itself is changed. In between are
the cognitive demands of decision-making, aggregation,
and downstream uses of data. Privacy management
tools can help to mitigate them, but they are challen-
ging issues and exhibit aspects which we consider likely
to be unsolvable. Table 2 presents this rough, by
necessity, categorisation.
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Discussion
Our overview of the potential of the CI approach was
largely positive in nature, in that we looked at the possi-
bilities of developing features which are potentially bene-
ficial for individuals. It is clear that the restrictions of the
approach, the implications of the CIs, and the limitations
of privacy self-management also merit discussion.
To begin with, the CI approach rest on the assump-
tion that people are inclined to manage privacy. While
the experienced lack of control and implicit means used
to gain some control exhibit a demand for better privacy
self-management tools, some might simply be happy
with current services. It is likely that new tools for priv-
acy management alone will not overcome disinterest.
The existence of economic incentives to maintain the
current state of affairs should not be overlooked.
The production of latent data is ingrained in the busi-
ness models of many online companies (Srnicek, 2017;
Zuboff, 2015); therefore, it is one underlying reason for
the extensive collection of personal data in the first
place. If the privileged position of organisations
which collect and use data is an outcome of privacy
self-management (Coll, 2014), then the current scatter-
ing of consents and the associated difficulties in privacy
self-management serve existing business interests.
Attempts to change the existing consent practices are,
therefore, likely met with resistance. Here, legal devel-
opments such as GDPR can have a significant impact.
For several of the privacy management obstacles,
it is evident that the problem is connected to the
fundamental assumption of the privacy self-manage-
ment model: that individuals themselves consider
costs and benefits of data disclosure case by case.
As outlined above, these problems could be managed
by automating or delegating decisions. The level of
abstraction can be increased, and the decision would
then concern the rules of automation or to whom the
decision would be delegated. Therefore, automation
and delegation of consenting decisions could well lead
to a better outcome, on the whole. The extent to which
these actions are possible within current regulatory con-
texts is an object of research in its own right.
This assumption also makes privacy self-manage-
ment an inherently individuated model. The social
dimensions of personal data are hidden by framing
the issue as ‘my data’ which is ‘about me’ (Crabtree
and Mortier, 2015). This framing leaves open the ques-
tion of social data which is not only about me, and
focusing on individual cost–benefit analysis downplays
the role of the norms which affect decisions. While it
can be possible to make the social and societal conse-
quences of data disclosure decisions more transparent,
private cost–benefit analyses can still fail to take
common good into account, which has the risk of lead-
ing to only locally optimal solutions; sometimes taking
a broader societal or collective view may lead to a
better, globally optimal solution. It would therefore
be misleading to think about the social obstacles to
privacy management as ‘problems’ which new consent
practices can ‘solve’. Rather, they are features of the
privacy self-management model and present an inher-
ent tension which cannot be overcome without chan-
ging the underlying individuated principle of the model.
The obvious question, then, becomes how to take the
collective aspect into account in the relationships
between individuals and data collectors. Concepts
such as networked privacy (Lampinen, 2015) and focus-
ing on the group rather than the individual as the start-
ing point of privacy (Taylor et al., 2017) pave the way
towards such alternative models. While this conceptual
discussion is ongoing, practical experiments in collect-
ive privacy management are underway in more limited
contexts, for example, developing an extended notion
of ownership of digital content and providing tools
which help in reaching collective decisions regarding
such content (Squicciarini et al., 2009). It might be pos-
sible to extend solutions like this to the more general
context of consent as well, which would amount
to developing a model to achieve common good from
an individual privacy management starting point.
CIs can likely function as platforms which facilitate
the building of tools from these wider points of view
as well. However, the individuated approach required
by privacy regulations might render such solutions
non-compliant.
Table 2. Potential to overcome obstacles with privacy
self-management tools.
Solvable
Timing and duration Practical problem of making it feasible
to revisit decisions and revoke
consent.
Non-negotiability Practical problem of negotiating power.
Scale Practical problem of making each deci-
sion easy enough.
Challenging
Aggregation Possible to mitigate by increasing
awareness of latent data.
Downstream uses Possible to mitigate by providing infor-
mation on consented and traceable
data flows.
Cognitive demands Possible to mitigate by changing the
nature of decisions.
Insuperable
Social norms Cannot be overcome within the indi-
viduated model.
Social data Cannot be overcome within the indi-
viduated model.
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While forms of automation could lead to easing the
cognitive load of decision-making, automation does not
come without its own trade-off: decision-making power
is transferred to those forming profiles and recommen-
dations, such as algorithm designers. More generally,
given the power invested in intermediary positions
between user and data-using entities, we should pay
close attention to how intermediaries make use of this
power. Intermediaries could channel collective action
and set up governance mechanisms which participating
organisations are expected to follow, which could well
work favourably for individuals. But we should not
assume this is the only possible outcome. The inter-
mediary also has the capacity to affect the behaviour
of its users, for example through discreet nudges or
outright limits to choices. This leads to the possibility
of coaxing users towards behaviours which serve its
own ends. This also renders the intermediaries tempting
targets for attacks, both for the troves of information
they contain about the individuals in the form of con-
sents, profiles, and policies, and for the power of influ-
encing the individuals in their privacy decisions.
Conclusions
As we will live with the consent-based privacy self-man-
agement model for some time, it pays to investigate ways
to make it better. From the recent developments of per-
sonal data services, we identified the concept of CIs
which gather privacy decisions under a single control
point. Based on our analysis, this provides only some
direct remedies to the obstacles which currently hinder
privacy self-management. However, intermediaries could
be leveraged to develop tools to mitigate obstacles, help-
ing people understand the decisions they make, better
evaluate their consequences, and simplify the decisions
themselves. We conclude that it is indeed possible to
make privacy self-management work better, and some
of its obstacles seem to be even solvable with new
tools. However, not all of the obstacles can be tackled
this way. Some obstacles seem challenging in the sense
that they could be only mitigated but likely not solved.
Finally the inherent problems related to individual-cen-
tricity of the model lead to insuperable problems that
could be better approached if its individuated assump-
tions were relaxed.
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Abstract 
 
Personal data spaces, or PDSs, are emerging intermediary services that allow users control over the sharing and use of their data. 
In this article, the surveillance capitalism model, which describes how businesses employ datafication to create value in the digital 
economy, is used to contextualize PDSs. Focusing on three PDS services, I analyze the social imaginaries they represent, paying 
attention to the increased agency over data they offer users. This proposed agency reflects the efforts of PDSs to intervene in, but 
not counter, surveillance capitalism. While their goal is to intensify datafication by increasing the quality and specificity of data 
that businesses can employ, their interventions also change the structure of data flows, allowing users to more directly benefit 
from datafication. PDSs envision their users as data-supplying and benefit-demanding market participants, active subjects in value 
creation instead of passive objects of data extraction. PDSs view themselves as platform providers that facilitate data exchanges 
and rely on market mechanisms to ensure beneficial services are developed for users to choose from.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the digital economy, value creation relies on datafication (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013): the 
transformation of aspects of people’s lives into quantified data. A stream of research has explored the 
connections between datafication, surveillance, and monetization of data. For example, van Dijck (2014) 
discusses how businesses employ data to monitor and monetize behavior online. Exploring power 
asymmetries related to datafication, Andrejevic (2014) points out the differences in capability between 
those who collect and mine data and those whom the collection targets. Following similar arguments, 
Andrejevic and Gates (2014) note the systemically opaque nature of data analytic processes, and Crain 
(2016) stresses the significance of unilateral control of the conditions of commodification of data. 
 
Zuboff (2015) discusses the evolution of computer mediation from the workplace into the online space 
and argues that datafication has given rise not only to new opportunities to learn about those whom data 
concerns, but also to new contests over learning. The pertinent questions have become who can learn, 
how, and what—and particularly, who decides about these things. Zuboff argues that to understand how 
the answers to these questions about learning are shaped, the underlying model of value accumulation 
must be understood. Zuboff calls the institutionalized value accumulation model in the online space 
surveillance capitalism: a specific form of informational capitalism (Castells 1996) pioneered by Google 
and employed by large online companies as well as online startups. Surveillance capitalism monetizes data 
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acquired through surveillance. It operates on data extracted from users, turns extracted data into 
behavioral predictions, and often monetizes them through markets that users cannot participate in. The 
taken-for-granted assumptions about how this is done already shape the answers to questions about 
learning. 
 
Discontent with the interrelationship between datafication and value creation has prompted new initiatives 
from technology developers, who promise to empower people to take control of processing of personal 
data (European Data Protection Supervisor 2016; Poikola et al. 2015). These initiatives include emerging 
intermediary services (Abiteboul et al. 2015; European Commission 2016) that provide users with a 
personal data space, or PDS, referring to a data storage service coupled with interfaces to manage flows of 
data. PDSs promise users a place in the driver’s seat for the uses of their personal data (Spiekermann et al. 
2015): users would make decisions on how, with whom, and for what purposes their data are shared. I 
consider PDSs to be representations of social imaginaries (Kelty 2008; Taylor 2004) of how the data 
economy should work. As I will discuss in this article, in these imaginaries people are able to reap more of 
the benefits of datafication for themselves by directing data only to uses they deem individually beneficial. 
Hence, PDSs appear to promote a new capacity to act towards data. 
 
Attempts to turn people from data sources into active data subjects resonate with the critical scholarship 
on datafication. In particular, they seem to tie in with Zuboff’s contestation over learning. At the 
superficial level at least, PDSs seem to propose an intervention in the current ways companies make use of 
datafication to learn about users and to predict and modify their behavior. The purpose of this article is to 
explore this intervention in the value accumulation model and the unilateral market operations of 
surveillance capitalism. Specifically, I approach these issues with two interconnected research questions. 
First, what agency towards data do PDSs offer people? Second, how, as a consequence, do they propose to 
transform the economic role of people in value creation from personal data? 
 
In Section 2, I look more closely at the value creation model of surveillance capitalism. Section 3 situates 
PDSs with initiatives for empowerment in the context of datafication. In Sections 4 and 5 I describe three 
PDSs, focusing on the agency towards data they propose. Section 6 discusses their intended intervention 
in surveillance capitalism, and Section 7 concludes with observations on issues that remain open.  
 
2. Datafication and Surveillance Capitalism 
 
Datafication as a basis for value creation is perhaps nowhere as obvious as in the context of online 
platforms. Platform companies like Facebook and Google offer services for free to consumers and expect 
profits from customers in other markets, often including markets where they sell targeting to advertisers. 
Gillespie (2010) describes how the strict computational understanding of platforms as infrastructure 
enabling the deployment of applications has been relaxed to favor a more everyday understanding of 
platforms as online services of various intermediaries. From a theoretical stance, Gawer (2014) identifies 
two perspectives to platforms: from an engineering perspective, platforms are modular technological 
architectures, and from an economic perspective, they are intermediaries of multi-sided markets. From the 
economic perspective, a company operating the platform creates products or services that facilitate 
exchanges between different types of market participants (Evans and Schmalensee 2011). Provision of 
free services to a group of customers is not an exceptional feature of online platforms. Platform companies 
often subsidize losses incurred in some sides of the market in order to stimulate sales in other, profit-
turning sides (Rochet and Tirole 2003). 
 
Google search provides a helpful example of how the platform logic works online. Rieder and Sire (2013) 
identify three distinct parties whose interactions the search platform mediates: users, content providers, 
and advertisers. Interactions between these parties take place in two markets. In the consumer market, the 
search service allows users and content providers to meet. In the other market, Google sells targeting to 
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advertisers. Targeting is based on data collected about the users as they use Google’s services, and 
advertisements are displayed to users beside search results. Google has incentives to influence users’ 
actions in the consumer market in ways that help maximize revenue from advertisers in the other market 
(Rieder and Sire 2013). Similarly, social media platforms have also been analyzed as multi-sided market 
intermediaries (Helmond 2015). In this case, the platform makes users, content providers, advertisers, and 
application developers meet. 
 
Similarities between value creation models online are no coincidence. Zuboff (2015) argues that the 
market economy in general tends to gravitate towards dominant models for value creation, which 
eventually become the institutionalized, taken-for-granted context in which companies operate. In the 
online space, Zuboff argues, surveillance capitalism has emerged as the dominant model. In surveillance 
capitalism, companies aim to produce ‘objective and subjective data about individuals and their habitats 
for the purpose of knowing, controlling, and modifying behavior to produce new varieties of 
commodification, monetization, and control’ (2015: 85). The multi-sided markets operated by online 
platforms are practical instances of this model, and its assumptions are embedded into the ways in which 
these companies collect, store, and use data about their users. 
 
Value Creation In Surveillance Capitalism 
Surveillance capitalism encompasses mass dataveillance—the systematic monitoring of people, by means 
of personal data systems, in order to regulate or govern their behavior (Clarke 1988; Degli Esposti 
2014)—within a value creation logic. Value creation in surveillance capitalism is based on extracting data 
about users, analyzing these data to produce behavioral predictions, and monetizing these predictions by 
means of prediction products such as targeting and personalization (Zuboff 2015, 2016). Zuboff views this 
model as a continuation of developments she observed in increasingly computer-mediated work 
environments starting from the 1980s: the capacity of information technology to produce information on 
what it automates (Zuboff 1985) gave rise to new contentions and divisions concerning the ability to learn 
things based on information, and the power to decide who gets to do this learning. Today, similar power 
dynamics are present not only in the workplace, but generally in the online space, where the answers to 
the questions of who gets to learn and who decides about learning are shaped by the underlying value 
creation model. 
 
Obviously, Zuboff is not alone in observing similarities in models of value creation from data. For 
example, van Dijck (2014) describes the ‘big data mindset’ of social media platforms in terms of 
measuring, manipulating, and monetizing human behavior, and Srnicek (2017) details the overall role of 
platforms in the contemporary economy. Zuboff’s (2015) description of surveillance capitalism, however, 
is nuanced in the users’ role, which makes it fitting for the purposes of analyzing personal data spaces. 
Towards this end, I highlight features of data extraction, decisions on data, production of predictions, and 
monetization of data that are pertinent to users’ participation in these processes. 
 
Data extraction. Zuboff asserts that data extraction in surveillance capitalism is a one-way process that 
occurs in the absence of dialogue between companies and their users, despite data signaling personal and 
potentially intimate details about users. This lack of reciprocity is supported by a number of observations 
on the demands for scale and scope of data extractive processes. Due to the probabilistic nature of their 
analytic capabilities, surveillance operations primarily value the quantity of data (Zuboff 2015). The 
extraction of data is not selective; all possible data on users’ actions are considered signals to be analyzed 
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013), and as much data as possible is recorded in order to determine 
their usefulness later (Andrejevic and Gates 2014). Accordingly, the extraction of data increasingly takes 
place beyond the immediate boundaries of online platforms, decentralizing their capacity to extract data 
about their users to the open internet (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013; Helmond 2015). These tendencies are 
explained by network effects: if service quality can be improved by data analysis, extracting more data 
leads to more users choosing the service, which again leads to better service (Rieder and Sire 2013; 
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Srnicek 2017). This incentivizes companies to broaden the scale and scope of data extraction. The role of 
users, then, is to be the source of as much data as possible. 
 
Decision rights. The legal approach to protecting informational privacy is based on providing people with 
rights to be notified about data collection and to make a choice about it (Solove 2013). This means data 
extraction requires asking for user consent. That companies can extract data would, then, indicate that 
users have grown accustomed to trading data in exchange for services (van Dijck 2014). However, asking 
for user consent is contextualized by an asymmetrical relationship, in which the terms of data extraction 
are imposed on the users (Degli Esposti 2014). Privacy scholars (e.g., Acquisti et al. 2015; Solove 2013) 
highlight various shortcomings in the way privacy rights are enacted: users provide consent for data 
extraction in conditions characterized by lack of transparency, context-dependent and malleable attitudes 
towards privacy, and un- or misinformed decisions regarding disclosure of data. In the context of 
ubiquitous data extraction and advanced data analytics, then, practical possibilities for users to provide 
meaningful consent are limited. Zuboff (2015) asserts that by asking users to provide broad consent for 
extracting and using data, companies have in fact been able to gain decision rights over data for 
themselves. 
 
Production of predictions. By using analytics on data extracted from users, companies produce behavioral 
predictions about the users: for example, their intentions, characteristics, or preferences. Producing 
predictions requires specialized means of production that rely on proprietary knowledge and capabilities 
(Zuboff 2015). Even if users are aware of predictions, they have only limited opportunities to view or 
correct them, and limited access to the information needed to comprehend the process producing them. 
The control of means of behavioral prediction, then, is asymmetric. This asymmetry, described as the ‘big 
data divide’ by Andrejevic (2014), further institutionalizes the lack of reciprocities between the company 
and users. It also gives companies the possibility to exercise ‘calculative power’ (Callon and Muniesa 
2005): companies can assess the value of data extracted from users, and simultaneously limit the users’ 
possibilities of performing the same valuation, which also limits their economic action towards data. 
Further, predictions are also employed to modify behavior, for example by constructing personalized 
choice environments that do not necessarily enforce or restrict choices, but rather nudge users towards 
preferred outcomes (Yeung 2016). The production of predictions, then, is characterized by asymmetries 
arising from differences in access to the capabilities of data collection and analysis. 
 
Monetization. In the end, who can make use of behavioral prediction and modification is determined in the 
market at which predictions are monetized. These markets are largely constructed by the companies. 
Rieder and Sire’s (2013) micro-level analysis of Google’s incentives to organize its markets in a self-
serving way shows an example of this in practice. The markets for prediction products most famously face 
advertisers—importantly, users do not generally participate in transactions in these markets (Zuboff 
2015). 
 
To summarize, in Zuboff’s surveillance capitalism, the role of users in different stages of the process of 
value creation is largely characterized by a lack of reciprocities. Companies are able to exert significant 
control on data extraction and the production of predictions, and are able to shape the conditions of 
monetization of data. Surveillance capitalism’s response to the question of who decides what data are 
collected, what is learned based on it, and who does the learning, is decidedly ‘not people’. 
 
3. Initiatives Aiming for User Empowerment 
 
Empowering Consumers and Citizens 
Discontent over the role users play in surveillance capitalism has given rise to various initiatives that offer 
people new capacities over data. Demands for transparency of the uses of data (Crain 2016; Richards and 
King 2014) are one example. Crain (2016) observes that transparency is a prevailing theme of consumer 
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empowerment online. He examines the data broker industry and argues that transparency runs into 
structural constraints arising from the political economy of commercial surveillance. Consumers are 
separated from the actual buyers and sellers of data by complex market arrangements that defy meaningful 
transparency. Moreover, much of the data the industry handles is separated from consumers by an 
analytical layer: while consumers are the source of raw data, the computationally generated predictions do 
not have a direct empirical source in consumers (Mai 2016). Crain (2016) considers the initial 
commodification of personal data to be at the root of power imbalances, and concludes that projects for 
consumer empowerment are toothless as long as commodification of data is taken for granted. According 
to Crain, empowerment through transparency is, then, bound to be unsuccessful. 
 
The open data movement (Baack 2015; Chignard 2013; Kitchin 2014) presents another example, focusing 
on citizen empowerment. Baack (2015) investigates the movement as a reaction to the uneven distribution 
of power and knowledge due to datafication. He describes how open data activists consider the 
distribution to favor companies and governments, and how this, in turn, hinders public agency. Open data 
activists regard the availability of raw data as a prerequisite for generating knowledge. Therefore, in their 
view, the interpretive monopolies of raw data holders could be broken by making data openly available. 
By means of utilizing open data, say the activists, everyone could make their own interpretations, instead 
of relying on the interpretations of others. On one hand, then, the activists criticize how datafication leads 
to monopolization of interpretation. On the other hand, their goal is to turn datafication to support, instead 
of hinder, public agency. The activists, according to Baack, acknowledge that in order to make new 
interpretations possible, simply opening up the sources of raw data is not enough; empowering 
intermediaries that act between people and data-holding institutions are needed also. 
 
Personal Data Spaces 
Personal data spaces, or PDSs, are another reaction to observed issues with the users’ role in surveillance 
capitalism. They are intermediary services allowing users to store personal data and control their sharing 
with third parties. As I will discuss below, they have similarities with transparency and open data 
initiatives in their objective to provide people with new capacities with respect to data. PDSs have spurred 
both commercial and policy interest exemplified by a recent report of the European Commission (2016) 
which included over 20 ‘personal information management systems’ from private-sector developers, 
academia, and nonprofits, and by the MyData 2016 conference (MyData 2016) which gathered businesses, 
public officials, and activists under the tagline ‘advancing human-centric personal data’. Moreover, this 
development is supported by new regulations, including the updated EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) (EU 2016), as indicated by the European Data Protection Supervisor (2016) in its 
opinion on systems for ‘more user empowerment in managing and processing personal data’. 
 
Developers of PDSs come from varying starting points. Accordingly, their services have varying practical 
solutions for data storage and sharing. Despite this, their visions exhibit a common belief that people 
should be able to exercise more control over their data, and that this would lead to valuable outcomes both 
for people themselves and for commercial service providers through more efficient markets for personal 
data. This highlights the focus of their approach: making possible what they consider desirable use of data, 
rather than prevention of misuse. Common beliefs also include the idea that there needs to be an 
intermediary service through which control of data by the user becomes possible. 
 
Historically, PDSs can be seen as a rejuvenation of mid-1990s discussions related to market solutions to 
informational privacy. Noam (1995) considered a situation in which consumers restrict the distribution of 
their data by paying companies that have collected them, concluding this would likely be unsuccessful, 
because if data were really worth paying for, third parties could always outbid consumers. Laudon (1996) 
discussed the need for individuals to receive fair compensation for the use of their information, and 
suggested information to be deposited on accounts in information banks, which were to be the means for 
individuals to tap into regulated information markets. Hagel and Rayport (1997) envisioned 
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‘infomediaries’ as custodians and bargaining agents acting between consumers and businesses, making it 
possible for consumers to gain useful services in exchange for data, and for companies to access a broad 
array of consumer data. The latter two concepts were based on people claiming ownership of their data. In 
the pre-internet technological context, data ownership, paired with an intermediary facilitating data 
exchanges, was expected to shift power towards consumers. 
 
Today, strategically positioned online companies are able to collect and make use of a broad array of data 
and provide services that Hagel and Rayport thought to be possible only through infomediaries. The term 
‘infomediary’ has since served to signify a variety of services offered by aggregating information from 
many sources (Ho and Tang 2001), and for example today’s data brokers (Crain 2016; US Senate 2013) 
can be considered specific kinds of infomediaries. However, the idea of a trusted data custodian acting 
specifically on behalf of individuals is currently reincarnated in the imaginaries of PDSs. 
 
Methodological Considerations 
To analyze these social imaginaries, I concentrate on three PDS services. Two are products of startup 
companies (Cozy Cloud and Meeco), and the third is an outcome of research project at MIT (OpenPDS). 
They all aim to enable users to first store data in a personal space, and then to make use of these data by 
sharing them with third parties. All attempt to carve themselves an intermediary position between 
individuals and companies. Focusing on the individual, they attempt to induce systemic changes through 
participation of individuals. The kinds of data these PDSs cover span from mundane everyday data to log-
type metadata. 
 
These PDSs exemplify ‘work in progress’. They are attempting to shape the market, working in a dynamic 
manner towards a more robust economic field for PDSs. While the three examples likely cannot cover all 
potential aspects of the PDS concept, they represent variations of imaginaries of how data collection and 
use should work. As laid out above, these imaginaries have also wider resonance, in terms of other similar 
initiatives and the policy interest they have attracted. 
 
Material on the three PDSs includes explorative interviews with their developers and their responses to a 
policy questionnaire collected by the European Commission as background information for a roundtable 
discussion (European Commission 2016). The author was later provided with access to the responses. The 
aim of analysis of interview transcriptions and questionnaire responses was to identify the features that 
potentially afford the users agency over data. Analysis was based on iterative coding, focusing on what 
end-users were doing, or imagined to be doing in the future, with the PDS. In the next two sections, I first 
describe three PDSs and then highlight the aspects of agency over data they propose for users. 
 
4. Personal Data Spaces: Descriptions 
 
Personal Cloud Server 
Cozy Cloud (2017) is a ‘personal private cloud and an app platform’ developed by a French startup 
company. In practical terms, Cozy Cloud is a server that a user can either set up for themselves, or have a 
service provider set up on their behalf. Cozy Cloud developers envision users would store data that is 
otherwise spread amongst databases of different service providers. The data would include mundane 
everyday data such as photos and documents; banking and other financial data; and data produced by 
activity loggers and smart home devices. Users could then make use of the data by installing and running 
applications on the server. In Cozy Cloud, there is a sense of resistance towards established actors: they 
advertise the possibility to ‘ungoogle your digital life’ by ‘reclaiming crucial parts’ of it. 
 
The benefits Cozy Cloud expects from its service are based on possibilities to combine data from multiple 
sources and applications from multiple providers. Cozy Cloud promises its users a ‘frictionless data 
experience’ within the confines of a personal server. They also propose ‘breaking the proprietary silos’ of 
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data holders: Cozy Cloud expects users to employ their rights to download and store data from one 
company (for example, a smart thermostat provider) and then allow an application provided by another 
company (in the example, an electricity company) to access them. What data applications can access, and 
whether something is communicated outside of the server, is left for the users to decide. Further promises 
are based on users running Cozy Cloud on the server of their own choosing, independent of specific 
service providers. Cozy Cloud software is distributed for free under an open source license, meaning 
skilled users can set up a server on their own and even create modified versions of the software. 
 
At the time of collection of material for this article, Cozy Cloud envisioned its paying customers to be 
other businesses, including companies offering Cozy Cloud servers to end-users who are unwilling to 
maintain their own servers, or companies developing tailored applications to be installed by the users. 
Cozy Cloud, then, positions itself as a provider of platform technology. Cozy Cloud does not intend to 
monetize or access data stored by its users, a promise they also employ in marketing. However, the 
developers maintain that third-party applications could reach any kinds of agreements with the users, 
including for example using data for targeted marketing. 
 
Digital Life Management 
Meeco (2017) is a ‘life management platform’ developed by an Australian startup company. Meeco is a 
cloud service, accessible via a web browser or a mobile device, in which users have accounts. Its intended 
use is to create, manage and share datasets. Its marketing material has a clear privacy focus: Meeco 
promises to have no knowledge of the data that is stored within its service; it promises encryption of 
stored data; it advertises to ‘never sell your data and sharing is always on your explicit terms’; and it 
provides communication and web browsing functions with promises of privacy and tracking-free service. 
 
Meeco envisions its users would create datasets on concrete objects such as ‘house’ or ‘car’ or more 
abstract things like health, finances or plans. The contents of these datasets might include documents, 
measurement results, characteristics, preferences, or connections to other things. Users would share 
selected datasets with third parties, such as service providers, for specific purposes and on their ‘own 
terms and conditions’: the users would, for example, share certain health-related datasets with their doctor, 
or datasets related to purchase intentions with potential vendors. Users would individually judge what data 
sharing is beneficial, and under what terms. Meeco, then, intends that users explicitly exchange data for 
things they value. 
 
Meeco promotes its users as both accumulators of nuanced data about themselves and as sources of 
abstract kinds of data such as preferences or intentions. The latter bear resemblance to the prediction 
products that online businesses currently produce based on extracted raw data. Indeed, Meeco views the 
current practices of data online tracking, data brokering and data analysis as leading to low-quality data 
about people. Meeco’s value proposition for data-using services is that data about preferences and 
intentions acquired directly from people would be more accurate. Meeco, then, envisions data exchanges 
between users and businesses that lead to increased value for both parties of the exchange. 
 
The details of Meeco’s own business model were not determined at the time of collection of material for 
this article, reflecting its work-in-progress nature. Its plans were in one way or another related to 
monetizing data exchange markets between users and service providers: for example, based on transaction 
fees, subscriptions for tailored exchange services, or licensing software to run specific kinds of data 
exchanges. 
 
Personal Data Store 
OpenPDS (de Montjoye et al. 2014; OpenPDS 2017) is a ‘personal metadata management framework’ 
developed in an MIT research project. It focuses on automatically generated log-type behavioral data from 
sensors, credit card transactions, or use of devices. OpenPDS developers argue that people currently do 
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not receive the best possible services with their data. According to them, more data would lead to better 
analytics and better services, but it is difficult for people to both practically provide data and to ensure that 
privacy is preserved in the course of data analysis. The purpose of OpenPDS is to solve this dual problem. 
 
To make the practical provision of data possible, openPDS provides a space for its users to accumulate 
metadata over time. Users would, for example, share their location data to third parties by giving access to 
location data stored in openPDS instead of the sensor output of their mobile device. By gaining access to 
data through openPDS, service providers could potentially access historical data, or data from multiple 
data sources. The rationale is that users could decide for themselves if a service provides enough value, 
taking into account the data it asks to have. 
 
OpenPDS approaches the privacy preservation target by providing access to behavioral data stored in 
openPDS in a way that would prevent re-identification and unsolicited further use of data. Processing of 
sensitive data would happen within openPDS, and only results considered non-sensitive would be sent 
outside. In practice, requests for data would be sent to openPDS in the form of ‘questions’. Answers to 
these questions, instead of the original data, would be sent back. In the example of location data, instead 
of sending raw historical coordinates to a service provider, the system could provide answers to questions 
such as ‘has the user visited X?’ 
 
At the time of material collection, the openPDS project and the development of the service itself seemed 
to have stalled. But, even if openPDS remained a research project without attempts to entice end-users in 
the longer term, it offers a relevant complementary view compared to the commercial PDSs. 
 
The fates of these three PDSs currently remain undetermined. Individual examples of an emerging service 
type might well not succeed in the longer term, and the work-in-progress nature of PDSs also means that 
details of features may change quickly. With this in mind, instead of focusing more deeply on the 
specificities of these three PDSs, I turn to analyze the ways they envision users to act towards data. The 
purpose of this is to abstract the analysis from the features of individual PDSs, approaching them as 
examples representing underlying ideas about how the digital economy should work. Even if these 
particular PDSs fail, variations of the social imaginaries they represent continue to underlie the efforts of 
other technology developers discontented in the current situation. 
 
5. Aspects of Proposed Agency 
 
Based on their features and development rationales, the above PDSs propose to provide users with new 
forms of agency over data. In this section, I highlight four aspects of this proposed agency and contrast 
them to the role users play in value creation in the surveillance capitalism model. The purpose of 
collecting data is not only to store data but also to allow doing things with data. The capability to act 
towards stored data leads to possibilities of data intermediation and the consequent controlling of 
analytics. Making it possible to store data on abstract things, instead of raw data, leads to the possibility of 
signaling subjective data. 
 
Collecting Data 
The intention to collect data and accumulate them in personal repositories were exemplified, albeit in 
different forms, by all three PDSs. Data would be uploaded or input by users themselves, collected by 
sensors or devices and automatically stored in PDS, or transferred from other services. Transferring 
existing data from other services is subject to the initial data collector providing the data, which likely 
depends on regulatory intervention and enforcement. The data portability rights provided in the GDPR 
(EU 2016), for example, work in this direction, granting users rights to download data from service 
providers in machine-readable format. 
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When they accumulate data within PDS, users become active participants in the process of data collection. 
Data are stored in PDS through acts of inclusion, exclusion, and moderation: users choose what sources of 
data are to be included or left out and what pieces of data are desired or unwanted. Data in the PDS could 
also be accessed over time, promoting personal history making and archiving, and resulting in a feedback 
loop that can allow reconsidering decisions. Decisions on the contents of the data space, then, are ongoing 
negotiations rather than one-off decisions, and users are provided with means to continuously participate 
in these negotiations. In contrast to the users’ role in the data extraction model of surveillance capitalism, 
data collection becomes subject to reciprocities and feedback loops. 
 
Intermediating Data 
PDSs do not only expect users to accumulate data, but also to provide third parties with access to data. 
Users, then, would use the PDS to intermediate data between the initial data sources and third parties. This 
role of a data intermediator was particularly pertinent to the intended uses of Cozy Cloud, as demonstrated 
by the smart thermostat example above, but it featured in the others as well. In the value creation model of 
surveillance capitalism, the production of predictions begins with the extraction of data about users over 
time. Data intermediation by the users would alter the first part of this process: production would begin 
with accessing data already accumulated in the PDS. Here, the user is envisioned to act as a gatekeeper 
between data and third parties. Intermediation of data between services is obviously dependent on the 
users’ ability to access collected data, which is likely dependent on data accessibility rulings of privacy 
regulators. 
 
All three PDSs envisioned users would allow third parties to access data only when it is associated with 
sufficient benefits. They believe users would actively seek new uses for existing data, with the expectation 
that this would open up currently inaccessible data to new service providers. 
 
An element of intermediation is the terms under which it happens. PDSs maintain that decision rights for 
data stored in the PDS would remain with the user, and companies would be able to access data only for 
purposes specified by users. The PDS users, and not initial data collectors or other companies, would 
determine who gets to use data. This contrasts with the tendency of companies to accumulate decision 
rights in surveillance capitalism. Features intended to allow users to specify terms for data use included 
temporal or purpose restrictions on data uses, the possibility to modify data before sharing them, and the 
possibility to withdraw previously shared data. 
 
Controlling Analytics 
A further possibility for acting towards data proposed by PDSs is to control analytics run on the data. 
PDSs propose two means to gain access to data analytics capabilities: users can run analytics within the 
PDS, or share data with providers of analytics services. With Cozy Cloud, for example, users can install 
data analytics applications within the PDS. With openPDS, data are processed within the service first, and 
only after this can they reach the value creation processes of businesses. The production of predictions by 
businesses, then, would not be based on the analysis of raw data; instead, openPDS performs data analysis 
on behalf of its user, turning raw data into something resembling intermediate products. 
 
The proposed control not only means choosing desired analytics, but extends also to preventing undesired 
ones. The purpose of performing analytics within the PDS is to limit undesired uses of data, and 
preprocessing raw data before sending them outside works towards the same end. These features further 
emphasize the goal of keeping decision rights concerning data with the user. By controlling analytics, 
users would become participants in the production of predictions based on data. PDSs expect users would 
wield significant power as participants: choosing what data are used, what analytics are run, and for what 
purpose predictions are produced. Instead of businesses deciding how the data are used in value creation, 
the users would decide, based on expected benefits. 
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Signaling Subjective Data 
The above aspects of agency concern users’ roles in the process of producing predictions from data. In 
addition to collection and sharing of data to base later analysis on, PDSs include features allowing users to 
share subjective data; that is, data that are timely and relevant from the personal point of view of the user. 
This is highlighted by Meeco, which aims to provide its users the ability to accumulate and share data on, 
for instance, preferences or intentions. Notably, in the value creation model of surveillance capitalism, one 
purpose of the production chain starting from extracted raw data is to predict such things. Meeco’s aim of 
making users share subjective data is to increase the accuracy and quality of data that things like 
recommendations or personalization are based on. Online companies currently aim to increase the quality 
of predictions by increasing the scale and scope of data extraction, and having users share subjectively 
accurate data represents an alternative means towards the same end. It also represents an intervention in 
the production chain from extraction of raw data through data analysis to predictions. Signaling subjective 
data by the users would circumvent the extraction of raw data and data analysis and arrive directly at data 
that could fulfill the role of predictions. 
 
6. A New Economic Role for Users 
 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the PDSs do not target commercial uses of data as such. They 
posit datafication as given and operate with the firm understanding that it leads to desirable outcomes. 
PDSs recognize the current benefits users receive from datafication through free services or features such 
as recommendations, and assume that there are more benefits to be gained. Part of their explicit aim is to 
increase the quality and intimacy of data, in order to achieve more detailed personalization and more 
accurate targeting. In this respect, their features and development rationales exemplify attempts to 
intensify datafication. It is, then, clear that PDSs do not aim to counter the monetization of data that lies at 
the heart of surveillance capitalism. 
 
However, it is also clear that these PDSs are born from a certain discontent with how this monetization 
currently happens. The predictions of surveillance capitalism are monetized in markets oriented to serve 
advertisers and other businesses. Decisions about how users benefit from their data, then, are currently 
made in the context of markets facing businesses and serve the interest of platform companies that operate 
these markets. PDSs posit that users cannot reap enough of the current benefits, and this is where they 
attempt to intervene in the value creation of surveillance capitalism. They propose reorienting markets is 
order to change who benefits from datafication. Markets shaped by PDSs are to be consumer driven, and 
the user needs to decide how and under which terms data are used. In contrast to the transparency 
initiatives critically analyzed by Crain (2016), consumer empowerment sought by PDSs is based on 
changing the structure of data flows in the data industry. They aim not only at transparency of data flows 
but at changing who gets to decide about them. 
 
These PDSs, then, attempt to intervene in surveillance capitalism by allowing users a new role in value 
creation. While users remain the sources of personal data that keep the online economy running, they are 
to be made sources of data in an altered sense; not only objects of data extraction, but also suppliers of 
data. In the imaginaries of PDSs, users have new roles in different points of the value chain: they supply 
raw data and intermediate products, or even final products in the form of subjective data. At the same 
time, PDSs underline the need for privacy-conscientiousness and features that allow users to limit the 
ways and purposes data are used. So, while the quality or quantity of data that businesses can access is 
expected to increase, so too is the ability of users to exercise control over the uses of data. The proposed 
role for individuals, then, is a data-supplying and benefit-demanding participant of the data economy. 
 
The economic role these PDSs envision for themselves is a neutral platform provider that facilitates 
different kinds of data exchanges. Their business models aim at monetizing either the provision of 
platform technology or data transactions, but not the data itself. This is reflected also in the promises made 
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by the PDS developers to not even know what data are stored by users. While these services do not aim to 
monetize data of users, third parties could do it if it was agreeable for the users. Monetization of data, 
then, is not to be shunned as such, but the platform facilitating markets would not do it directly. In this 
sense, too, PDSs attempt to intervene in, but not counter, surveillance capitalism. 
 
PDSs work with the assumption that new opportunities for valuable services emerge when users become 
data suppliers. Market mechanisms, then, are assumed to ensure new services are designed for users to 
choose from. These services would be provided by consumer-facing equivalents of the ‘analytical 
deputies’ (Degli Esposti 2014), that specialize in providing services for customers who lack analytical 
capabilities themselves. In other words, user empowerment is expected to happen through market 
mechanisms. 
 
It is also through these analytical deputies that PDSs seek systemic changes. First, they propose building 
environments that offer alternative routes to market success. Surveillance capitalism favors the ability to 
accumulate proprietary data assets, and the effectiveness and value of predictions are increased by 
leveraging the scope of data collection. Therefore, businesses that do not have access to data assets are in 
a disadvantaged position. PDSs attempt to intervene by providing an alternative path to market success: 
companies could thrive by promising valuable services and analytics based on consumer-provided data. 
Second, in an environment where users act as data intermediaries, businesses would lack monopolistic 
control of data and analytics. Even if incumbent businesses continue to accumulate data, they would not 
be capable of unilateral market control. In this sense, PDSs resemble Baack’s (2015) open data activists. 
Like the activists, PDSs work to reorient datafication and break the access and interpretation monopoly 
that institutional data collectors have on data. Likewise, PDSs similarly recognize the need for, and aim to 
act as, data intermediaries for the purpose of realizing these outcomes. 
 
To summarize the imaginaries of PDSs, they aim to intensify datafication but promise more individual 
control over its outcomes. Their assumption is that technical features to control data lead to the ability to 
control data analysis and, therefore, behavioral predictions. This hinges on premises that deserve to be 
spelled out; if they do not hold, even more, and more nuanced, user data ends up being produced and 
collected for the purposes of knowing, controlling and modifying behavior. 
 
To begin with, PDSs expect users to peruse market offerings for desirable uses for data they have 
accumulated and exchange their data for things like insights, personalization, and better services. The 
users’ data, then, effectively turns into an object of exchange. PDSs work with a particular notion of users 
as subjects and data as an object: users need to consider their data as a resource to tap into, and utilize it in 
a way that works to their advantage. This means users must be interested and capable of taking part in 
managing data and also need to accept the consequences of their decisions. Given the personal nature of 
PDSs, these consequences are implicitly assumed to be individual in nature. By assumption, data stored in 
a PDS is a personal resource that should be controllable by the individual, for subjective and private 
benefit. 
 
Considering data as a resource for users means they would need to make informed decisions about the use 
of this resource. The provision of consent for data extraction is based on a similar idea: that users weigh 
the costs and benefits of data collection and use in each case (Solove 2013). Solove argues that an 
individual’s ability to perform cost-benefit analyses on data is limited by the available information and the 
bounds of rational decision-making. The production of predictions based on disclosed data (Mai 2016) 
further complicates the issue, as the costs and benefits depend on other data and on data analysis 
technologies available to companies now and in the future. Notably, Crain (2016) argues that the data 
industry is structurally incompatible with the possibility of people being informed about data use due to 
trade secrets, complex market arrangements, and analytic processes that obscure the sources and 
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destinations of data. These issues remain pertinent: the problems of informed consent will likely hinder 
meaningful decision-making on data in the context of PDSs as well. 
 
Finally, for control to be meaningful, the technical features to control data would need to result in freely 
made decisions. Zuboff (2015) considers power online to be identified with the ownership of means of 
behavior modification, and Yeung (2016) highlights the potent and unobtrusive ways that behavioral 
predictions produced by big data techniques are used to modify behavior. Even if PDS users’ decisions 
were informed, the issue of behavior modification remains. Personalized choice environments enable 
nudging that can predictably direct people towards preferred choices without forcefully limiting the 
choices available (Yeung 2016). Despite increased agency towards data promoted by PDSs, businesses 
may remain in a position to affect—through, for example, nudging—the decisions users make. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The proposed agency over data reflects PDSs’ efforts to reshape the economic role of users, turning them 
from passive data sources and objects of surveillance into active subjects and participants in value 
creation. In the imaginaries of PDSs, the individual is the beneficiary of datafication and the final arbiter 
of value derived from data. Zuboff’s (2015) questions about data and learning—who can learn from data, 
and who decides—are, then, answered with ‘individuals decide for themselves based on subjective 
benefits’. The success of this hinges on the possibility to freely and meaningfully carry out these 
decisions. If PDSs provide users with efficient means to make personal data available, but the underlying 
power imbalances remain untouched, they risk turning people into helpful accomplices for more efficient 
ways of commodification and monetization of data. 
 
To move from the margins of the digital economy, PDSs must reorient the current institutionalized market 
model of surveillance capitalism. Likely, this will not happen without the aid of supportive legislation. 
The regulatory environment in the EU seems to take steps in a favorable direction with the data portability 
rulings of GDPR. They provide individuals with new rights to access data about themselves in a machine-
readable format. This could make the movement of data between service providers possible and operate in 
favor of intermediaries that promise valuable uses for these data. The potential to use PDSs to avoid state 
surveillance online might well pull in the opposite direction, to the extent that state surveillance is made 
possible by the practices of the incumbent companies. The exploration of PDS-related concepts by 
incumbents (Gurevich et al. 2016) also emphasizes their capability to adapt to new regulations and to 
occupy new positions opened up by societal developments, which should not be underestimated either. 
 
The eventual success of PDSs is an open question, but given the signs of traction the underlying idea has 
gained, we will likely see more efforts towards their development in the near future. This calls for 
discussion of aspects that will likely affect the success of their imaginaries of agency over data. 
 
PDSs operate on an individual scale and build on assumptions about the kinds of needs and wishes people 
have. Success of PDSs depends on a large enough proportion of people aligning with these assumptions. 
In part, this is a question of evolution of attitudes towards surveillance: can the resigned cynicism and 
rationalization of surveillance (Zuboff 2015) and the feelings of powerlessness to contest industry 
practices (Andrejevic 2014) be turned into a strong enough social demand for alternatives? One indicator 
that such evolution could be taking place are the above-mentioned regulatory developments. 
 
Apart from individual desires, PDSs also rely strongly on individuals’ ability to manage data if technical 
means are provided. More critical questions can be posed regarding this ability. The role PDSs promote 
for people is demanding—is it reasonable to expect people to be willing or knowledgeable enough to 
control data? Even if people had control, how can it be turned into meaningful choices? In what sense 
does control of data lead to control of prediction, let alone modification, of behavior? On a more systemic 
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level, the individual empowerment that PDSs promote relies on the effect that technical means to control 
data have on the wider environment. To be effective in offering an alternative to surveillance capitalism, 
control of personal data needs to be the determinant of power. Is it reasonable to assume that once data are 
available, markets provide analytical capabilities for the benefit of people? How can we ensure that the 
ability to control data flows does not place people under more effective surveillance, in a position where 
they are forced to share even more details of their personal life? 
 
This does not mean that providing people with more control would be flawed as a concept, but rather that 
technical features to control are not enough. The above questions regarding individual abilities and 
systemic effects are fundamentally tied together in that both can be supported by governance mechanisms, 
which are also works-in-progress in this early stage of PDSs. Control could, for example, be coupled with 
boundaries on how it can be exploited by businesses. By exploring alternatives to limit actions of both 
individuals and businesses, we could start finding mechanisms to encourage societally desirable outcomes 
and to ensure that the power to make decisions does not actually slip back to businesses. 
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Abstract
Data activism has emerged as a response to asymmetries in how data and the means 
of knowledge production are distributed. This article examines MyData, a data activism 
initiative developing principles for a new technical and commercial ecosystem in which 
individuals control the use of personal data. Analyzing material collected at a formative 
event shaping MyData activism, we examine how more just data arrangements are 
framed to enhance equal participation. Our analysis shows agreement on what is 
ultimately at stake: individual data agency and fair competition in the data economy. 
However, two alternatives are offered for what participation involves. Collaboration 
with commercial actors favors framing participation as agency in data markets, thereby 
potentially limiting the scope of what is at stake. The alternative framing presents a 
rights-based understanding of economic and civic agency, potentially leading to a 
broader understanding of participation in a datafied society.
Keywords
Data activism, data agency, data economy, frame analysis, justice, MyData, 
participation
Introduction
Routine aspects of our lives today produce data, which play an increasingly important 
role in contemporary capitalism. Companies have long stressed the social benefits, 
democratic potential, and consumer empowerment accruing from the collection and 
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exploitation of user data (West, 2019). In contrast, scholarship forming what could be 
called the data economy’s “counternarrative” (Pasquale, 2017) has focused on the asym-
metric distribution among companies and individuals of the means of data-based knowl-
edge production (Andrejevic, 2014; Citron and Pasquale, 2014; Crain, 2018; Tufekci, 
2014; Van Dijck, 2014; West, 2019; Zuboff, 2015). Data practices that dominate the digi-
tal environment have developed alongside technologies that convert aspects of social life 
into quantifiable data, and ahead of ethical scrutiny, public understanding, and regulation 
(Zuboff, 2015). These developments have given rise to advocacy and experimentation 
connected with people’s rights, capabilities, and roles as users, consumers, and citizens 
in the information society—or digital citizenship (Hintz et al., 2017). Examples include 
advocating the rights of consumers to participate in content production (Postigo, 2012); 
employing open source principles for digital rights campaigning (Breindl, 2013) or open 
data promotion (Baack, 2015); hacking as a form of data agency (Pybus et al., 2015); 
using digital media for political causes (Kaun and Uldam, 2017); the deployment of 
infrastructure and tools by civic hackers (Schrock, 2016); and alternative data collection 
and analytics practices in the Quantified Self (QS) community (Sharon and Zandbergen, 
2017). Technology and advocacy movements indicate different ways of responding to 
the closing off and monopolizing of knowledge production and value creation in digital 
environments, and emerging movements may either support or resist the dominant politi-
cal economy of data. The QS community, for example, engages in “soft resistance” 
(Nafus and Sherman, 2014) to dominant data practices by welcoming big data actors but 
questioning who gets to aggregate data and how. QS is also ambiguous in terms of its 
valuations, allowing the values of sharing to thrive alongside the commercialization of 
self-tracking (Barta and Neff, 2016).
This article contributes to research on data activism, referring to civic engagement 
and political action responding to the uneven distribution of data access and capabilities 
in datafied times (Baack, 2015; Milan and Van der Velden, 2016). Data activism “seeks 
to challenge existing data power relations and to mobilize data in order to enhance social 
justice” (Kennedy, 2018: 18), recognizing that more just practices can be promoted in the 
place of dominant ones (Dencik, 2018). As data activism is rooted in data and software, 
it can involve the promotion of alternative technologies and associated policies, which 
may in turn involve some form of collaboration with the industry (Milan and Van der 
Velden, 2016), such as the producers of data-related technologies. This collaboration can 
serve pragmatic ends; while technology-oriented activism requires the development and 
production of alternative technologies, firms producing such technologies can in turn 
seek markets for their outputs (Hess, 2005). In mobilizing more just data arrangements—
how organizations collect and use data, the policies that govern such practices, and new 
capabilities for people to engage with data (Kennedy, 2018)—data activism may then 
concern firms as participants and beneficiaries. Our contribution is to examine the ten-
sions that emerge between activist and commercial interests, when commercial actors are 
involved in data activism.
In scholarship on data justice (Dencik et al., 2016; Taylor, 2017), social harms result-
ing from dominant data practices are seen to both exacerbate existing injustices and 
produce new ones. We take the normative view that justice requires arrangements that 
permit all to participate as peers in social life (Cinnamon, 2017; Fraser, 2008). From this 
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point of view, the more just data arrangements envisaged by data activists pertain to 
enhancing citizen participation in the information society by removing obstacles that 
hamper equal engagement. Starting from this understanding of justice enables alternative 
views of the issues relevant to it: injustices can concern the economic dimension of dis-
tribution, sociocultural recognition, or political representation (Fraser, 2008). Dominant 
data practices can be seen to pose threats to equal participation in all three dimensions 
(Cinnamon, 2017). Asymmetric data accumulation practices give rise to distributive 
injustice, denying some the resources necessary for participation. This also lays the foun-
dation for sociocultural misrecognition through profiling and social sorting, and for 
political misrepresentation by restricting people’s means of contesting how they are rep-
resented by data. The asymmetric distribution of data can, therefore, be seen as the initial 
injustice that enables further injustices.
This article focuses on how equal participation is framed in data activism involving 
commercial actors and interests. What injustices hamper equal participation, what are 
their remedies, and whose interests deserve consideration? Our empirical context is 
MyData, a data governance initiative that originated within open data activism in Finland, 
and has since expanded into an international movement. MyData proponents argue that, 
to realize their individual, commercial, and societal benefits fully, personal data should 
be released from the confines of monopolistic data holders, provided that individuals 
“have an easy way to see where data […] goes, specify who can use it, and alter these 
decisions over time” (https://mydata.org/what-we-want). MyData envisions a techno-
logical and commercial ecosystem where people would control the sharing of their data 
between interoperable data sources and endpoints. Commercial actors would occupy 
positions in the ecosystem as, for example, technology providers, service developers, or 
intermediaries. Ultimately, the expansion of this ecosystem is expected to transform indi-
viduals into “empowered actors, not passive targets, in the management of their personal 
lives both online and offline” (Poikola et al., 2015: 2). Even though MyData aims to 
increase people’s capabilities to use their data, it also promises to serve firms’ prevailing 
economic interests in personal data: “[MyData] combines digital human rights and 
industry need to have access to data” (Poikola et al., 2015: 4). It, therefore, provides an 
example of data activism explicitly involving commercial data use, making it highly 
relevant to our research interest.
Our data were collected at the first large international gathering of people interested 
in MyData’s aims, which turned out to be a formative event for the MyData community. 
Applying frame analysis to keynote presentations and audience responses at this influen-
tial event, we examine how injustices and their remedies are presented in MyData. Our 
analysis identifies agreement on what is ultimately at stake: individual data agency in the 
information society. Dominant contemporary data arrangements are framed as hamper-
ing equal participation, the remedy being the development of a technological infrastruc-
ture providing people with agency over their data and allowing their participation in data 
collection, sharing, and processing. This was simultaneously framed as a means to redis-
tribute data so that firms can equally compete in an environment currently dominated by 
monopolistic data holders. However, while general consensus was reached on these 
means of achieving equal participation, alternative framings for participation itself were 
suggested. One framing equated participation with the ability to choose between 
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alternative data uses in the market, while another considered participation more broadly 
in terms of rights and digital citizenship. These frames evidence multiple interpretations 
of specific dimensions of justice by either construing individuals as market agents or, 
alternatively, also allowing the consideration of economic and civic agency in broader 
terms. It is here, we argue, that the involvement of commercial interests in data activism 
becomes significant. When data agency must serve both activist and commercial inter-
ests, and market agency is more readily transformed to serve commercial data uses, what 
is at stake risks being reduced to participation in data markets.
Data activism and equal participation
Data activism includes variable forms of engagement with existing data arrangements 
and their politics, and different ways of mobilizing more just data arrangements. By tak-
ing an unjust distribution of data as the initial injustice preventing equal participation in 
the information society (Cinnamon, 2017), we may examine how alternative data 
arrangements proposed by data activists aim to address this inequity.
Proactive data activism understands data as a potent force for social change, and sees 
active engagement with data as “a pathway to empowerment, equal participation and 
action” (Milan and Gutierrez, 2018: 58). This may mean employing data infrastructure 
for explicit advocacy goals, such as impeding environmental threats through data collec-
tion, sharing, and visualization, and the promotion of data transparency (Milan and 
Gutierrez, 2018). Here, addressing distributive injustice is a means to combat other injus-
tices. Another example is open data activism, which advocates the redistribution of data, 
aiming to break the interpretative monopoly of governments, and to balance the unjust 
distribution of power and knowledge (Baack, 2015). Redistribution of data, however, 
does not automatically promote justice; open data exist only in relation to the political 
economy of data, and due to asymmetrically distributed capabilities to do with data, 
opening data might benefit corporations, but not citizens (Johnson, 2014). More broadly, 
the involvement of corporations in data activism has been objected due to concerns over 
potential co-optation, as well as dubious political alignments (see Schrock, 2016); for 
example, political processes restricting the counter-hegemonic potential of open data can 
instead shape it to support the marketization of public services (Bates, 2013). Data activ-
ists themselves can act as a monitorial elite enabled by open data, guarding the public 
against unjust data use (Schrock, 2016), and may also recognize the need for intermedi-
aries that help to make open data more accessible to the public (Baack, 2015).
For personal data, an unjust distribution results from data industry’s dominant prac-
tices separating people from their data and enabling data accumulation by corporations 
(Cinnamon, 2017). Some data activists posit these data practices as threats to individual 
rights, and combat them with technical self-protection, such as anonymity, obfuscation, 
and encryption (Milan and Van der Velden, 2016). In response to an unjust data distribu-
tion, this kind of reactive data activism attempts to prevent the production of data in the 
first place, avoiding the potential harm as well as the benefits accruing from exchanges 
involving personal data. Here, seeking justice becomes a private act relying on techni-
cal skill and ability (Dencik, 2018). Some recent, more proactive instances of data 
activism focus on redistributing personal data, or their benefits, from firms to people. In 
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addition to MyData, developments include the “re-decentralization” initiative of web 
pioneer Berners-Lee, aiming to make personal data a resource for people (https://solid.
inrupt.com; Andrejevic, 2014; Brooker, 2018); the proposal by another Internet pioneer, 
Lanier (2013), to achieve commercial symmetry between firms and users by remunerat-
ing people for personal data use; the development of software (see Lehtiniemi, 2017) 
and devices (Crabtree et al., 2016) to provide users with means to exercise control over 
data collection and use; and “smart disclosure” programs releasing machine-readable 
personal data from firms to consumer-citizens (Iemma, 2016). Whereas the data analyt-
ics industry promises to put organizations in charge of their data for their own advan-
tage (Beer, 2018), these initiatives aim to do the same for individuals. On the surface, 
they seem to advocate economic agency for people in the information society. They can, 
however, be criticized on many grounds: for example, that they are excessively individ-
ual-centric and reliant on markets that do not work economically (Charitsis et al., 2018); 
that over-individualization can make them susceptible to private sector co-optation in 
the same way as the protection of privacy (Coll, 2014); and that they are driven by the 
judgments of the technical elite about just data practices (Kennedy, 2018). Despite this, 
they represent work-in-progress experimentation on what a more just data economy 
could look like; we, therefore, consider them as “moments where meaningful change 
can occur” (Schrock, 2016: 583). The following section describes our empirical 
approach to one such moment.
Data and analysis method
The MyData conference
The first author has closely followed MyData in Finland through participant observation 
in research projects since 2014 (see Lehtiniemi and Ruckenstein, 2019). Data for this 
research were collected in the context of participant observation at a conference called 
“MyData 2016” (https://mydata2016.org). In the previous year, the Finnish activists had 
published a report outlining MyData’s aims (Poikola et al., 2015) which attracted interest 
from like-minded activists around the globe, eventually leading to organizing the confer-
ence in collaboration with the nonprofit Open Knowledge Finland and the French think-
tank FING. The event attracted an audience of 700 domain experts1 with an interest in 
“human-centric personal data management,” including businesspeople, entrepreneurs, 
technologists, researchers, privacy advocates, and public sector officials. The event 
became a formative step for the MyData community, providing grounds for further 
developments: annual follow-up conferences, a declaration outlining MyData principles 
(https://mydata.org/declaration/) and the launch of an international NGO “MyData 
Global” in 2018, with the expressed goal of creating “a fair, sustainable, and prosperous 
digital society” (https://mydata.org).
If MyData is considered as an emerging field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) of data 
activism, the conference may be regarded an example of a field-configuring event 
(Lampel and Meyer, 2008); these are events which shape technologies, markets, or 
industries by assembling diverse interest groups, offering interaction opportunities and 
facilitating information exchange, and collective sensemaking. Actors in an emerging 
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field have the leeway to shape it to suit their own interests by inducing the cooperation 
of others (Fligstein, 2001), and a professional conference offers a venue for contestation 
between future visions, as well as an environment facilitating selection between alterna-
tives (Garud, 2008). Indeed, “if the whole field were to be contained in a nutshell, a 
conference would be its most likely manifestation” (Garud, 2008: 1084). At the MyData 
conference, then, actors attempted to shape what MyData is “about” to suit their activist, 
policy, or commercial ends.
Data and analysis
Our empirical approach is based on analyzing the frames constructed by the conference’s 
keynote presentations, and the reception of these frames by the audience. Frames in gen-
eral offer a schema for highlighting aspects of a situation, functioning as modes for 
articulating strategy to be undertaken. Those constructed in keynotes suggested ways of 
understanding the current situation, identifying issues to act on, and ways of acting on 
them. As an analytical framework, we employ the identification of collective action 
frames (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1988) that diagnose the issue in 
need of change and who is to blame, prognose solutions and how to achieve them, and 
motivate collective action. By focusing on keynotes, we employ a form of purposive 
sampling of settings where the processes of interest are most likely to be observed 
(Silverman, 2006: 306–307). Three features make keynotes suitable for our purpose: 
first, the biases demonstrated by the choice of speakers, as the event organizers selected 
them with an eye toward shaping MyData (see Lampel and Meyer, 2008); second, key-
note lectures concerned MyData’s means and ends generally rather than detailed issues 
such as technical or legal minutiae; and third, related to this, the majority of the confer-
ence public was present during the keynotes, necessitating that speakers navigate the 
varied interests of conference participants. Overall, we can expect keynote speakers to 
attempt to construct frames that resonate with their audience’s interests; however, while 
different keynote speakers represented different interests and backgrounds, investigating 
only the constructed frames risks devaluing the power relations in play. In order to take 
this into account, we also examine the success of framing efforts (Snow and Benford, 
1988) through audience responses to them, allowing us to examine not only how injus-
tices are framed as obstructing equal participation, and the means suggested for their 
removal, but also the extent of agreement on these issues.
Our material consists of two datasets. First, we transcribed video recordings2 of 12 
keynote talks and the follow-up Q&A sessions, totaling some 7 hours of recordings. 
Second, we received access to 750 anonymous messages sent by audience members using 
online backchannel software developed for real-time audience interactions at events 
(Nelimarkka et al., 2016). The software allowed people to send anonymous messages dur-
ing keynote lectures, specifically prompting “comments and feedback to speakers” as 
well as “key lessons.” The messages were public to the conference audience. While com-
menting was continuously encouraged by conference hosts, strong agreement, and disa-
greement with issues raised may be over-represented. Nevertheless, we argue that this 
method of gathering audience data is fruitful as there is a low barrier to giving feedback, 
and immediate responses can be gathered from a wide range of participants. In addition, 
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we prepared field notes on our observations during the conference, which were employed 
as background material for this study. Using Atlas.ti, we initially identified sections from 
the keynote transcriptions that represented collective action frames and broadly concerned 
participation in the information society. We classified these sections with an open coding 
scheme, and iteratively reclassified them until reaching the six frames presented in the 
next section. We included only frames that were either widespread or contested. The audi-
ence interaction data were then employed to examine agreement and tensions arising in 
response to the identified frames.
To present our results, we divided the keynote speakers into five groups based on their 
affiliation: one conference organizer; advocates including an NGO representative and a 
journalist/author; technology developers from a start-up and a research consortium; 
speakers affiliated with private sector firms such as a telecom company, financial ser-
vices companies, and a consultancy; and speakers from the public sector including a 
ministry official, a data protection authority official, and a Finnish government minister. 
Two of the speakers came from Finland, the others from elsewhere in Europe, Australia, 
and the United States. We also include quotations from anonymous audience members.
Framing MyData
An overview of the frames of participation—under three headings—and how they were 
employed in keynotes, is presented in Table 1. Participation enablers exhibit a widely 
employed frame describing how favorable developments in technological and regulatory 
environments make promoting new data arrangements possible. Agreed-on means of 
participation include two frames identifying key injustices and their remedies. One was 
the inability of people to act on their personal data, with the solution being to develop 
technologies that provided users with data agency, and another was the asymmetric 
access to personal data that hindered firms’ opportunities; both were framed to allow 
simultaneous redistribution of data between firms. These frames were employed by all 
speaker groups and widely accepted by the audience. Contested aims of participation 
include alternative framings that also received contrasting audience responses. Notably, 
many speakers avoided them completely. One contested issue was whether the data 
economy’s giants should be allowed to benefit from opportunities emerging from data 
activism. Alternative frames were also constructed for what equal participation involved. 
Some speakers, including technology developers, framed equal participation as market 
symmetry between users and firms. The alternative was to frame participation as based 
on rights and citizenship.
Participation enablers
Technical and legal tools. Two major developments were framed as enabling dominant data 
arrangements to be challenged: evolving personal data technologies and a changing regu-
latory environment. The technological driver was the increasing availability of personal 
data technologies for individuals to use for their own benefit. While data collection, stor-
age and analysis had so far been only available to corporations, the underlying technolo-
gies were reaching a level of mundanity and ubiquity, which meant that individuals could 
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claim control of their data. This was framed as technology democratization countering 
unjust data arrangements: “the only thing that has been limiting us up until now, is the 
ability for us to have that technology” (Developer 1). The regulatory driver were rulings 
to ensure data access and interoperability, whose role was instrumental; in order for peo-
ple to have control over their personal data, new services would need to work together, 
and data would need to be accessible and technically and semantically interoperable. Of 
notable importance was the then-upcoming EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
containing data portability rulings ensuring machine-readable access to personal data: 
“GDPR is really important and is about to […] rebalance […] the relationships between 
individuals and companies” (Public sector 2).
The significance of these developments was not contested and their combination was 
an opportunity to shape new data arrangements: “[Data] portability is really a legal tool 
that we will be able to mobilize for the MyData projects” (Private sector 1). The respon-
sibility of the MyData community was to ensure that the opportunities are properly 
exploited: “the legal tools […] become really useful if they meet a social movement, if 
they meet a cultural change” (Private sector 1).
Agreed-on means of participation
Agency for individuals. Central to diagnosing the injustice of dominant data arrangements was 
that they worked in the interest of firms and organizations, but not individuals. The majority 
of keynote speakers mentioned the inability of individuals to act in relation to data, present-
ing the digital environment as detrimental to human agency. As individuals did not have the 
meaningful capability to make decisions on their data, their choices were constrained: “The 
idea of […] a complete opt out or this total surveillance [is] no agency at all. That’s not a 
social contract that’s sustainable” (Developer 1). The culprit was technology that only firms 
could use for their own benefit: “Why is it we cannot have more freedom to do digital stuff 
ourselves? Because we don’t have our own platform” (Developer 2).
The prognostic component of this frame was the development of technologies allow-
ing the control of data use, transforming individuals from objects of data collection into 
subjects with data agency. MyData was about “empowering people with their data” 
(Organizer) or “engaging with information in a way that actually enriches our life” 
(Developer 1). Agency was hence framed as the capacity to decide who can use data and 
on what terms. “Personal agency systems” (Developer 1) would allow people to use data 
for their own advantage; selective sharing of data would enable the conveyance of 
abstract notions such as intentions or preferences, leading to the fulfillment of personal-
ized wants and punctual service delivery. Agency was framed as the defining feature of 
MyData: “PIMS3 are when you give individuals agency through new technologies […]. 
It’s about something that’s personal and mine, [that] understands me […] and acts in my 
interest” (Private sector 4). In addition to individual benefits, agency was framed as real-
izing societal benefits; the developed technologies would lead to an information society 
characterized by individual rights and free will, in which people would participate by 
making their voices heard.
A concern was that what was being offered would not be recognized: “People have 
been formatted for 20 years to get excellent services without caring about their data” 
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(Private sector 1). The problematic assumption of willing and capable technology users 
was, however, to be addressed by augmenting human capabilities with technology: “We 
don’t want to be constantly processing […] our consent [rather] we will be able to out-
source some of these things” (Developer 1). Audience reactions were largely supportive 
of the identified problems and proposed solutions; for example, as one person observed, 
“We have no agency today. But can’t we build it back? Via MyData tools?” (Audience). 
Some comments, however, were aimed at broadening the view to extend beyond techno-
logical solutions, such as “The real question is who sets the norms?” (Audience), and, 
“How to make people desire that agency?” (Audience).
Redistribution of data. Equally prominent was a frame diagnosing another asymmetry 
in the data economy: the unjust distribution of data between firms. Its prognostic ele-
ment framed the technologies providing data agency to individuals as also benefiting 
firms.
Data economy kingpins were presented as being successful due to how data aggrega-
tion and monopolization further cemented their position: “Gathering a lot of data is kind 
of [an arms race]. It’s not a game we can win, because we are a small company” (Private 
sector 3). At the same time, the economic model, based on commercial surveillance, was 
framed as erosive, raising doubts about its sustainability: “Trust towards organizations 
[…] has never been so low. And business data practices play a big part in that growing 
mistrust” (Organizer). Correcting the unjust distribution of data was required: “We have 
to move from winner-takes-all to competition-takes-all” (Private sector 1). Individual 
agency in relation to data was expected to bring about a “disruption to current data aggre-
gator models” (Public sector 1). When individuals can decide how and by whom data are 
used, it will no longer be possible to build monopolistic positions on proprietary data 
assets; instead, people will share personal data with firms and organizations that serve 
their interests. Competition for users’ data would not only reinstate trust in data-using 
businesses in general, but would also provide a competitive edge to firms that earn con-
sumers’ trust: “The more trusted you [are], the more data you’ll be able to handle and 
collect from the individual, [and] the more revenue you create” (Private sector 4). This 
would lead to opportunities “for you and I to absolutely revolutionize the creation of new 
value” (Developer 1) by means of new innovative services.
Reacting to this framing, vocal audience members demanded concrete evidence of 
business success, pointing out, for example, “Every time monetary values come up, dis-
cussion gets vague and disconnected from reality” (Audience). Converting visions to 
concrete reality was thought to require not only abstract promises of business opportuni-
ties, but also evidence of commercial success.
Contested aims of participation
Beneficiaries. This frame concerned the interests that could be served by the business 
opportunities which, it was expected, equal participation in the data economy would cre-
ate. At issue here were the dominant players—or GAFA4 as they were referred to—and 
whether they should be strictly resisted, or whether data agency was what always 
mattered.
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On most occasions when mention was made of GAFA, MyData was about explicit 
resistance: there was “a battle to address” (Private sector 3). One speaker, a technol-
ogy developer, first expressed the will to collaborate and share technology with “any-
one who feels the way we do.” When directly asked about GAFA by the audience, the 
speaker stated, however, that they “don’t want Facebook there” (Developer 2). 
Resisting GAFA was, societally, the right thing to do: “The rules which have been laid 
down by GAFA could represent a threat for liberty and […] the free market” (Private 
sector 3). The audience humorously supported resistance: “How do we kill Google, 
Apple, Facebook and Amazon?” (Audience) and “Google and Facebook are fundamen-
tally doomed” (Audience).
The other way to regard GAFA was less explicit and inclusive of anyone following the 
MyData principles. Large corporations in particular would react slowly, so patience 
should be exercised, and inclusion in MyData should be based on future actions. An 
example of attempting to include GAFA was this avoidance of drawing boundaries:
Is Facebook a PIMS? I think platforms […] that give individuals agency […] can start to be 
considered as PIMS. […] We need to be very careful of thinking that PIMS are a binary. 
(Private sector 4)
In this view, it was not important to categorize the firms, but rather to consider whether 
their technologies “gave individuals agency.”
Many speakers did not express their position on this issue. This reluctance was evi-
dent to the extent that GAFA were on more than one occasion referred to as “the ele-
phants in the room.” The audience had no such restraint. Several anonymous audience 
comments, for example, directly demanded the above speaker to acknowledge a previous 
consultancy relationship: “Facebook has hired you [so] the goal must be to sell Facebook 
as a PIMS?” (Audience). The tension over who should be allowed to benefit from user 
data mainly emerged through audience responses.
Market symmetry. Above, individual agency with regard to data was framed as a prereq-
uisite for participation in the information society. Data agency would transform individu-
als into empowered subjects; however, framing agency and participation relied on two 
different understandings of what participation involved, so we begin by discussing how 
parity of participation was framed as market symmetry.
The asymmetric relationship between individuals and firms was framed as arising 
from the inability of individuals to exercise economic interest in terms of their data. The 
problem was the asymmetric commodification of data by commercial players; conse-
quently, this frame extended the commodification of personal data so that they would 
become saleable, or rather exchangeable, by individuals themselves. The offline world 
offered an illustrative comparison: “We have many more freedoms in physical lives […] 
because […] we have freedom of property. By owning stuff, we are free to use it make 
our lives better” (Developer 2). The objective was to shape an economy where “customer 
data is not just a corporate asset, but also a personal asset” (Private sector 4). This fram-
ing presented individuals as market agents, data agency as market agency, and participa-
tion in the information society as making choices in the marketplace from different 
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options for data use. Benefits on the societal level would emerge from the rational actions 
of individuals who were treating their data as an asset serving their own interests. As 
individuals seek to make their lives better by exchanging data for services, competition 
between firms to provide these services would ensure the best possible options from 
which to choose. Many reactions from the audience were supportive of individual bene-
fit-seeking through data markets, something enunciated in the comment, “Love the idea 
[of] helping people achieve outcomes and experiences they desire and that have real 
value to them” (Audience).
Fundamental rights. The second framing of participation by means of data presented 
equal participation in data collection and use as something resembling a fundamental 
right. It was aligned with the market symmetry frame in the diagnosis of problems aris-
ing from the privileged economic relationship some firms had with data. However, 
agency was not framed as making market choices between alternative data uses, but as 
the right of individuals to determine what can be done with their data. While the argu-
mentation was not extensively spelled out—possibly due to this frame’s being provoked 
as a reaction to the observed inadequacy of the market symmetry frame—extending the 
commodification of data was nonetheless seen as a dubious means to reduce the harm 
that commodification had initially caused:
You give me some information as if you’re handing me a pile of stuff. […] It’s not what really 
goes on with participation. (Activist 2)
We should stop talking about owning our data. […] We should anchor them to […] fundamental 
rights, and […] clearly refuse those approaches of people who want to monetize personal data 
in exchange for openness. (Private sector 1)
An approach rooted in rights would better contain the harm caused by the commodi-
fication of data by commercial actors. These “fundamental rights” concerned data agency 
in the sense of participating in processes that determine how and for what purposes data 
are used, such as democratic governance over sharing the value produced with data. In 
this model, individuals could also participate in the information society beyond the pur-
suit of economic self-interest:
We need to [emphasize] the community, the crowd, the strengths of collective action […] Let’s 
put participation in this sense in the very center of the way we think about data. (Private sector 1)
The aim was, then, to produce subjectivities that would transform people from objects 
of data collection into digital citizens with rights and entitlements.
In audience responses, the market symmetry frame was challenged as well, mainly 
due to the complexities involved in the ownership of digital goods: “We may have differ-
ent rights in data, […] but not ownership like in property” (Audience). Audience reac-
tions were, however, divided: for example, both “personal data is not property” and 
“personal data is property” were proposed and up-voted as important lessons learned at 
the closure of the conference.
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Discussion: the dimensions of equal participation
Our analysis shows that MyData proponents agree on the diagnosis that the lack of indi-
viduals’ agency over personal data is the principal problem, and on proposing MyData 
technology as the means of resolving the problem. The agreed-on goal for MyData was 
to transform people into “proper modern agentic individuals” (Meyer and Jepperson, 
2000) able to manage their lives on- and offline. This would be achieved through an 
ecosystem of personal data technologies providing people with the capability to make 
data serve their own interests rather than only those of commercial firms. Contestation 
over who participates and how (Zuboff, 2015) was, therefore, framed as a question that 
needs to be tackled with technology development, and specific kinds of technology were 
a condition for having agency in a datafied environment.
MyData proponents framed new data arrangements in terms of user empowerment, 
but simultaneously presented them as supporting the recovery of missed economic 
opportunities and as providing innovation potential for firms and society at large. While 
early discourse on the dominant arrangements of the data economy also focused on con-
sumer power accruing from data gathering, it had largely masked companies’ economic 
interests in data use (West, 2019). Here, in contrast, commercial data use is part and 
parcel of the envisioned realization of datafication’s benefits, and the lack of commercial 
success stories to exemplify the economic potential of more just data arrangements was 
lamented. However, although commercial data use is in principle lauded if it involves 
data agency, the tensions involved in allowing the GAFA to enjoy MyData’s commercial 
benefits demonstrate that the ethics of acceptable data use could be more nuanced.
Even if MyData proponents agreed on data agency and a more just distribution of data 
as the first steps toward settling further injustices and achieving equal participation (see 
Cinnamon, 2017), this agreement does not imply specific form of participation. Here, we 
identified two alternative frames. The first frame, participation as market symmetry, not 
only focuses on the economic dimension of participation in the information society, but 
it also involves narrowing the economic dimension down to market exchange. Equal 
participation, here, primarily signifies the ability to choose between alternative uses for 
personal data in the marketplace. It is proposed that the obstacles preventing equal par-
ticipation could be dismantled by providing people with the means to exchange personal 
data, and the market is expected to take care of the rest. In this framing, MyData aims to 
transform people into consumer-participants in the information society (see Lehtiniemi, 
2017), and to base participation in market agency. The routinization of data collection 
(Couldry and Yu, 2018) is not seen as a problem as such, but the aim is rather to subju-
gate it to the market, with the belief that suitable end-user technologies will allow people 
to exercise control in the sphere.
This frame constitutes an extension of data industry rhetoric presenting personal data 
as an asset to be turned into value (Sadowski, 2019)—in this case, for users themselves. 
The promise for firms is fair competition in markets for alternative data uses, where 
access to user data would be gained by supplying enticing services. The ability of firms 
to exploit data for competitive advantage would, then, not stem from a position in a locus 
of user activities which enables the monopolistic extraction of user data (Zuboff, 2015), 
but from the quality of their offerings. The value of personal data is primarily understood 
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to lie in exploiting data as a scarce resource: in the case of users, for the purposes of self-
interest; in the case of firms, for competitive advantage. This “competitive value” derived 
from data is what already motivates the data industry (Cinnamon, 2017). Framing par-
ticipation as market symmetry, then, does not fundamentally question the data industry’s 
dominant economic rationale, but rather aims to transform it to serve the ends of both 
activism and commercial actors.
The other alternative frame for participation is based on rights. Here, market symmetry 
is presented as a dubious means of achieving equal participation. Instead, people are to be 
transformed into digital citizens more broadly understood, with rights, entitlements, and 
the ability to participate in more democratic governance of data use (Cardullo and Kitchin, 
2018; Evans, 2017). This frame allows data technologies to be considered as a means of 
not only correcting the initial distributive injustice, but also directly addressing other 
dimensions of it, such as misrecognition or misrepresentation (Cinnamon, 2017). The 
imagined data agency can be understood in terms of what Hintz et al. (2017) call ideal 
configurations of digital citizenship: “comprehensive self-determination in a datafied 
environment” (p. 735) made possible by an amalgamation of the necessary infrastructure, 
its informed use, an enabling regulation, and public knowledge. In terms of the economic 
dimension of participation, this frame also presents a broader view than merely market 
participation: the economic can be considered not only as meeting market demand but 
also, more generally, in terms of provisioning goods and services that meet the needs of 
humans (Elder-Vass, 2016: 28–29; Nelson, 1993). From this viewpoint, data activism 
seeking just data arrangements for equal participation would explicitly consider which 
arrangements allow provisioning for human needs. This would involve the inclusion of 
other kinds of value derived from data, in addition to the competitive value gained from 
data that others do not have. Value could be drawn from using data for the common good, 
or for serving the interests of specific communities (Lehtiniemi and Ruckenstein, 2019; 
Cinnamon, 2017). The roles offered to people could, therefore, be extended from consum-
ers toward participants in a manner that is grounded in rights and the common good 
(Cardullo and Kitchin, 2018).
These alternative frames of participation, which are at least potentially at odds with 
each other, encourage consideration of the relationship between the involvement of 
commercial interests, and the goal setting of data activism. Examples from technology 
movements in symbiotic relations with the private sector, such as the free software 
movement, indicate that when a movement’s innovations are incorporated within 
industries, they are transformed to serve profitability concerns more effectively, poten-
tially leading to conflicts within the movement (Hess, 2005). The QS community, 
however, provides contrasting evidence: it maintains ambiguous valuations and sup-
ports the commercialization of self-tracking technologies, while simultaneously pre-
venting the co-optation of the community by commercial values (Barta and Neff, 
2016). Significantly, whereas QS pursues individual and community learning, 
MyData’s means for social change are dependent on success in shaping an ecosystem 
of new, also commercial, services (see Lehtiniemi and Ruckenstein, 2019). Instigating 
social change by means of a gradually expanding technical and commercial ecosystem 
necessitates, for example, demonstrating the benefits for start-ups that aim to occupy 
niches in it. Commercial values are thus inherent to the sought-after social change. 
The ideas of individual data agency, their implementation in data technologies and 
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imagined business benefits come neatly together in the market symmetry frame. The 
rights-based framing of participation does not bring together commercial interests with 
an understanding of data agency in equally concrete terms. Commercial data use, then, 
seems to favor a specific understanding of data and participation: data as an asset for 
individuals, and data agency as participation in data markets. This understanding, 
however, leaves potentially narrow parameters for what is at stake; it risks seeing 
data’s value in terms of the competitive dynamics of data markets, and relies on the 
market to resolve further injustices once the distributive injustice is resolved.
Conclusion
Data activism only exists in relation to the political economy of personal data and its 
sociotechnical arrangements. This suggests that commercial potential and alignment 
with existing interests toward data can have a powerful role in determining the success 
of data activism’s innovations. Our analysis shows how commercial interests involved in 
data activism can be served by a market framing for data agency and societal participa-
tion. The conflation of data agency with the ability to make choices on sharing data can 
serve firms, but such an approach obviously glosses over the multitude of factors that 
influence and limit independent choice (Lehtiniemi and Ruckenstein, 2019), and could 
in the end lead to people sharing more, and more nuanced, personal data. This suggests 
the course of remaining skeptical of the potential that data activism collaborating with 
commercial actors has to enhance people’s participation in the information society in a 
sufficient and sustainable manner.
However, it can be difficult for us, as a society, to identify and start resolving data 
economy’s injustices without people’s awareness of modes of data collection, access to 
data, and ability to express choice. While these capabilities are not sufficient for equal 
participation in the information society, our analysis indicates that they can act as starting 
points for resolving a variety of economic, sociocultural, and political injustices, provided 
that data agency is not understood only in terms of data markets and private benefits. This 
suggests that data activism involving commercial interests can aid in the development of 
data arrangements that are more just in a sense that surpasses participation in markets, but 
this may hinge on developing a normative agenda for what participation in a datafied 
society should involve, and also on articulating nonmarket data agency in concrete terms. 
Leaving this as an open question may hopefully provide further motivation for scholars to 
investigate data activism initiatives.
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Notes
1. Based on a survey, 40% of conference participants represented firms, 35% the public sector, 
and the rest NGOs or research institutions. Of firms, half were large corporations and the rest 
start-ups or small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The representativeness of this sample 
is, however, questionable.
2. Keynote talks, excluding follow-up discussions, are available at https://www.youtube.com/
playlist?list=PL6_IssKYHuPReO0Sr7_7GRbUtRkRqnm6m
3. PIMS, personal information management systems, was one of the several names for MyData 
services.
4. We adopt this abbreviation for Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon.
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Abstract
Data activism, promoting new forms of civic and political engagement, has emerged as a response to problematic aspects
of datafication that include tensions between data openness and data ownership, and asymmetries in terms of data usage
and distribution. In this article, we discuss MyData, a data activism initiative originating in Finland, which aims to shape a
more sustainable citizen-centric data economy by means of increasing individuals’ control of their personal data. Using
data gathered during long-term participant-observation in collaborative projects with data activists, we explore the
internal tensions of data activism by first outlining two different social imaginaries – technological and socio-critical –
within MyData, and then merging them to open practical and analytical space for engaging with the socio-technical
futures currently in the making. While the technological imaginary favours data infrastructures as corrective measures,
the socio-critical imaginary questions the effectiveness of technological correction. Unpacking them clarifies the kinds of
political and social alternatives that different social imaginaries ascribe to the notions underlying data activism, and
highlights the need to consider the social structures in play. The more far-reaching goal of our exercise is to provide
practical and analytical resources for critical engagement in the context of data activism. By merging technological and
socio-critical imaginaries in the work of reimagining governing structures and knowledge practices alongside infrastruc-
tural arrangements, scholars can depart from the most obvious forms of critique, influence data activism practice, and
formulate data ethics and data futures.
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Introduction
It will not be enough, however, to gain control over the
infrastructure of our communicative lives. [. . .] This is
the critical challenge posed by the Big Data era and the
new forms of control it ushers in: not simply to reima-
gine infrastructural arrangements, but also the know-
ledge practices with which they are associated.
(Andrejevic, 2013: 165)
An expanding area of scholarly interest that could be
loosely characterized as ‘data activism research’
explores the harnessing of the capacities of data tech-
nology to promote social justice, new forms of agency
and political participation, meanwhile challenging
accepted norms, practices and ideological projects
(Baack, 2015; Delfanti and Iaconesi, 2016; Greenfield,
2016; Kennedy, 2018; Milan and Gutierrez, 2018;
Milan and van der Velden, 2016; Pybus et al., 2015).
Data activism research is closely linked with processes
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of datafication (Ruckenstein and Schu¨ll, 2017; van
Dijck, 2014) and the ways in which personal data –
any data related to, or resulting from actions by, a
person – is being utilized for economic and political
aims in an increasingly systematic manner (van Dijck
and Poell, 2016; Zuboff, 2015). While data activism
research calls for attention to the exploitative forces
inherent in processes of datafication, it does not
merely detail problematic aspects of datafication;
rather, it investigates and draws inspiration from new
forms of civic and political engagement that respond to
datafication, with the aim of instigating and strengthen-
ing more responsible data futures (Milan and van der
Velden, 2016).
We build on research that explores how data activ-
ism develops ‘alternative social imaginaries’ and creates
‘a new sense for the legitimacy of collective knowledge
creation’ (Baack, 2015: 8). The notion of the social
imaginary, offered by Taylor (2002), aids in the explor-
ation of how data activists make sense of society’s prac-
tices, imagine their social existence, and deal with ‘the
expectations that are normally met, and the deeper nor-
mative notions and images that underlie these expect-
ations’ (p.106). Developing this idea, Jasanoff (2015)
highlights the ‘instrumental and transformative’ role
that technology developments play in generating
imaginaries of social order, defining socio-technical
imaginaries as collectively held notions of desirable
futures, animated by shared understandings of social
aims, and attainable through advances in technology.
In terms of data activism, this provides a way
to account for the interplay between the design of tech-
nologies and the social arrangements that inspire and
sustain their production – in other words, how technol-
ogy both embeds, and is embedded in, the social
(Jasanoff, 2015: 2–3). Of particular interest here is
how transformations in wider social imaginaries may
occur through the development of new practices and
associated imaginaries in groups or collectives
(Taylor, 2002: 111).
While data activism retains and develops social ima-
ginaries that promote new practices by employing data
technology to fulfil aims of social justice or political
participation, these capacities can also support oppos-
ing perspectives and values. For example, open govern-
ment data can support liberal democratic values by
providing mechanisms for more just governance, but
also libertarian agendas by providing justification for
privatization and deregulation (Schrock, 2016). It is
thus crucial to acknowledge that multiple and conflict-
ing social imaginaries are at work in terms of data
activism.
In the following, we discuss tensions arising from
alternative ways of ‘framing, packaging, and presenting
data’ that ‘have the potential to alter not only our
vision of the world, but also our own theory of know-
ledge’ (Milan and van der Velden, 2016: 63). Our
approach is inspired by Jasanoff’s argument that even
if imaginaries are collectively held, ‘multiple imagin-
aries can coexist within a society in tension or in a
productive dialectical relationship’ (2015: 4). We
begin by identifying opposing social imaginaries in
the context of a single data activist initiative,
MyData, and then rework them into a shared dialogue.
Our contribution is informed by our involvement in
four years of research projects and participatory activ-
ities with data activists; it draws from a range of dis-
ciplinary sources including critical data studies,
anthropology, economic sociology and science and
technology studies, and also develops our previous
work in the field (Janasik-Honkela and Ruckenstein
2016; Lehtiniemi, 2017; Ruckenstein and Pantzar,
2015).
As a form of data activism, the MyData initiative
aims at a more sustainable, and simultaneously citizen-
centric, digital economy; it is built on the understanding
that people, companies, the public sector and society at
large benefit when individuals become more active data
citizens and consumers by controlling the gathering,
sharing and analysis of personal data. MyData is pol-
itically and ideologically thought-provoking by virtue
of its self-portrayal as an initiative driven by digital
rights, an auto-designation which it introduces as a
placeholder in an ambitious aim to provide society
with ‘parallel development of digital rights, innovation
and business growth’ (Poikola et al., 2015: 4). This
translates into the concurrent advancement of processes
and policies for protecting individuals’ rights while
accommodating the industry’s demands to process per-
sonal data in the development of innovative services.
MyData seeks to achieve systemic outcomes by rear-
ranging the infrastructure underlying individual-level
data practices. The new infrastructure being developed,
here understood as technical forms that facilitate user-
controlled exchange of personal data (Larkin, 2013),
comprises of personal data storages, data schemas
and standards, exchange protocols, digital identity
frameworks, and permission management tools. The
principle of individual data control is intended to be
general and sector-independent; indeed, it can be
embedded in field-specific initiatives ranging from
health and mobility to retail and finances.
In what follows, we separate two social imaginaries:
a technological imaginary that favours data infrastruc-
ture as a corrective measure, and a socio-critical imagin-
ary that questions the effectiveness of technological
correction. This exercise clarifies political and social
alternatives ascribed by different social imaginaries to
the data activist initiative, highlighting the need to con-
sider the social structures in play. The more far-
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reaching goal, however, is to reach beyond identifying
tensions in imaginaries: our account of the unpacking
of social imaginaries aims to offer a productive way
forward. Towards this end, we finish by discussing
how to merge technological and socio-critical imagin-
aries in the work of reimagining governing structures
and knowledge practices alongside infrastructural
arrangements.
Alternative social imaginaries
The perceived need to separate alternative imaginaries
before bridging the gap between them was initially trig-
gered by our personal involvement in the MyData ini-
tiative. Between 2014 and 2018 we have worked
together with developers and data activists in three
research projects in fields of health and knowledge
work, focusing on personal data uses and emergent
data infrastructures. We started our research collabor-
ation with the goal of exploring the wide range of agen-
cies and aims in play in terms of datafication. Initially,
we intended to introduce collective aims and expect-
ations in order to open a reflexive conversation about
the political and ideological underpinnings of MyData,
meanwhile offering ideas on how to promote what we
considered societally ‘more robust’ data activism (see
Kennedy, 2018). While our collaboration with data
activists was motivated by a mutual understanding
that both technology developers and social scientists
have an important role in shaping data activism, the
first joint meetings were characterized by a certain dis-
comfort. We were viewing a stream of diagrams on
PowerPoint slides depicting databases and data flows,
in terms of which a more socio-critical imaginary
remained oddly irrelevant. Witnessing how society is
imagined as being built with information systems
shaped our involvement with MyData, pushing us
towards an outsider’s position from where we had to
work our way to a shared dialogue.
We learned first-hand that the socio-critical imaginary
that we had internalized through our training in the
social sciences, which we also associated with data activ-
ism, differed from the technology developers’ view,
sometimes in a profound sense. In order to explain our
position to technology developers we had to clearly spell
it out. The socio-critical imaginary is informed by the
critical stance characterizing social scientific inquiry,
which also questions the optimistic and future-oriented
imaginary of technological advances. Drawing from crit-
ical political economy and neo-Foucauldian analyses,
researchers have explored the effects of datafication on
the economy, politics, social life and self-understanding,
with particular attention to how technical innovation is
outrunning both public understanding and regulation
(Kennedy, 2018; Zuboff, 2015). Research highlights
how the introduction of technologies as corrective meas-
ures to address identified societal problems leads to new
issues that, in turn, need to be corrected: for example,
the data economy practices that initiatives like MyData
are currently trying to fix were originally justified with a
jubilant discourse of the political and societal benefits of
online services (West, 2019).
In contrast, the technological imaginary that we
encountered in data activism is fed by practical and
future-oriented aims. As Fred Turner points out
(Logic Magazine, 2017), the engineering attitude
includes a tendency to do politics primarily by changing
infrastructure. This mindset typically rests on a techno-
libertarian ideology promoting notions of a free market
and autonomous, free-spirited individuals benefiting
from advances in information technology (Barbrook
and Cameron, 1996; Turner 2006). It tends to take
the stance that technology evolution is inevitable:
since we cannot stop it, we must make technologies
serve us. In this view, information technology, per se,
does not generate the undesirable uses to which it is
put; rather, they arise when technologies are harnessed
to serve particular interests. For technology developers,
then, the commitment to societal transformations
encompasses ideas of both a more just society, and
the correct role of technical means in achieving that
transformation (Kelty, 2008). Applying this formula-
tion, initiatives such as MyData treat infrastructural
interventions as corrective measures for unsatisfactory
societal developments that need to be reversed, or redir-
ected towards fairer and more responsible practices by
building new technology. Thus, where the engineering
attitude favours infrastructural development, critical
scholars, committed to a more socio-critical stance,
question the reimagining of such arrangements, par-
ticularly if it fails to involve knowledge practices
(Andrejevic, 2013).
Our aim is not to paint a caricature of either tech-
nology developers or social scientists by separating
these social imaginaries, or to claim that either would
sufficiently represent any form of data activism. In
practice, the two imaginaries are not neatly separable;
individual data activists move between them when they
explain their future aims. Rather, the two are funda-
mentally aligned: both recognize the far-reaching con-
sequences of datafication, which enables new
approaches for making sense of the world that in turn
affect the production of knowledge, business practices
and governance (Kitchin, 2014a). In fact, this align-
ment is what initiated our research collaborations in
the first place, as we wanted to better our understand-
ing of the critical potential of technology developers to
rework processes related to datafication. The analytical
separation between the two can, however, clarify how
data activism contributes to ‘alternative narratives of
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our datafied social reality’ (Milan and van der Velden,
2016: 69), and aid in formulation of data activism in
terms of social and economic justice (Dencik, 2018). By
exposing tensions between social imaginaries, we high-
light the contested social aims and expectations of data
activism, thereby assisting the evaluation of potential
data futures. We argue that the imaginaries inform
engagements with new forms of information and know-
ledge, and their production: that is, they represent dis-
similar data futures. In particular, as we suggest below,
the imaginaries promoting dissimilar data futures have
different relations to the project of individual control of
personal data.
Participant-observers of MyData
Studying an initiative such as MyData means dealing
with a work-in-progress and uncertain futures in the
making. In terms of the actual research process, the
emergent nature of the phenomenon at hand has
meant that our research has been ethnographically ori-
ented in that we have engaged in ongoing observation
and dialogue when interacting with data activists. The
observations alerted us to the fact that, rather than
being confronted with a uniform ‘data activist public’,
what we face are alternative data futures. To get a
better sense of desirable data futures, we started to
explore data activists’ social imaginaries. This required
us to understand how data activists differ from one
another, and the nature of their concerns and aims.
In the process, however, data activists pushed us not
only to study them, but also to offer ‘our solution’ to
remedying the current ills of the data economy.
Requests for constructive response echo demands for
design input from social scientists in the fields of
human–computer interaction and systems design (e.g.
Anderson, 1994; Hughes et al., 1994). For us, this
meant we needed to ‘come up with ingenious solutions
to the problem of how to become interesting enough’
for data activists and find ways for ‘exploring common
futures with practices’ (Jensen and Lauritsen, 2005:
72–73). Towards this end, we actively had to supply
constructive feedback to maintain a productive conver-
sation. In the process, we gained a role in shaping and
mobilizing data activism. This has meant that, along-
side our research, we have participated in attempts to
steer MyData-related improvements constructively.
Overall, our engagement with data activism has two
aims: to influence data activism by means of our
socio-critical imaginary, and to produce scholarly
insights providing resources for re-articulating the
aims and futures of such activism. Together, these
lead to an attempt to synthesize data future visions in
a manner that takes the criticism of datafication in the
direction that Latour (2004: 247–248) advocates:
the critic should not be ‘the one who debunks, but
the one who assembles’.
Our empirical material stems from our long-term
participation, but also referenced documents, formal
and informal interviews, discussions at project meet-
ings, and countless everyday interactions. Alongside
the research project’s activities, we have taken on
participant-observer roles in a 450-member Facebook
discussion group1 consisting of civil servants, activists,
technology developers and start-up entrepreneurs. The
first author has also participated in the Finnish
MyData industry alliance, where a national MyData
model is being developed through pilot projects.
Further, we have done fieldwork in our roles as organ-
izers, presenters and observers at three annual inter-
national MyData conferences in Helsinki since 2016.
These collaborations have placed us in the unique pos-
ition of becoming part of assembling MyData into
a socially more robust form of data activism. In the
following, we first detail the technological imaginary
of MyData activism, the activists’ common understand-
ing of relevant issues, and legitimate technological solu-
tions, before moving into more socio-critical
understandings of the initiative.
‘Human-centric’ personal data activism
The high-level MyData vision – described in a white
paper2 written primarily by researchers at the Helsinki
Institute for Information Technology and the Tampere
University of Technology (Poikola et al., 2015) – outlines
a transformation of the ‘organization-centric system’ into
a ‘human-centric system’ that treats personal data as a
resource that the individual can access and control, bene-
fit and learn from. Overall, the MyData vision and
related documents suggest that, in the current situation,
the collection and analysis of data are too heavily dic-
tated by organizations. As a result, data may be diverted
to unforeseen purposes, be combined and analysed in
ways that cause people harm or, in another form of
loss stressed by MyData developers, may not be used
when beneficial to individuals due to the interpretation
monopolies of the data-collecting organizations.
The concept of MyData originated with an Open
Knowledge Finland working group, where it was devel-
oped collaboratively. Open data activists argue that
data produced by public authorities should be technic-
ally and legally free to use, distribute and reuse
(Kitchin, 2014b). According to the MyData initiative,
the right to decide on the uses of personal data collected
by organizations – such as data on economic transac-
tions, location, smart home appliances, occupational
health check-ups or social media – should reside with
the data subjects themselves, instead of being monopo-
lized by the organizations. The MyData vision, then,
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represents a transformation of the Open Data idea: both
aim to release data from a proprietary, monopolistic
regime for new uses, but in the case of MyData, both
the scope of data, and the scope of benefits derived from
data, are scaled down from the collective to the individ-
ual level. Jointly formulated MyData principles range
from getting access to personal data held by organiza-
tions in a machine-readable format – recently also sup-
ported by the data portability rights provided in Article
12 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation – to
using the data freely, sharing them with third parties, or
deleting them. Personal data become MyData if they
adhere to the spelled-out principles.
Despite the heated debate on ‘who owns personal
data’, in the legal sense a logical answer to the question
is ‘no one’ (Determann, 2018). In order to avoid the
legal debate on data ownership and property rights,
MyData activists consciously employ the concepts of
data management and control, focusing on individuals’
practical capacity to make use of their data. Figure 1
illustrates how MyData developers perceive their
vision. They portray the individual as the ‘operation
centre’, placed in the middle of the digital service eco-
system uniting data sources and data endpoints; flows
of data pass (either permission-wise or in actual trans-
fers) through the central point.
By aiming to make individuals ‘empowered actors,
not passive targets, in the management of their lives
both online and offline’ (Poikola et al., 2015: 2),
MyData attempts to push the market, or the public
sector, to design new services and operation models
that allow citizens and consumers to gain personal
value from their data. With the datasets thus created,
MyData proponents argue, it is possible to create sys-
tems based on real-time feedback, allowing people and
organizations to learn about themselves, or readjust
their operations. The white paper offers examples of
how individuals could utilize personal data for their
own purposes, either directly or through sharing.
Similar to many other data-driven initiatives, then,
MyData promotes new forms of data gathering, sharing
and analysis in order to enhance or challenge current
practices. Services of this type already exist: for instance,
self-tracking devices generate data that people can
access. Typically, however, they are problematic as
they also utilize personal data for purposes of which
their users might not be aware, or knowingly endorse
(Crawford el al., 2015; Ruckenstein and Schu¨ll, 2017).
To advance towards its vision, MyData does not
affix itself to a particular technological implementation,
allowing considerable interpretive flexibility and
thereby supporting incommensurable social imagin-
aries. Indeed, interactions around MyData are charac-
terized by a shared understanding of much-needed
technological intervention and, simultaneously, of the
complex nature of the issues related to it. MyData is
first and foremost an infrastructure-level intervention,
focusing on the underlying technological systems
needed to realize a ‘human-centric’ personal data eco-
system. Yet, the way it is discussed and promoted has
attracted attention in other quarters,3 from service-
developers and tool-makers to policy advocates.
Participants are interested in the kinds of information
architecture, data exchange standards and
Figure 1. The MyData vision (Poikola et al., 2015).
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organizational models needed to support MyData prin-
ciples, but also the conceptual tools, research and
policy required. This tends to attract individuals, com-
panies, or other organizations interested in redefining
and readjusting the current data economy by develop-
ing approaches giving users more control over their
data, including startup companies like Meeco or Cozy
Cloud (see Lehtiniemi, 2017), decentralized digital iden-
tity technologies such as Sovrin, Kantara Initiative’s
User-Managed Access protocol, or ‘Vendor
Relationship Management’ systems (see Belli et al.,
2017). The approach has some influential supporters in
the public sector, as policy makers in Finland4 and in the
European Commission5 have recognized the potential of
the ‘human-centric’ data management vision. In the next
section, we explicate analysis of the technological
imaginary underlying MyData, and then discuss the ini-
tiative in light of the socio-critical imaginary.
Reversing the reverse adaptation
By advancing individual empowerment through the
control of data collection and data sharing, the
MyData vision relies on the ethical principle of
‘human self-determination’, treating the individual as
an autonomous subject with inalienable rights and lib-
erties. The concept of human autonomy, deeply rooted
in modern philosophical thinking and embedded in this
ethical principle, provided us with one of the first entry
points to the ideological underpinnings of the MyData
approach (Janasik-Honkela and Ruckenstein, 2016). In
essence, MyData can be treated as a practical version of
an established philosophical tradition, providing a tool
to assess and observe the exploitation of data subjects
by a ‘system’ or ‘organizations’. As Taylor (1989) sug-
gests, our perceptions of autonomy and dependency are
defined by the notion of free will, according to which an
independent agent autonomously sets goals for action.
A dependent agent, on the other hand, is someone
whose actions are influenced by an external force
detached from the individual.
A classic text that resonates with the notion of lost
autonomy inhering in the MyData initiative is the treat-
ment of autonomous technology by Winner (1978).
Winner perceives the human–technology relationship
in terms of Kantian autonomy: via analysis of interrela-
tions of independence and dependence. The core ideas
of the MyData vision have particular resonance with
Winner’s formulation of ‘reverse adaptation’, wherein
the human adapts to the power of the system and not
vice versa. Winner presents five methods of action that
contribute to reverse adaptation:
. Firstly, the autonomous system, consisting of ‘socio-
technical aggregates with human beings fully
present, acting and thinking’ (Winner, 1978: 242),
can take over markets relevant for its operations.
According to Winner, markets rarely control the
operations of technological systems.
. The second feature of reverse adaptation is that the
system strongly influences the political processes that
ostensibly regulate its outputs and the prerequisites
for its operation. The regulation of markets is so
general and non-specific that in reality it is
ineffectual.
. The third possible manifestation of reverse adapta-
tion entails the system’s finding a ‘mission’ that fits
its technological capabilities. For instance, innov-
ation politics is employed to recognize new object-
ives or areas of operation to support the market.
. Fourthly, the system might propagate and/or
manipulate the needs it serves. As Winner puts it,
why wait for public opinion to be shaped when
there are numerous ways to influence the formation
of social needs?
. Finally, the system might ‘run into’ a crisis to justify
the need for its growth or change; typically, this
might be a recognized threat or an alleged deficiency.
Read through a Winnerian lens, MyData is con-
cerned with a gradual loss of control over technological
arrangements. Individuals do not have the power to
control the system through markets, and the regulatory
controls provided, for instance, by data protection and
antitrust are insufficient. How MyData frames the
problem thus aligns with Winner’s classic text, even if
the technology developers may not be familiar with the
author. The literature that builds the imaginary of tech-
nology developers in a more overt manner is typically
polemical rather than academic, with close ties to tech-
nology circles. For example, Jaron Lanier, a Silicon
Valley entrepreneur and pioneer, asks in Who Owns
the Future? (2013) how to remain human in a society
wherein machines appear to be independent agents
functioning separately from us:
Popular digital designs do not treat people as being
‘special enough’. People are treated as small elements
in a bigger information machine, when in fact people
are the only sources or destinations of information, or
indeed of any meaning to the machine at all. (2013: 4,
original emphasis)
Lanier associates the current data economywith exploit-
ation and loss of human dignity, as data-gathering enti-
ties he calls ‘siren servers’ control us. He offers
monetization of personal data as a solution: ‘In a
world of digital dignity, each individual will be the com-
mercial owner of any data that can be measured from
that person’s state or behavior’ (2013: 16). In other
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words, Lanier promotes commercial symmetry between
users and siren servers (p.236) to compensate for the
loss of ‘digital dignity’. According to this logic,
when commercial agents profit from digital traces,
a portion should be distributed to the data subjects
as ‘instant remunerations’ in return for data use. A
later iteration of the idea refers to ‘data labor unions’
(Arrieta Ibarra et al., 2018) through which users collect-
ively bargain with the data giants.
Like Lanier, the MyData white paper suggests mon-
etization of data as one of the model’s potential benefits
(Poikola et al., 2015: 3–4), and we have witnessed
discussion of numerous business ideas based on that
principle. In this imaginary, more efficient and better-
targeted distribution of data generates personal and
social advantages by way of economic transactions.
Supporting the expansion of the personal data market
links MyData principles to value-generating models.
Thus MyData is not seen as settling into the existing
technology market, but as giving rise to new business
models, with economically more balanced use of per-
sonal data as their driving force.
When Winner’s ‘autonomous system’, Lanier’s
‘information machine’, or MyData’s ‘organization’
treats humans as mere means to an end, humans are
instrumentalized as sources of information instead of
being treated as ends in themselves, and what ultim-
ately comes under threat is human dignity. Where
Lanier suggests remuneration for personal data as a
practical solution for tackling Winnerian reverse adap-
tation, the promoters of MyData aim at protecting
human dignity through advocating MyData principles.
Both approaches suggest that people need digital dig-
nity to be capable of self-determination, and argue that
dignity can be protected with correctly positioned
technology.
Socio-critical engagement with
individual control
From the socio-critical stance, the articulation of citi-
zen and consumer agency in terms of individual-centric
data infrastructure is deeply problematic, raising the
question of whether MyData actually leads, as its advo-
cates hope, away from reverse adaptation into a more
human-centric direction. Or does it, through expanding
datafication, encouraging further reliance on data
utilization, and opening data to monetization and com-
petition, actually end up strengthening the system?
Socio-critical engagement with MyData forces us to
ask whether it is simply another iteration of Winner’s
reverse adaptation. While MyData proposes new data
practices based on individual control, it remains
ambiguous in how it treats information and knowledge
flows. Perceived too simplistically, MyData’s corrective
measures could become a force co-opting rather than
countering control of individuals, as with privacy and
its protection (Coll, 2014).
Even if MyData activists promote monetization of
personal data as only one of many possible technical
solutions, the proposition is symptomatic of a belief
that individuals can control the market. Promoting
the personal data market assumes that people are com-
petent to make informed choices concerning their data
(Lehtiniemi and Kortesniemi, 2017), and that economic
rights to data are straightforward determinants of
market agency. The notion of a personal data market
appeals to the technologically oriented data activists
due to the rationale that, since data brokers can suc-
cessfully monetize personal data for their economic
benefit, an intermediary technology could also open
the data market to individuals (Belli et al., 2017;
Lehtiniemi, 2017). Here, an obvious risk of reverse
adaptation lies in the belief that markets ostensibly har-
nessed to serve individuals would control the system. In
other words, a critical imaginary orients us to treat the
expanding commodification of personal data as a pre-
carious effort to protect human dignity, but failing to
take unpredictable consequences into account.
Monetization could potentially lead to further inequal-
ities and discrimination; for instance, privacy might
become a prerogative to which only the wealthy can
aspire, while the less financially endowed must either
trade their personal data, or become data contributors
in exchange for basic services such as internet access,
housing or electricity. The dividing line could also run
along other societal divisions such as technical capabil-
ity or financial literacy. If new intermediaries start bro-
kering data on behalf of individuals, unprecedented
forms of commodifying everyday life might appear:
for instance, diseases might become a source of
income through data sale. We might face a new class
of people responding to the demand by generating data
traces and practices that have a market. Moreover,
individually optimal data transactions can be socially
or societally harmful. The socio-critical imaginary
emphasizes contextual aspects of privacy that go
beyond the individual: if we consider privacy as a com-
mons (Regan, 2002), individual decisions can erode
that commons and harm everyone collectively.
In the MyData 2016 conference,6 presenters under-
lined the individual-centricity of the initiative with
inventive terms: ‘the Internet of me’, ‘the person as
the platform’, ‘the API of me’, ‘the mecosystem’, or
the ‘self wide web’. They shared the foundational idea
that individuals are interested in controlling personal
data. In this respect, the Quantified Self (QS), which
took form in 2008, offers an instructive parallel devel-
opment. The motors of QS are self-trackers, crafting
their personal data stories. Individuals are at the
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centre of the movement, yet it is not entirely individual-
centric. Personal data charts and visualizations trigger
collective narration and critical reflection, offering a
common language to which people can relate (Nafus
and Sherman, 2014). QS has offered support for
enquiry into questions of self-knowledge in relation to
data practices and the emerging politics of data.
As Nafus and Sherman (p. 1877) argue, ‘QS is one of
the few places where the question of why data matters is
asked in ways that go beyond advertising or controlling
the behaviors of others.’ Due to its infrastructural
rather than human-level aims, MyData lacks this kind
of collective data work.
We were particularly ready to see MyData in light of
critical technology studies, critique of the data econ-
omy, and calls for agency (Kennedy et al., 2015), but,
in general, our experience with MyData was that while
activists are enthusiastic about new perspectives, to be
effective they should involve possibilities for technology
development or clearly enunciated policy guidance.
Where we tended to see a community that would
benefit from a more nuanced understanding of its ideo-
logical underpinnings, potentially leading to reconsid-
eration of the ways concrete technology projects are
envisioned, community members rather considered
themselves as practical enablers of technology develop-
ment. The divide between the social imaginaries
concretizes at the point where developers value rapid
action and iterations, and social scientists want to take
a step back and lean on their concepts and literary
sources, resorting to discursive rather than technical
intervention in material practices.
Still, there is no doubt that well-executed MyData
principles could aid in promoting collective engagement
and public culture: for instance, MyData-based
approaches encourage the rethinking of governance in
companies, as well as advancing new forms of activism.
By means of data activism, personal health can be rede-
fined as a collective and political matter; people suffering
from serious illnesses can contribute their health data to
enhance medical research, or, alternatively, share infor-
mation about themselves online for everyone to see. The
Italian artist Salvatore Iaconesi set up a website featur-
ing medical data related to his brain tumour, alongside a
request for ‘cures’. By opening a public space within
which to experience his illness, he resisted being reduced
to the category of a cancer patient constituted by a set of
medical data (Delfanti and Iaconesi, 2016). Such exam-
ples demonstrate the possibility of re-appropriating per-
sonal data and harnessing technological and
communicative powers for constructing collective
spaces that can call into question existing social and pol-
itical imbalances. With these observations and experi-
ences, we began to synthesize a more productive
relationship between the two social imaginaries.
Beyond data solutionism
After the publication of the MyData white paper in
2015, the Finnish MyData promoters were contacted
by developers, activists and policy-makers in Europe
and beyond. Supported by the appeal of the concept,
the first MyData conference was held in Helsinki in
August 2016. The event brought together 700 partici-
pants, differing in interests and objectives, and in the
terms and concepts they employed to talk about
MyData and similar initiatives. Presentations from
various parts of the world and different sectors of soci-
ety showcased services and tools that either explicitly
follow MyData principles or, without committing to
any form of data activism, shared its political aims.
According to a key promoter, the conference was an
occasion where the ‘MyData community started to
become self-aware’ (MyData.org, 2017: 16). In a sum-
mary speech for the conference, Valerie Peugeot (2016)
from Orange Labs pushed the audience to widen their
imaginary by introducing MyData as a social move-
ment and expanding the activist stance beyond techno-
logical and regulatory issues. In light of the imaginaries
we have outlined, Peugeot’s summary indicated that,
when viewed through the technological imaginary,
MyData is an ambitious political project advancing
human-centricity, but in terms of the socio-critical
imaginary it is not ideological enough to reach its
aims of digital dignity, empowerment and citizen-
centricity. Building on this idea, in order to become
sufficiently ideological, MyData should more explicitly
outline intended aims for technology development,
including desired and undesired objectives of data
usage. The infrastructure-level vision should be
combined with actual knowledge practices and clearly
enunciated outcomes. At the least, it should propose
how to move beyond defining personal data within an
individual property paradigm, and take into account
the relations and politics that uses of personal data
bring into being. As argued above, with its ambiguous
stance towards information and knowledge production,
as long as it conforms to individual data control,
MyData can merely introduce new forms of exploit-
ation. In order to avoid this, more clearly stated soci-
etal aims are needed.
In August 2017, the authors teamed up with Peugeot
and co-hosted a track called ‘Our Data’ at the MyData
conference to promote the reimagining of knowledge
practices alongside infrastructural data arrangements.
By talking, somewhat provocatively, about ‘our’
instead of ‘my’ data, we promoted collective engage-
ment through data activism with the intent of
combining technology-oriented MyData activism with
a socio-critical stance on the individual-centricity of the
initiative. We argued that developing data technologies
for the individual and leaving it up to the market to
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correct the economic imbalances will hardly work alone
(Lehtiniemi, 2017). Technologically savvy data activists
are urgently needed for clarifying and mediating the
work that data practices and infrastructures require.
Therefore, in order for the socio-critical imaginaries
to be realized, technological designs and repositionings
of the data infrastructure are required to strengthen
forms of activism not centred on the individual or on
data, but on people collectively as the sources and dis-
tributors of data. The presentations and subsequent
conversations focusing on ‘Our Data’ in the MyData
conference and beyond suggest several possibilities for
combining the technological and socio-critical imagin-
aries, thereby bringing back together the imaginaries
that we initially separated for analytical purposes.
However, rather than merely traveling a full circle
back to Jasanoff’s notion of socio-technical imaginary,
the analytic separation and ensuing merging of the
social imaginaries has allowed us to open practical
and analytical space for the exploration of the socio-
technical future currently in the making. From that
space we can influence data activism practice and see
more clearly what is timely in terms of data activism
research and data ethics.
The following outcomes of combining technological
and socio-critical imaginaries operate on different scales
and registers, and are provided here as examples of
future data activist work. Together they indicate grow-
ing interest among the MyData participants in working
towards consciously building a socio-technical future
and thinking beyond data solutionism. First, services
abiding by MyData principles could exercise notions
of desired and undesired data use by means of collective
data governance. The concept of governance is already
built into the MyData vision; the developers are cogni-
zant that a functioning digital service environment
requires that interoperability is assured by rules that
govern both technical and operational aspects of data
flows. These rules could be coupled with explicit govern-
ance of data usage and exploitation, aligning MyData
principles with collectively agreed notions of acceptable
data use. At one end, personal data that is acknowledged
as a constitutive part of personal identity (Floridi, 2017:
95–96) could be considered strictly off limits in terms of
trading or processing. At the other end, it could be
agreed that some data may be safely shared with
almost anyone. In practice, activist work is needed to
explore how to reach decisions collectively about these
extremes and the space in between.
A second combination takes advantage of infra-
structural technologies’ relying on MyData principles
in producing data commons, which can be formed
of proprietary personal data, but can also bring
together other kinds of open data sources benefiting
collective aims. In this way, MyData can aid specific
collectives in reclaiming personal data to benefit the
community at large instead of the individual, adding
a societally oriented layer to technological infrastruc-
ture. Various projects working towards the creation
of data commons already exist: for instance, for plat-
form cooperatives (Carballa Smichowski, 2016), in
the context of the smart city (Morozov and Bria,
2018), in the health research realm (Evans, 2017),
and through data sharing platforms such as Open
Humans (Ball, 2018).
Third, the tradition of cooperative-based governance
can function as a basis for shared data ownership and
citizen-led initiatives by promoting digital rights. In
Europe, Nordic countries in particular, sharing the
goal of advancing a more responsive and responsible
digital society can provide a rich cultural breeding
ground for MyData principles (Janasik-Honkela and
Ruckenstein, 2016), preventing society being subordi-
nated to proprietary and monopolistic data infrastruc-
tures. Cooperative ownership models are undergoing
experimentation in initiatives such as Healthbank and
MIDATA.coop. Overall, MyData technology devel-
opers could collaborate with social movements aiming
to solve societal problems in order to demonstrate, in
practice, how data can shape knowledge practices and
generate advocacy and public benefits (Milan and
Gutierrez, 2018).
Finally, refusals to share personal data can also
become political acts and corrective measures. Despite
our focus on proactive (Milan and van der Velden,
2016) data activism that sees the beneficial potential
of datafication, there is a need for continued question-
ing of the naturalization of relentless data gathering
and storing, and to insist that less data are gathered
for unknown future uses. The very collection of data,
and not only subsequent uses of it, may have negative
implications. In line with our reasoning, reactive data
activism – for instance, refusing certain forms of shar-
ing personal data with corporations or the state (Moore
and Robinson, 2016) – can also be technologically
mediated, engaged in collectively, and leveraged for
the collective good.
Conclusion
An important consideration for data activism is how to
ensure a robust enough conceptual grounding for
advancing the public good, as concepts such as political
participation, privacy, autonomy, or health are taken
up, enacted, and altered through interactions with data
processing technologies, and become enmeshed with
engineering and design. This calls for rigorous analyses
of the production of data infrastructures, how they are
imagined, and of what kinds of ideological and every-
day data relations they consist. In this article, we have
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contributed to this debate by separating two social ima-
ginaries at stake in terms of data activism – the techno-
logical and the socio-critical – and highlighting their
discrepancies. Then we brought the two together in
order to open practical and analytical space for enga-
ging with socio-technical futures and promoting dia-
logue across professional and scholarly fields.
In becoming a part of the data activist scene that we
are studying, we are participants in a widening schol-
arly trend. In order to understand the aims and tensions
of data activism in an empirically grounded manner,
researchers have begun to explore applied perspectives,
often by collaborating with data activists and data-
driven initiatives outside their academic spheres.
Applied research perspectives can deepen understand-
ings of datafication by revealing how data technologies
are taken up, valued, and repurposed in ways that
either do not comply with imposed data regimes, or
that mobilize data in alternative or inventive ways.
For instance, health-related initiatives have strong ties
with the academic community in addressing the tension
between data openness and data ownership and asym-
metries in terms of data usage and distribution (Kish
and Topol, 2015; Nafus, 2016), and the inadequacy of
informed consent and existing privacy protections
(Sharon, 2016a). A shared aim is also the re-articula-
tion of ethically motivated concepts, such as sharing,
solidarity, commons and the public good (Prainsack
and Buyx, 2017; Sharon, 2016b).
All along we have argued that the rapidly changing
technology landscape calls for taking Latour’s (2004)
view on critique seriously: we need to keep asking what
productive ‘critical engagement’ means in the context of
data activism and developing data infrastructures.
Based on our experience with MyData, it seems that
in order to succeed in cross-professional dialogue,
social scientists need to exercise disciplinary self-aware-
ness; they need to understand how their socio-critical
imaginary differs from the imaginary of technology
developers and be ready to depart from the most obvi-
ous forms of critique associated with the exploitative
forces of datafication. By offering critique that is pieced
together in a constructive manner, data activism
research can focus on collectively sustainable socio-
technical data futures. As we have demonstrated, by
uncovering the aims and contestations around data
activism, socio-critical imaginaries can aid in promot-
ing progressive ‘public good agendas’, offering support
for navigating policy-crafting, technology companies’
proprietary software, and data platforms that have
become participants in deciding what counts in people’s
lives. Linking knowledge production to data activism
practice, we can strengthen the understanding of how
data technologies become part of everyday practices
with societally comprehensive goals.
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Notes
1. Critique of the data economy is indeed discussed on
Facebook, even though some activists refuse to use the
platform.
2. The ‘white paper’ is a summary of a more comprehensive
Finnish-language study commissioned by the Ministry of
Transport and Communication (Poikola et al., 2014).
3. See http://www.mydata.org (accessed 13 December 2018).
4. In 2015, the Finnish government programme included the
following aim: ‘People’s right to decide about and monitor
their personal information will be enhanced, while ensur-
ing the smooth transfer of data between the authorities’
(see Prime Minister’s Office, 2015: 27).
5. The European Commission organized a roundtable for
personal information management service developers:
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/emer-
ging-offer-personal-information-management-services-
current-state-service-offers-and (accessed 13 December
2018).
6. http://www.mydata2016.org (accessed 13 December 2018).
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